Case Digest: Rafael M. Crisol, Jr. v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 235764, September 14, 2021 Supreme Court, En Banc Ponente: Justice Ricardo R. Rosario

 

FACTS

Rafael M. Crisol, Jr., Chief of the Cash Division of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), challenged the Commission on Audit (COA) Decision and Resolution holding him civilly liable under Notice of Charge (NC) No. 2011-001-101(10) for the unremitted collections amounting to ₱425,555.53 incurred by Arnel Tabije, a Special Collection Officer (SCO) assigned to the Collection Division of the BOC. Tabije failed to remit government collections and subsequently stopped reporting for work. Upon conducting an initial audit, Crisol discovered the shortage, reported the discrepancy to the District Collector, required Tabije to explain and settle the deficiency, and later referred the matter to the COA for audit.

Following the audit, the COA issued a Notice of Charge against Tabije, the District Collector, and Crisol. On appeal, the COA National Government Sector (NGS) Cluster A excluded both the District Collector and Crisol from liability, finding that they merely occupied supervisory positions and had not participated in the loss of government funds. However, upon automatic review, the COA Commission Proper reversed the exclusion of Crisol, ruling that as Chief of the Cash Division, he failed to exercise the diligence expected of his office in supervising the collection officer. The COA also directed that the matter be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate investigation.

Crisol filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the COA gravely abused its discretion in holding him personally liable despite the absence of evidence showing bad faith, malice, gross negligence, or participation in Tabije's failure to remit collections. During the pendency of the case, Tabije fully paid the amount of ₱425,555.53, thereby extinguishing the government's monetary claim. Nevertheless, Crisol maintained that the issue of his personal liability remained justiciable because the COA's finding adversely affected his legal rights and official record.

ISSUE

Whether or not the payment by Arnel Tabije of the unremitted collections rendered the petition moot and academic.

Whether or not the Commission on Audit gravely abused its discretion in holding petitioner Rafael M. Crisol, Jr. civilly liable under the Notice of Charge despite the absence of evidence that he acted with bad faith, malice, gross negligence, or participated in the loss of government funds.

Whether or not a superior public officer may be held personally liable for the unlawful acts or omissions of a subordinate solely by reason of his supervisory position under the applicable auditing rules and Sections 38 and 39, Book I of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and REVERSED AND SET ASIDE the COA Decision and Resolution insofar as they held Crisol civilly liable under the Notice of Charge. The Court first ruled that the case was not rendered moot by Tabije's payment of the entire amount. Although the government's monetary claim had already been extinguished under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, the question of whether Crisol was correctly adjudged personally liable remained a live controversy because the COA's finding continued to affect his rights and official accountability. Accordingly, the Court proceeded to resolve the merits of the petition.

The Court held that COA gravely abused its discretion in imposing civil liability upon Crisol. It emphasized that a superior public officer is not automatically liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of a subordinate. To incur personal civil liability, there must be a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. The Court explained that gross negligence means a willful and intentional disregard of duty amounting to conscious indifference to the consequences, and not merely an error of judgment or ordinary negligence. The records failed to show that Crisol participated in, consented to, or tolerated Tabije's failure to remit government collections.

On the contrary, the Court found that Crisol acted diligently and responsibly upon discovering the shortage. He immediately conducted a preliminary audit, reported the discrepancy to the District Collector, required Tabije to account for the missing collections, and referred the matter to the COA for formal investigation. These actions ultimately led to the filing of administrative charges against Tabije and the eventual recovery of the entire amount. Rather than demonstrating negligence, Crisol's conduct showed that he exercised the degree of diligence expected of a supervisory official. The Court further noted that COA Circular No. 2009-006 measures liability according to the officer's actual participation and involvement in the charged transaction, and the evidence did not establish that Crisol had any participation in the unremitted collections.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court exonerated Rafael M. Crisol, Jr. from civil liability under Notice of Charge No. 2011-001-101(10). The Court reiterated that supervisory authority alone does not give rise to personal liability for the misconduct of subordinates. Liability of superior officers requires competent proof of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, none of which was established in this case. The Court thus set aside the COA's contrary findings and upheld the principle that public officers should not be held personally accountable absent a clear legal and factual basis.