CASE DIGEST : VITANGCOL VS NEW VISTAS PROPERTIES

[G.R. NO. 176014 : September 17, 2009]

ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners, v. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS : Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1702 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (25311) 2528 of the Calamba, Laguna Registry in the name of Maria A. Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros

On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property described in the SPA as located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with Lot No. 1735 consisting of 242,540 square meters more or less. Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed on August 9, 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square meters situated in Calamba, Laguna.

Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers. he controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered into on August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit. Consequent to the Vitangcol-Maria Alipit sale, TCT No. (25311) 2528 was canceled and TCT No. T-482731 issued in its stead in favor of Vitangcol on August 15, 2001.

Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. By Order of November 25, 2003, the trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint[10] sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein that after the purchase and compliance with its legal obligations relative thereto, New Vista was immediately placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold to Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice

On August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the December 21, 2004 RTC Order

ISSUE : WON THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE TWELFTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER CHALLENGE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW

HELD : The Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It contains three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect that right; and (3) a breach of the defendants duty.[19] It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a right to file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.[20].

Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[22] However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded;[23] allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true;[24] and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.[25]

CASE DIGEST : SINGSON VS ISABELLA SAWMILL

G.R. No. L-27343 February 28, 1979

MANUEL G. SINGSONG, JOSE BELZUNCE, AGUSTIN E. TONSAY, JOSE L. ESPINOS, BACOLOD SOUTHERN LUMBER YARD, and OPPEN, ESTEBAN, INC., plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
ISABELA SAWMILL, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO LEON GARIBAY, TIMOTEO TUBUNGBANUA, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendants, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS : This is an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cage No. 5343, entitled "Manuel G. Singson, et all vs. Isabela Sawmill, et al.,". In a resolution promulgated on February 3, 1967, the Court of Appeals certified the records of this case to the Supreme Court "considering that the resolution of this appeal involves purely questions or question of law over which this Court has no jurisdiction. On June 5. 1959, Manuel G. Singsong, Jose Belzunce, Agustin E. Tonsay, Jose L. Espinos, Bacolod Southern Lumber Yard, and Oppen, Esteban, Inc. filed in the Court of first Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, against "Isabela Sawmill", Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, Leon Garibay, Timoteo Tubungbanua and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a complaint. Said defendants interposed a cross-claim against the defendsants Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua praying "that in the event that judgment be rendered ordering defendant cross claimant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount claimed in the latter's complaint, that the cross claimant whatever amount is paid by the latter to the plaintiff in accordance to the said judgment. ...5. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendants, Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, appealed to the Court of Appeals

ISSUE : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD : The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in so far as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of litigation, is defined in the amended Judiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any case the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. An action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to th category.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the cliam is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiciton is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject ogf the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

On the question of whether a court may nullify a final judgment of another court of co-equal, concurrent and coordinate jusridiction, this Court originally ruled that:

A court has no power to interfere with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and cannot be allowed to interfere with each others' judgments or decrees.

In December 1971, however, this court re-examined and reversed its earlier doctrine on the matter. Our conclusion must therefore be that a court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, suit to annul final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court... n the light of the latest ruling of the Supreme Court, there is no doubt that one branch of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental can take cognizance of an action to nullify a final judgment of the other two branches of the same court

The contention of the appellant that the appleees cannot bring an action to annul the chattel mortgage of the propertiesof the partnership executed by Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua in favor of Margarita G. Saldajeno has no merit.

As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party thereto. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may file an action to annul the contract. This Court has held that a person, who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract, may exercised an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he has no intervention.

CASE DIGEST : UNGRIA VS CA

[G.R. No. 165777 : July 25, 2011] 

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, AND RHODORA R. PELOMIDA AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, AND ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO, RESPONDENTS

FACTS : Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint[3] for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to DismissPetitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss[5] raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which the RTC denied in an Order[9] dated February 4, 2000. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10] asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint. In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.

In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petitionPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE : WON APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES

HELD : we find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.[23] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated

SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee

However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[30] we laid down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1.     It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.     The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.     Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[33] Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.[34] In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.

CASE DIGEST : MACABABBAD VS MASIRAG

[G.R. NO. 161237 : January 14, 2009]

PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr.,^* deceased, substituted by his heirs Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and Mary Grace Macababbad, and SPS. CHUA SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY,Petitioners v. FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY, Respondent 

FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD, AND SANTIAGO MASIRAG, Intervenors - Respondents.

FACTS : On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5] against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6] On May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint to allege new matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter. The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12] (hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00.[13] Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408,[14] presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.[15] Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his Petition for another owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.[17]

On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order[19] dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within the purview of the CAs appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint

ISSUE  :  WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision

HELD : A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[34] A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.[35] No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law.[36] The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a calibration of the evidence. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants notice of appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38] In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and on the basis of the environmental facts.[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had prescribed and that they had slept on their rights.[40] All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents appeal with the CA

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiffs cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the parties pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents complaint.

when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.[51] Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.

CASE DIGEST : CAPIOSO VS CAPIOSO

[G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002.]

LOLITA B. COPIOSO, Petitioner, v. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

FACTS : On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint2 for reconveyance of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar. Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00. The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration was denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of the twin orders of the trial court. The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the appellate court, hence this petition.

ISSUE :

HELD : The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation

Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real property involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC

Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST : FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.

FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court

ISSUE : WON  the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities