CASE DIGEST : MACABABBAD VS MASIRAG

[G.R. NO. 161237 : January 14, 2009]

PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr.,^* deceased, substituted by his heirs Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and Mary Grace Macababbad, and SPS. CHUA SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY,Petitioners v. FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY, Respondent 

FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD, AND SANTIAGO MASIRAG, Intervenors - Respondents.

FACTS : On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5] against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6] On May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint to allege new matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter. The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12] (hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00.[13] Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408,[14] presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.[15] Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his Petition for another owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.[17]

On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order[19] dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within the purview of the CAs appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint

ISSUE  :  WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision

HELD : A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[34] A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.[35] No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law.[36] The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a calibration of the evidence. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants notice of appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38] In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and on the basis of the environmental facts.[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had prescribed and that they had slept on their rights.[40] All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents appeal with the CA

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiffs cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the parties pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents complaint.

when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.[51] Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.