CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Marivic Genosa G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 En Banc — Panganiban, J.

 

FACTS

Marivic Genosa and Ben Genosa were legally married on November 19, 1983. They had children, and at the time of the incident Marivic was eight months pregnant. The evidence established that Ben had repeatedly subjected Marivic to physical abuse. On November 15, 1995, after another violent confrontation between the spouses, Marivic admitted that she killed Ben by hitting him at the back of the head with a metal pipe and subsequently shooting him. She then left for Manila.

Marivic was charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as restored by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7659. The Information alleged that she killed her legitimate husband with treachery and evident premeditation. During trial, the defense presented evidence concerning Ben's alleged history of being a drunkard, gambler, womanizer, and wife-beater, as well as expert testimony concerning Marivic's psychological condition and the effects of repeated domestic violence.

The Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City found Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance. It sentenced her to death and ordered her to pay the heirs of Ben ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000 as moral damages. The case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court because of the death penalty.

Before the Supreme Court, Marivic admitted killing her husband but invoked self-defense and defense of her unborn child. She also relied on the battered woman syndrome (BWS), arguing that the repeated physical abuse inflicted by Ben had caused psychological effects that affected her ability to control her actions and her perception of danger. The Court therefore examined whether BWS could support self-defense and whether the circumstances of the killing justified the complete or partial exoneration of Marivic.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Marivic acted in self-defense or in defense of her unborn child. Because she admitted killing Ben, the Court considered whether she had established the elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court particularly considered whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of Ben at the time Marivic killed him.

The second issue was whether the battered woman syndrome could be considered in determining Marivic's criminal liability. The Court considered whether the repeated and severe beatings she had suffered could constitute cumulative provocation and psychological paralysis sufficient to affect her criminal responsibility, even though the requirements for complete self-defense were not present at the precise moment of the killing.

A further issue was whether treachery attended the killing and, consequently, whether it could qualify the offense or serve as an aggravating circumstance. The Court examined whether Marivic deliberately employed a method of attack that ensured the execution of the crime without giving Ben any opportunity to defend himself, as required for treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED Marivic Genosa's conviction for parricide, but REDUCED the penalty. The Court ruled that she was not entitled to complete self-defense because there was no unlawful aggression at the time she killed Ben. However, the Court recognized the effects of the repeated battering she had suffered and appreciated two mitigating circumstances arising from the battered woman syndrome: the psychological paralysis caused by the cumulative battering and passion and obfuscation under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court explained that unlawful aggression is indispensable to self-defense. There must be an actual or imminent attack that threatens the person invoking self-defense. Since Ben was not shown to have been committing an immediate and unexpected attack upon Marivic at the precise time she killed him, the requirement of unlawful aggression was absent. Without unlawful aggression, there could be no complete or incomplete self-defense. Thus, the battered woman syndrome could not, by itself, establish complete self-defense in this case.

Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the repeated beatings inflicted upon Marivic constituted cumulative provocation that had broken down her psychological resistance and self-control. This condition, described as psychological paralysis, diminished her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. The Court considered this circumstance under Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court also appreciated passion and obfuscation, because the acute battering inflicted upon her immediately before the killing, while she was eight months pregnant, overwhelmed her reason and produced an emotional and mental state that impelled her to protect herself and her unborn child.

The Court also rejected the finding of treachery. Treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself and cannot be based merely on inference or conjecture. The Court found no convincing proof that Marivic consciously and deliberately chose the method of attack to ensure the killing without risk to herself. The fact that she used a gun did not by itself establish treachery, particularly because the evidence indicated that the decision to use it arose at approximately the same time as her decision to kill Ben.

Because two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance were appreciated, the penalty for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code was reduced by one degree pursuant to Article 64(5). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since Marivic had already served the minimum period while detained during the pendency of the case, the Court stated that she could be released on parole upon determination of her eligibility.

The Court emphasized that the battered woman syndrome was a novel concept in Philippine jurisprudence at the time. It stated that the syndrome could potentially support a claim of self-defense when the circumstances established the required elements, including the cycle of violence, the final acute battering episode, the accused's actual fear of imminent harm, and the batterer's probable grave harm based on the history of violence. However, not all of these elements were established in Marivic's case. Her conviction for parricide was therefore affirmed, with the penalty reduced because of the mitigating circumstances.

CASE DIGEST : Luisito P. Basilio v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 113433, March 17, 2000 Second Division — Quisumbing, J.

 

FACTS

On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries. Pronebo was the driver of a dump truck owned and registered in the name of Luisito P. Basilio. While driving the truck in Marikina, Pronebo collided with several vehicles. The collision resulted in the death of Danilo Advincula and injuries to other persons, as well as damage to several vehicles.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Pronebo guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two years and four months, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional, as maximum, and was ordered to pay civil indemnity, actual and compensatory damages, damages for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Pronebo subsequently applied for probation, causing the judgment to become final and executory. The trial court also found that, at the time of the accident, Pronebo was employed as the driver of Basilio's dump truck.

Basilio later filed a Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration, asking the trial court to reconsider the judgment insofar as it subjected him to subsidiary civil liability for the civil aspect of Pronebo's criminal case. His motion was denied. The private respondent then sought execution of Basilio's subsidiary liability. The trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution against Basilio. Basilio challenged the orders before the Court of Appeals, claiming, among others, that he had been denied due process because he was not given an opportunity to prove that no employer-employee relationship existed between him and Pronebo.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Basilio's petition. It sustained the trial court's ruling that the criminal judgment had become final and executory and that execution of the subsidiary civil liability could proceed. Basilio then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. He argued that the trial court could not impose subsidiary liability upon him without first giving him an opportunity to be heard regarding his alleged employer-employee relationship with Pronebo.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the judgment of February 4, 1991 had become final and executory when Pronebo applied for probation at the promulgation of the judgment. The Court also considered whether Basilio, who was not an accused or a party in the criminal case, could challenge the judgment insofar as it imposed subsidiary civil liability upon him.

The second issue was whether an employer may be held subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code without being afforded an opportunity to be heard. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether Basilio was denied due process when the trial court ordered execution of the subsidiary civil liability against him.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMED the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992. The Court held that the trial court did not deny Basilio due process when it ordered execution of his subsidiary civil liability.

The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary civil liability is Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that the subsidiary liability established for other persons also applies to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. The Court stated that this liability may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding in which the civil award is made.

However, before execution against the employer may proceed, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for that purpose, of the following: (1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee was adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the employee is insolvent. The Court explained that the alleged employer must be given an opportunity to be heard because he is not a party to the criminal case.

The Court found, however, that Basilio was not deprived of due process. He knew about the criminal case because the truck involved in the accident was his. The insurance company that insured the truck even provided counsel for Pronebo pursuant to the insurance contract. Despite knowing that evidence concerning the employer-employee relationship was being presented, Basilio did not intervene in the criminal proceedings.

The Court further found that Basilio was given another opportunity to be heard during the proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment. He filed an opposition in which he specifically alleged that no employer-employee relationship existed between him and Pronebo and that Pronebo was not performing any function related to his employment when the accident occurred. Basilio's counsel, however, failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for execution, and his later counter-manifestation was filed only after the matter had already been submitted for resolution. The Court therefore concluded that Basilio had been afforded opportunities to present his defenses but failed to timely avail himself of them.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the subsidiary civil liability could be enforced against Basilio, and that the lower courts did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals' Decision was AFFIRMED, with costs against Basilio

CASE DIGETS : Concept Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 108734, May 29, 1996 First Division — Hermosisima, Jr., J.

 

FACTS

Concept Builders, Inc. (Concept Builders) was a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business. The private respondents were its employees, working as laborers, carpenters, and riggers. In November 1981, they were individually given notices terminating their employment effective November 30, 1981, on the ground that their employment contracts had expired and that the project for which they had been hired had already been completed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), however, found that the project had not actually been completed and that Concept Builders had engaged subcontractors whose workers performed the same functions previously performed by the employees. The employees consequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and nonpayment of legal holiday pay, overtime pay, and 13th-month pay.

On December 19, 1984, the Labor Arbiter ordered Concept Builders to reinstate the employees and to pay them back wages equivalent to one year or 300 working days. The NLRC later dismissed Concept Builders' motion for reconsideration, making the decision final and executory. A writ of execution was issued, and a portion of the judgment award was satisfied through garnishment. An alias writ was subsequently issued for the remaining balance of ₱117,414.76, together with the order to reinstate the employees.

When the sheriff attempted to enforce the alias writ, he discovered that Concept Builders was no longer occupying its former premises. The persons inside the premises claimed that they were employees of Hydro Pipes Philippines, Inc. (HPPI). The sheriff also encountered resistance from security guards and was unable to remove the properties he had levied upon. He therefore recommended the issuance of a break-open order. A third-party claim was then filed by Dennis Cuyegkeng, who asserted that the properties were owned by HPPI rather than Concept Builders. The employees opposed the claim and argued that HPPI and Concept Builders were essentially the same corporation.

The NLRC eventually issued a break-open order against Concept Builders and HPPI and dismissed the third-party claim. The NLRC found significant similarities between the two corporations. Their General Information Sheets showed the same president, board of directors, corporate officers, and subscribers, and both corporations had the same office address. The NLRC concluded that Concept Builders had ceased its operations to evade its obligation to pay the employees' back wages and to prevent their reinstatement, while HPPI was being used as a business conduit. Concept Builders challenged the NLRC's action before the Supreme Court, arguing that HPPI had a separate and distinct juridical personality and that the NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the NLRC correctly applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to Concept Builders and HPPI. Concept Builders maintained that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations, and that HPPI's properties could not be used to satisfy Concept Builders' judgment debt merely because the corporations were allegedly related.

The second issue was whether the facts justified disregarding the separate juridical personality of HPPI and treating it as a mere instrumentality or alter ego of Concept Builders. The Court had to determine whether the common ownership, officers, directors, subscribers, corporate address, and manner of conducting business demonstrated the degree of control and misuse of the corporate fiction necessary to pierce the corporate veil.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and sustained the NLRC's action. The Court held that the corporate veil between Concept Builders and HPPI was properly pierced. The separate juridical personality of a corporation is a fundamental principle of corporation law, but it is a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote justice. When that fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the corporate personality may be disregarded.

The Court identified several probative factors of identity that may justify piercing the corporate veil: (1) stock ownership by one corporation or common ownership of both corporations; (2) identity of directors and officers; (3) the manner of keeping corporate books and records; and (4) the methods of conducting the business. The Court also discussed the instrumentality rule, under which the corporate entity may be disregarded when one corporation is so organized and controlled that it is merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another.

The Court stated the three-part test for applying the instrumentality rule: first, there must be control—not merely majority or complete stock control, but complete domination of finances, policy, and business practices concerning the transaction involved, such that the controlled corporation had no separate mind, will, or existence of its own; second, such control must have been used to commit fraud or wrong, perpetuate a violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or perform a dishonest and unjust act in violation of another's legal rights; and third, the control and breach of duty must have been the proximate cause of the injury or unjust loss complained of.

Applying these principles, the Court found that Concept Builders and HPPI had the same president, board of directors, corporate officers, and subscribers, and that they maintained the same business address. The circumstances showed that Concept Builders had ceased its operations in order to evade the payment of the employees' back wages and to prevent their reinstatement, while HPPI emerged as the business conduit through which the corporate obligation could be avoided. The Court therefore held that HPPI could not invoke its separate juridical personality to defeat the employees' lawful claims.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court sustained the piercing of the corporate veil and the NLRC's issuance of the break-open order. The corporate fiction could not be used as a shield to evade Concept Builders' obligations to its illegally dismissed employees. The Court thus upheld the NLRC's action in treating the two corporations as one for purposes of enforcing the judgment award.

CASE DIGEST " People of the Philippines v. Richard Napalit y De Guzman G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010 Second Division — Del Castillo, J.

 

FACTS

On October 26, 2001, an Information was filed charging Richard Napalit y De Guzman, together with two unidentified companions who remained at large, with murder for the killing of Joseph Genete. The Information alleged that on October 16, 2001, in Malabon City, the accused, conspiring with one another and armed with a bladed weapon, attacked and stabbed Genete with intent to kill, hitting him on the nape and back and causing injuries that resulted in his death. Napalit pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented Glen Guanzon, Marivic G. Duavis, and Dr. Bienvenido G. Torres. At around 2:00 a.m. on October 16, 2001, Genete, Guanzon, and three other companions were walking along Langaray Street, Malabon, after a drinking spree. As they passed by Napalit's group, Napalit shouted, “ano, gusto n’yo, away?” and suddenly stabbed Genete with an ice pick at the back. When Guanzon attempted to help Genete, one of Napalit's companions, known as alias Paksiw, also stabbed Guanzon. The group of victims tried to flee, but they were pursued. Genete eventually fell, after which Napalit and his companions fled. Genete was brought to the hospital but died the following day from hypovolemia caused by extensive loss of blood from the stab wound.

Guanzon survived and positively identified Napalit as the person who stabbed Genete. The defense, however, consisted solely of Napalit's testimony. He denied knowing Guanzon or Genete and denied participating in the killing. He claimed that he was asleep in his house in Dagat-Dagatan, Malabon, when the crime occurred. The Regional Trial Court found the prosecution's evidence more credible, particularly Guanzon's eyewitness testimony, which it found straightforward and without any indication that he had been coached or had an improper motive to testify against Napalit.

The RTC found Napalit guilty of murder, holding that the killing was attended by treachery, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reduced the actual damages from ₱52,849.00 to ₱33,693.55, the amount supported by receipts. Napalit appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and, alternatively, that the killing should be considered homicide because treachery had not been established.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Napalit was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing Joseph Genete. The Court examined the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, Glen Guanzon, against Napalit's denial and alibi.

The second issue was whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code attended the killing, thereby qualifying the offense from homicide to murder. Specifically, the Court considered whether Napalit's manner of attacking Genete ensured the execution of the killing without giving the victim a real opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

HELD

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED Napalit's conviction for murder, with modifications as to damages. The Court found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Napalit was the person who fatally stabbed Genete. The eyewitness testimony of Guanzon was supported by the records and was not shown to have been motivated by ill will against Napalit.

The Court held that treachery was present under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that directly and specially ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defensive or retaliatory act that the victim might make. What is decisive is that the manner of attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.

The Court rejected Napalit's argument that treachery was absent because he had shouted “ano gusto n’yo, away?” before stabbing Genete. The Court held that this statement did not constitute sufficient warning of the impending attack. The records showed that immediately after challenging the unsuspecting victim to a fight, Napalit suddenly lunged at Genete and stabbed him in the back. Genete was merely walking along the street and was unsuspecting of any harm. The sudden and deliberate attack left him with no opportunity to defend himself.

The Court also rejected the argument that the prosecution failed to establish Napalit's participation. His denial and alibi could not prevail over Guanzon's positive identification. The Court therefore sustained the finding that Napalit was responsible for Genete's death and that the killing constituted murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was affirmed. The Court also affirmed the award of ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱33,693.55 actual damages, as modified by the Court of Appeals. In addition, the Supreme Court awarded ₱50,000.00 moral damages and ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages, citing Article 2230 of the Civil Code for exemplary damages in criminal cases where an aggravating circumstance, such as treachery, attended the crime. 

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Juan Cabbab, Jr. G.R. No. 173479, July 12, 2007 First Division — Garcia, J.

 

FACTS

Juan Cabbab, Jr., together with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra with Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery. The Information alleged that on April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra, the accused, armed with a firearm and acting in conspiracy, shot Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, causing their deaths. They also allegedly shot William Belmes, who survived, and took ₱12,000 belonging to Winner Agbulos. 

The victims had gone to the area for a fiesta celebration. After learning that the celebration had already ended, they decided to return home to Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, they stopped at Sitio Turod, Barangay Kimmalasag, to eat. After lunch, while they were on their way home, they encountered Cabbab. The prosecution's evidence established that the victims were subsequently attacked and shot. Winner Agbulos was killed immediately, while Eddie Quindasan died shortly thereafter. William Belmes was also shot but survived because he was able to roll away and the assailants' shots did not fatally hit him.

Cabbab was identified as one of the assailants. The prosecution presented evidence concerning his participation in the shooting and robbery. Cabbab, on the other hand, denied the accusations and claimed that he was not responsible for the crimes. The case proceeded to trial, after which the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review. Pursuant to People v. Mateo, the case was first referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, with modification. Cabbab then appealed to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the evidence and the proper classification of the offenses committed.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Cabbab was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The Court had to determine whether the prosecution sufficiently established his participation in the shooting of the victims and the taking of Winner Agbulos' money.

The second issue was whether the killing of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, together with the taking of Winner's money, constituted robbery with homicide, and whether the shooting of William Belmes constituted attempted murder. The Court had to determine the proper characterization of the offenses based on the evidence presented during trial.

HELD

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the conviction, with the modifications stated in its decision. The Court sustained Cabbab's criminal liability for robbery with homicide and attempted murder. The Court found that the prosecution had established his participation in the crimes beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court explained that in robbery with homicide, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The homicide is the principal offense, while the robbery is absorbed in it. It is immaterial whether the intent to rob preceded or followed the killing, provided that the homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, when the killing and taking of property are sufficiently connected with each other, the resulting offense is robbery with homicide rather than separate offenses of homicide and robbery.

The Court likewise sustained the finding of attempted murder with respect to William Belmes. The prosecution established that the assailants shot at Belmes with intent to kill, but he survived because he was able to roll away and the shots failed to produce his death. The execution of the intended killing therefore did not reach the stage of consummation because of circumstances independent of the offenders' will.

The Court ultimately held Cabbab criminally liable for robbery with homicide and attempted murder based on the evidence establishing his participation in the attack. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction, subject to the modifications contained in the dispositive portion of the decision. 

CASE DIGEST : The People of the Philippines v. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943 En Banc — Moran, J.

 

FACTS

Antonio Z. Oanis was the Chief of Police of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, while Alberto Galanta was a corporal of the Philippine Constabulary. On December 24, 1938, they were instructed to arrest Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict. They were instructed to arrest him and, if necessary, get him dead or alive. Oanis and Galanta, together with other officers, proceeded to a house where Balagtas was believed to be staying.

Upon reaching the house, Oanis and Galanta entered a room where they saw a man sleeping with his back toward them. Without first making any reasonable inquiry as to the man's identity, they simultaneously or successively fired their revolvers at him. The man was Serapio Tecson, an innocent and peaceful citizen, and not Balagtas. Tecson died from the gunshot wounds.

Oanis and Galanta were prosecuted for the killing. They argued that they acted in the performance of their official duties and that they honestly believed Tecson to be Balagtas. The trial court nevertheless found them guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. They appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining that their mistake as to the identity of the person they shot should exempt them from criminal liability.

The Supreme Court considered whether their actions could be justified by their official duty to arrest Balagtas. It also considered the rule governing the use of force in making an arrest and whether their mistake of fact could excuse the killing. The Court examined Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, concerning the performance of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office, as well as Article 69, concerning the penalty when an incomplete justifying circumstance exists.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Oanis and Galanta were justified in killing Tecson because they were acting in the performance of their duty to arrest Balagtas. The Court had to determine whether the killing was a necessary consequence of the lawful performance of their duty and whether the circumstances permitted them to use such force against the person they believed to be Balagtas.

The second issue was whether the accused could invoke their mistake of fact regarding Tecson's identity as a defense. The Court had to determine whether their honest belief that Tecson was Balagtas relieved them from criminal responsibility, considering that Tecson was sleeping and had offered no resistance and that the accused had made no prior inquiry as to his identity.

HELD

The Supreme Court MODIFIED the judgment. It held that Oanis and Galanta were guilty of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of alevosía, but that they were entitled to the mitigating effect of an incomplete justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court therefore imposed a penalty lower by one or two degrees pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 11, paragraph 5, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. However, there are two requisites for this justification: (1) the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury or offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of that duty or lawful exercise of the right or office. The Court found that only the first requisite was present.

The Court held that the killing of Tecson was not the necessary consequence of the performance of the accused's duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas, or to kill him only if resistance was offered and the officers were overpowered. Instead, through impatience, over-anxiety, or the desire to take no chances, they killed the person whom they merely believed to be Balagtas. Tecson was asleep, offered no resistance, and the accused made no previous inquiry regarding his identity.

The Court further held that even if the person killed had actually been Balagtas, the accused would still not have been justified in killing him while he was sleeping. The law does not permit an officer making an arrest to use unnecessary or unreasonable force. The Court therefore rejected the claim that the accused's mistake regarding Tecson's identity completely excused their conduct.

The killing was qualified by alevosía because Tecson was asleep and was therefore in no position to defend himself. However, because the accused had acted in the performance of their duty to arrest Balagtas, although they exceeded the lawful limits of that duty, the Court considered the circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 5 as an incomplete justifying circumstance. Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty was reduced by one or two degrees. The Court consequently sentenced each accused to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and ordered them to pay the heirs of Serapio Tecson ₱2,000 jointly and severally, with costs.

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Primo Campuhan y Bello G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000 En Banc — Bellosillo, J.

 

FACTS

On April 25, 1996, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan went downstairs in their house to prepare Milo drinks for her two children. Her four-year-old daughter, Crysthel Pamintuan, was upstairs with her younger sister. Corazon then heard Crysthel crying, “Ayoko, ayoko!” She immediately rushed upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan, who was a helper of Conrado Plata, Jr., inside the children's room. Campuhan was kneeling before Crysthel, whose pajamas and panty had already been removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. Corazon testified that Campuhan was forcing his penis toward Crysthel's vagina.

Corazon confronted Campuhan and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows, pulled up his pants, and pushed her aside as he tried to leave. Corazon ran outside and shouted for help. Her brother, cousin, and uncle, together with other persons living within the compound, chased and apprehended Campuhan. He was eventually brought to the barangay officials. A physical examination of Crysthel showed that her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 centimeter in diameter. No evident external physical injuries were found on her.

Campuhan denied the accusation. He claimed that Crysthel was merely playing and wanted to ride on his back. According to him, she suddenly pulled him down, causing both of them to fall. Corazon allegedly saw them in that position, became hysterical, slapped him, and accused him of raping her daughter. Campuhan further claimed that Corazon's relatives chased and assaulted him after he denied the accusation.

The Regional Trial Court found Campuhan guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death, because Crysthel was only four years old. The RTC also ordered him to pay ₱50,000 moral damages and ₱25,000 exemplary damages. The case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Campuhan was guilty of consummated statutory rape. The Court had to determine whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Campuhan's penis had penetrated Crysthel's female organ, even to the slightest degree, as required for consummated rape.

The second issue was whether the acts committed by Campuhan constituted attempted rape instead of consummated rape. The Court examined whether the evidence established the necessary acts of execution for consummated rape or whether Campuhan merely commenced the commission of rape through overt acts without completing all the acts necessary to produce the crime.

The third issue was whether the testimony of Corazon and the physical findings sufficiently established penetration. The Court considered the circumstances under which Corazon claimed to have seen the sexual contact, Crysthel's own testimony that there was no penetration, and the medico-legal examination showing no physical indication of sexual contact or penetration.

HELD

The Supreme Court MODIFIED the RTC decision. Campuhan was not guilty of consummated statutory rape but was found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE. The Court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

The Court explained that under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as then applicable, statutory rape was committed when a man had carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age. Because Crysthel was only four years old, the applicable penalty under R.A. No. 7659, Section 11 was death when the offense was consummated. However, the Court emphasized that penetration, however slight, must still be established for rape to be consummated. Mere touching of the external surface of the female genitalia is not sufficient. The touching must be connected with entry into the labia or lips of the female organ.

The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove penetration. Corazon testified that she saw Campuhan forcing his penis toward Crysthel's vagina, but the Court found that her position and Campuhan's kneeling position made it difficult for her to have an unobstructed view of the actual point of contact. Campuhan's body, arms, and hand holding his penis obstructed the supposed contact area. The prosecution therefore failed to sufficiently establish that his penis entered the labia or female organ.

Crysthel herself testified that Campuhan's penis touched her organ but categorically answered “No” when asked whether it penetrated her organ. The Court refused to give this four-year-old child's answer an adult interpretation that touching necessarily meant penetration. The Court also noted that she did not experience intense pain and that the medico-legal examination found no external injuries and provided no medical basis for concluding that sexual contact had occurred.

The Court therefore held that all the elements of attempted rape, and only attempted rape, were present. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution necessary to produce the crime because of a cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Since penetration was not established, the crime remained at the attempted stage. The penalty for attempted rape was two degrees lower than the penalty prescribed for the consummated offense. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed the penalty stated above.

The Court thus modified the judgment finding Campuhan guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death, and instead found him guilty of attempted rape. Costs were imposed de oficio