CASE DIGEST : PANGILINAN vs CAYETANO
GR 238875 March 16, 2021
SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM" AQUINO :CV, LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioners,
-versus-
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR S. PANELO, Respondents.
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March 17, 2018. Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations in New York, deposited the Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations' Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the notification from the Philippine govemment. On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon, Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros and Antonio Trillanes IV filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, 20 assailing the executive's unilateral act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, and its members, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn Balais-Serrano, among others, also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 239483. On August 14, 2018, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed its own Petition,24 and an Omnibus Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the Oral Arguments. Oral arguments were conducted on August 28, 2018, September 4, 2018, and October 9, 2018
In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the Philippines validly entered into, the Rome Statute "has the same status as an enactment of Congress,"29 as "a law in the Philippines."30 They claim that the President "cannot repeal a law."
In G.R. No. 239483, pe,titioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its members assert that their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute.33 Citing a decision of the South African High Court, they also claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a multilateral treaty require the Senate's concurrence.
ISSUE : whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual
While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present consolidated Petitions revolve. All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into international agreements. However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by the Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive, and is balanced by the legislative branch. The textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the basic separation of powers and to a system of checks and balances. Presidential discretion is recognized, but it is not _absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists on how the Philippines withdraws from, an international agreement, the president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis treaty abrogation may run counter to the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic operation of treaties,. The mirror principle and the Youngstown framework are suitable :starting points in reviewing the president's acts in the exercise of a power shared with the legislature, However, their concepts-and methods cannot be adopted mechanically and indiscriminately.'. A compelling wisdom underlies them, but operationalizing them domestically requires careful consideration and adjustment in view of circumstances unique to the Philippine context
Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts, and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements
1) The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes
2) the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to congressional imprimatur.
3) the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence
In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal
