CASE DIGEST : Cabrera v. Ng G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014

 

FACTS

Felix Ng filed a complaint for sum of money against the spouses Marylou and Marionilo Cabrera after three checks they issued were dishonored because the accounts had already been closed. The spouses admitted issuing two of the checks but claimed that the corresponding obligations had already been paid through Ng's son. They denied issuing the third check, asserting that it had been forcibly taken from them. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Ng and ordered the spouses to pay more than ₱2.5 million, plus legal interest, moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

The spouses timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) under Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court, which require that written motions be set for hearing and that notice be served on the adverse party at least three days before the scheduled hearing. However, although the motion was filed on time, Ng received a copy only after the original hearing date. Because of changes in the trial court's schedule, the hearing was reset twice, and the motion was eventually heard more than two months later. Before the actual hearing, Ng had already filed a written opposition to the motion. Despite these circumstances, the RTC denied the MR solely for failure to comply with the three-day notice rule, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.

The spouses elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the strict application of the three-day notice requirement disregarded the fact that the respondent had been given ample opportunity to oppose the motion and that the purpose of the rule had already been fulfilled.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC correctly denied the spouses' Motion for Reconsideration solely for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement under Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court, despite the respondent having been given sufficient opportunity to oppose the motion.

Whether strict adherence to procedural rules should prevail over the fundamental requirements of procedural due process and the constitutional right of a party to be heard when the adverse party actually suffered no prejudice.

HELD

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed both the Court of Appeals and the RTC. It held that although the three-day notice requirement under Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 is generally mandatory because it forms part of procedural due process, the rule is not absolute. Its primary purpose is to ensure that the adverse party is given adequate time to study and oppose the motion. When that purpose has been achieved, rigid application of the rule is unwarranted.

The Court emphasized that Ng actually received the motion, was given more than two months before the hearing, and successfully filed a written opposition. Since he was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, there was no denial of due process or prejudice on his part. Consequently, the RTC erred in treating the motion as a mere scrap of paper. The Supreme Court reiterated that procedural rules are instruments to promote, not defeat, substantial justice, and should not be applied so rigidly as to frustrate the fair resolution of cases. The case was therefore remanded to the RTC for resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration on its merits. 

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippine Islands v. Ambrosio Linsañgan G.R. No. 43290 • December 21, 1935

 

FACTS

Ambrosio Linsañgan was charged and convicted for nonpayment of the cedula (poll) tax under Section 1439, in relation to Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 1439 identified the persons liable to pay the cedula tax, while Section 2718 penalized any person who remained delinquent in paying the tax for fifteen days after June 1 and, upon demand by the provincial treasurer, still refused to pay. The law classified such nonpayment as a misdemeanor punishable by five days' imprisonment for each unpaid cedula. The trial court convicted Linsañgan and sentenced him accordingly.

Linsañgan appealed, arguing that the statutory provisions authorizing imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll tax were unconstitutional. While his appeal was pending, the 1935 Constitution took effect. Article III, Section 1(12) expressly provides that "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." This constitutional guarantee directly conflicted with Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code, which still authorized imprisonment as a penalty for failure to pay the cedula tax.

The Court likewise examined the Constitution's transitory provision under Article XV, Section 2, which states that existing laws shall remain operative after the inauguration of the Commonwealth only insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, until amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Thus, the Court had to determine whether Section 2718 remained enforceable after the Constitution became effective and whether Linsañgan's conviction could still stand despite the constitutional prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code, which imposed imprisonment for failure to pay the cedula or poll tax, remained valid after the effectivity of Article III, Section 1(12) of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly prohibits imprisonment for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.

Whether the constitutional prohibition applied to Linsañgan's case, considering that his conviction was rendered before the Constitution took effect but his appeal was still pending, and whether Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution rendered Section 2718 inoperative because of its inconsistency with the Constitution.

HELD

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. It held that Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government because it was inconsistent with Article III, Section 1(12) of the 1935 Constitution, which categorically prohibits imprisonment for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax. Under the Constitution, any prior law inconsistent with its provisions cannot continue to have legal effect. Consequently, no valid criminal conviction could rest on a statute that had already become unconstitutional.

The Court further explained that Article XV, Section 2 expressly provides that existing laws remain operative only if they are consistent with the Constitution. Since Section 2718 authorized precisely what the Constitution prohibited, it automatically ceased to operate upon the establishment of the Commonwealth. Because Linsañgan's appeal was still pending and the judgment had not yet attained finality, the constitutional protection applied to his case.

The Court emphasized the supremacy of the Constitution over all statutes, declaring that whenever a legislative enactment conflicts with a constitutional provision, the Constitution prevails. The decision established the doctrine that constitutional rights take immediate precedence over inconsistent prior laws, and that no person may be imprisoned solely for failing to pay a poll or cedula tax, regardless of any earlier statutory provision authorizing such punishment. 

CASE DIGEST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Express International, Inc. (Philippine Branch) G.R. No. 152609 June 29, 2005

 

FACTS

American Express International, Inc. (Philippine Branch) is a Philippine branch of a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, USA. It served as the Philippine servicing unit of the Hong Kong branch of American Express by facilitating the collection of receivables from Philippine cardholders and processing payments to accredited establishments in the Philippines. For taxable year 1997, it filed its VAT returns and later amended them, declaring substantial zero-rated sales and excess input VAT. It subsequently filed an administrative claim for the refund of its excess input VAT under Sections 110(B), 112, and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) failed to act on the claim, American Express filed a petition before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking a refund.

The CTA granted the refund, finding that the services rendered by American Express qualified as zero-rated services under Section 102(b)(2) of the NIRC of 1986 (now Section 108(B)(2) of the NIRC of 1997). The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA, holding that the services were performed in the Philippines for a foreign client and were paid for in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) regulations. The CIR elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the services were not consumed abroad and therefore did not qualify for zero-rating under the destination principle governing VAT. The CIR likewise relied on Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 5-96 and VAT Ruling No. 040-98, which required that the services be consumed outside the Philippines before they could be zero-rated.

The controversy centered on whether respondent's services constituted export services entitled to zero-rated VAT despite being physically performed in the Philippines. It likewise questioned the validity of the CIR's interpretation that added the requirement that the services must be consumed abroad before zero-rating could apply.

ISSUE

Whether the services rendered by American Express Philippines to its foreign principal qualified as zero-rated services under Section 102(b)(2) of the National Internal Revenue Code (now Section 108(B)(2) of the NIRC of 1997) because they were performed in the Philippines for a non-resident foreign corporation and paid for in acceptable foreign currency accounted for under BSP regulations.

Whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through Revenue Regulations No. 5-96 and VAT Ruling No. 040-98, could validly impose the additional requirement that the services must be consumed outside the Philippines before they may be zero-rated, notwithstanding the language of the Tax Code. The case also raised the issue of whether respondent was entitled to a refund of its excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated transactions.

HELD

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the CTA. It ruled that respondent's services were properly subject to zero percent (0%) VAT under Section 102(b)(2) of the NIRC because all the statutory requirements were satisfied: (1) the services were performed in the Philippines; (2) they were rendered to a non-resident foreign corporation doing business outside the Philippines; and (3) payment was made in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for under BSP rules. The Court explained that while the VAT system generally follows the destination principle, the Tax Code itself expressly creates an exception by treating certain export services as zero-rated even if performed in the Philippines. Since the law itself grants the benefit, the courts cannot add qualifications not found in the statute.

The Court further held that Revenue Regulations No. 5-96 and VAT Ruling No. 040-98, insofar as they required that the services be consumed abroad before they could qualify for zero-rating, were ultra vires because administrative regulations cannot amend, expand, or restrict the provisions of the law they seek to implement. Administrative agencies may interpret statutes but cannot impose additional conditions beyond those prescribed by Congress. Consequently, American Express was entitled to the refund of its excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated transactions. The case established the doctrine that administrative regulations inconsistent with the Tax Code are void, and that services satisfying the statutory requirements for zero-rating are entitled to such treatment regardless of where the benefit of the service is ultimately consumed.

CASE DIGEST : Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-46720 G.R. No. 46720 June 28, 1940

 

FACTS

Birdie Lillian Eye, a resident and domiciliary of Los Angeles, California, died on September 16, 1932, leaving a will that was duly probated in California. Among the properties included in her estate was her one-half conjugal share in 70,000 shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, a corporation organized under Philippine laws with its principal office in Manila. The shares remained in the Philippines, and the stock certificates had been endorsed in blank and entrusted to the corporation's secretary. The estate paid the corresponding Federal and California inheritance taxes on the shares.

The Collector of Internal Revenue nevertheless assessed Philippine inheritance tax on the transfer of the shares pursuant to Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, which imposed inheritance tax on shares issued by corporations organized in the Philippines. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company, as trustee of the estate, filed a petition for declaratory judgment, arguing that the shares, being intangible property, had their situs at the decedent's domicile in California under the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam. Thus, the estate contended that only California could impose inheritance tax on the transfer of the shares and that the Philippine assessment amounted to impermissible multiple taxation. The Court of First Instance ruled that the shares were subject to Philippine inheritance tax, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.

The petitioner further argued that the due process clause barred the Philippine Government from taxing the transmission of intangible property owned by a non-resident decedent. It relied on earlier United States decisions recognizing that the situs of intangible property for inheritance tax purposes is generally at the domicile of the owner. The government, however, maintained that the shares represented ownership in a domestic corporation created under Philippine law and that their transfer was sufficiently connected with the Philippines to justify the imposition of inheritance tax.

ISSUE

Whether the Philippine Government may impose inheritance tax under Section 1536 of the Administrative Code on the transmission by death of shares of stock in a domestic corporation owned by a non-resident decedent, notwithstanding that the decedent was domiciled in California and had already paid inheritance taxes there.

Whether the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam, which generally fixes the situs of intangible personal property at the domicile of the owner, precludes the Philippines from taxing the transfer of such shares, and whether the assessment violates the due process clause by subjecting the same property to multiple inheritance taxation.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and held that the shares of stock were subject to Philippine inheritance tax. It ruled that Section 1536 of the Administrative Code expressly subjects to inheritance tax every transmission by death of shares issued by corporations organized or constituted in the Philippines. The Court emphasized that an inheritance tax is not a tax on the property itself but on the privilege of transmitting property upon death. While the rule mobilia sequuntur personam generally fixes the situs of intangible property at the owner's domicile, the Court held that the doctrine is merely a legal fiction adopted for convenience and must yield where the property has acquired a business or taxable situs in another jurisdiction.

The Court explained that the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company was a Philippine corporation, the stock certificates remained physically in the Philippines, and they were endorsed and held by the corporation's secretary, who possessed authority to vote the shares, collect dividends, and otherwise exercise rights over them. These circumstances established a substantial connection between the shares and the Philippines, thereby giving the Philippine Government jurisdiction to tax their transmission. The Court likewise rejected the due process argument, explaining that the issue involved the power of taxation rather than deprivation of property without due process. It observed that multiple taxation is not prohibited where different jurisdictions possess distinct bases for exercising taxing power, such as domicile, citizenship, or situs of the property. Accordingly, the Court sustained the Philippine inheritance tax and reaffirmed that intangible property may acquire a taxable situs outside the owner's domicile when protected by and benefiting from the laws of another jurisdiction.

CASE DIEGST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006

 

FACTS

Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC), a domestic corporation engaged in power generation, is a VAT-registered taxpayer. For the period from April 1 to December 31, 1996, it purchased capital goods and services for the construction and development of its power plant and paid input Value-Added Tax (VAT) amounting to ₱39.33 million. Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1986, as amended by Republic Act No. 7716, and Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, MPC filed an administrative claim with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate for its unutilized input VAT on capital goods. To avoid the expiration of the two-year prescriptive period, it also filed a petition before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

After examining the documentary evidence, including invoices and official receipts, the CTA found that only ₱28,744,626.95 was sufficiently supported and ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to issue a tax credit certificate for that amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA. On appeal before the Supreme Court, however, the CIR changed its theory and argued for the first time that MPC was a public utility subject to franchise tax under Section 117 (now Section 119) of the NIRC, not VAT, and therefore was not entitled to an input VAT refund.

ISSUE

Whether the CIR may raise for the first time on appeal the argument that Mirant Pagbilao Corporation is subject to franchise tax rather than VAT, thereby disqualifying it from claiming a refund of input VAT; and whether MPC is entitled to the refund of its input VAT on capital goods under the Tax Code.

HELD

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of the CTA and the Court of Appeals. It held that a party cannot change its theory of the case on appeal, consistent with Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, because doing so violates the principles of due process and fair play by depriving the opposing party of the opportunity to present evidence on the new issue. The Court ruled that the CIR failed to justify the relaxation of procedural rules, and thus could no longer assert that MPC was allegedly subject to franchise tax instead of VAT. Consequently, the appellate courts correctly refused to consider the new issues raised only on appeal.

The Court further held that Section 106(b) of the NIRC of 1986 (now Section 112(B) of the NIRC) expressly authorizes a VAT-registered taxpayer to claim a refund or tax credit of input VAT paid on capital goods that has not been applied against output VAT. Likewise, Section 104(a) of the NIRC recognizes input VAT on depreciable capital goods as creditable input tax. The Court found that MPC had proven through valid VAT invoices, official receipts, and supporting evidence that the purchases were necessary for its VAT-taxable business. It also emphasized that claims for refund of input VAT on capital goods are distinct from claims attributable to zero-rated sales, and therefore are governed by different requirements under Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. Finding substantial evidence to support the CTA's factual findings, the Court ordered the CIR to issue a tax credit certificate amounting to ₱28,744,626.95 in favor of MPC.

CASE DIGEST : Philippine National Bank – Binalbagan Branch v. Antonio Tad-y, et al. G.R. No. 214588, September 7, 2022 GAERLAN

FACTS

Spouses Jose Tad-y and Patricia Tad-y obtained agricultural sugar crop loans from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in 1975. To secure the loans, they executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over six parcels of land. The REM required the mortgagors to pay all taxes and assessments on the mortgaged properties, with failure to do so constituting an event of default. It also contained a stipulation that, in case of judicial foreclosure, PNB could advance the payment of taxes and insurance premiums, with such advances becoming part of the secured obligation.

In 1988, two of the mortgaged properties became delinquent in the payment of real property taxes. Instead of advancing the tax payments as allegedly contemplated under the mortgage and Republic Act No. 7202 (Sugar Restitution Law), PNB participated as the lone bidder in the tax delinquency auction and acquired the properties. After the spouses restructured and fully paid their loans pursuant to R.A. No. 7202, they demanded the reconveyance of all mortgaged properties. PNB reconveyed the other parcels but refused to return the two lots it had acquired through the tax sale.

The heirs of the spouses filed a complaint for breach of contract and reconveyance of property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), arguing that PNB violated the REM and its fiduciary obligations by purchasing the mortgaged properties for itself instead of protecting the mortgagors' interests. The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. PNB elevated the case to the Supreme Court, insisting that the action had prescribed and that it had lawfully acquired ownership through the tax delinquency sale.

The Supreme Court examined the parties' contractual obligations under the REM, the powers granted to PNB under its charter, the legal consequences of the tax delinquency sale, and whether PNB could validly acquire ownership of the mortgaged properties despite its fiduciary relationship with the mortgagors.

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ISSUE

Whether PNB validly acquired ownership of the two mortgaged properties by purchasing them at the tax delinquency auction despite its fiduciary relationship with the mortgagors and the provisions of the Real Estate Mortgage.

Whether the heirs' action for breach of contract and reconveyance was already barred by prescription or laches under Article 1144 of the Civil Code and the applicable statutes of limitation.

Whether PNB breached the Real Estate Mortgage and the fiduciary duties arising from its relationship with the mortgagors by acquiring the properties for itself instead of merely protecting its security interest.

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HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and affirmed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. It held that PNB could not legally acquire ownership of the mortgaged properties because its relationship with the spouses was fiduciary in nature. By virtue of the REM, PNB had the authority to advance payment of taxes and preserve the mortgaged properties but not to purchase them for its own benefit. Applying the long-settled principle under the Civil Code on agency and fiduciary relations, particularly as explained in Severino v. Severino, an agent or fiduciary cannot acquire interests adverse to those of the principal over property entrusted to it. PNB effectively acted as an agent in protecting the mortgaged properties and was therefore estopped from asserting ownership against the mortgagors.

The Court further ruled that the defense of prescription could not be entertained because PNB raised it only on appeal. Under the Rules of Court, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be seasonably pleaded before the trial court. Moreover, PNB itself relied on varying provisions of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, demonstrating uncertainty as to the applicable prescriptive period. Since the complaint involved both breach of contract and reconveyance, and the validity of the tax sale also affected the proper statute of limitations, the issue required factual determination that could no longer be raised for the first time on appeal. Likewise, laches could not prosper because it likewise required factual proof that PNB failed to establish before the trial court.

Finally, the Court held that PNB violated the obligations imposed by the Real Estate Mortgage and acted contrary to the fiduciary standards governing its relationship with the mortgagors. Instead of preserving the security by advancing the payment of delinquent taxes, PNB chose to acquire the properties through a tax sale for its own benefit. Such conduct was inconsistent with good faith and equity and effectively constituted a breach of contract. Accordingly, the Court ordered PNB to reconvey the disputed properties to the heirs upon reimbursement of the amount it paid during the tax auction, together with the corresponding expenses and interest, thereby restoring the parties to their rightful legal positions

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Tito S. Sarion G.R. Nos. 243029-30, August 22, 2022 GAERLAN

 

FACTS

Tito S. Sarion, then Municipal Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, entered into a contract with Markbilt Construction for the Phase II construction of the Daet Public Market. During the implementation of the project, Markbilt claimed payment for price escalation under the contract. Sarion approved the disbursement voucher and signed the Land Bank check authorizing the payment despite the absence of a specific appropriation and despite the failure to comply with the requirements for price escalation under the Government Procurement Reform Act (Republic Act No. 9184). As a result, criminal charges for Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were filed against him.

The Sandiganbayan found Sarion guilty of both offenses, holding that he was an accountable public officer who, through gross inexcusable negligence, facilitated the unlawful release of government funds. It ruled that the payment of the price escalation lacked both legal appropriation and compliance with the statutory procurement requirements. Sarion elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in appreciating the evidence and that he acted in good faith. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed his conviction.

Sarion then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that he was denied his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation because the Information allegedly referred only to the absence of a Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) and not to the absence of an appropriation or other procurement irregularities. He likewise maintained that he did not act with gross inexcusable negligence and that the payment was supported by the municipal appropriation ordinance. The Supreme Court examined whether these arguments warranted a reversal of its earlier ruling.

The Court also reviewed the legal requirements governing the disbursement of public funds, particularly Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184 on price escalation, Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code) requiring a prior specific appropriation and certification of available funds before any government expenditure may be authorized, as well as the elements of Article 217 of the RPC and Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

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ISSUE

Whether Sarion's conviction for Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be reversed on the ground that he did not commit gross inexcusable negligence and that his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation was violated.

Whether the payment of the contractor's price escalation claim was valid despite the alleged absence of a prior appropriation and the non-compliance with Section 61 of Republic Act No. 9184 and Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 governing the lawful disbursement of public funds.

Whether the issues raised by Sarion involved reviewable questions of law under Rule 45 or merely factual matters already conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan.

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HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed Sarion's conviction. It ruled that the issues he raised remained questions of fact, which are generally beyond the scope of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. None of the recognized exceptions allowing the Court to review factual findings were present. The Court further held that Sarion merely reiterated arguments that had already been fully considered and rejected in its earlier Decision.

The Court sustained the finding that Sarion committed gross inexcusable negligence, an essential element both of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. As Municipal Mayor, he was an accountable officer charged with safeguarding public funds. By approving the payment of the contractor's price escalation despite the absence of a prior specific appropriation, and despite the failure to comply with Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184, which allows price escalation only under limited conditions prescribed by law, Sarion facilitated the unlawful release of public funds. The Court emphasized that Section 86 of P.D. No. 1445 expressly prohibits government expenditures without a prior appropriation and certification of available funds, rendering the price escalation clause unenforceable insofar as it lacked legal funding.

The Supreme Court likewise rejected Sarion's claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation had been violated. It held that the Information sufficiently alleged the essential facts constituting the offenses charged, enabling him to understand the accusations and prepare his defense. The Court explained that the absence of a valid appropriation and the failure to comply with procurement laws were matters necessarily connected with the illegal disbursement of public funds and were adequately litigated during trial. Good faith could not be appreciated because a prudent public official occupying the highest executive position in the municipality should have verified compliance with the procurement law and the Government Auditing Code before approving the payment.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's ruling that Sarion was criminally liable for Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. It reiterated that public officials must strictly observe the safeguards imposed by R.A. No. 9184 and P.D. No. 1445 before authorizing the expenditure of government funds, as failure to exercise the required diligence constitutes gross inexcusable negligence and gives rise to both criminal and anti-graft liability