Morales v. Olondriz G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016 Second Division — Brion, J.

 

FACTS

Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003, leaving his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and several children. Believing that he died intestate, his heirs filed a petition for partition of his estate and for the appointment of a special administrator before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City. Iris Morales later filed a separate petition alleging that the decedent had left a will dated July 23, 1991, and sought its probate and her appointment as special administratrix. The two proceedings were subsequently consolidated.

The will provided that the entire estate would be divided into six equal parts among Iris Morales Olondriz, four of the decedent's children, and their mother. The will, however, omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent. The respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings on the ground that Francisco had been preterited.

The RTC ordered the parties to present evidence regarding the alleged preterition. Morales agreed to the evidentiary hearing but failed to appear on the scheduled hearing dates and thereby waived her opportunity to present evidence on the issue. The RTC subsequently found that Francisco was a compulsory heir in the direct line, that he had been completely omitted from the will, and that he had therefore been preterited.

The RTC consequently reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator and ordered the case to proceed as an intestate proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Morales then went to the Supreme Court, arguing that probate of a will was mandatory, that the probate court could not determine its intrinsic validity, and that Francisco had not been preterited because he had allegedly received a house and lot from the decedent as an advance on his legitime.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz had been preterited from the will.

The second issue was whether the probate court could pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before its formal probate when the preterition of a compulsory heir would render the will ineffective.

The third issue was whether the RTC properly ordered the estate to proceed intestate despite its previous order setting the case for probate.

HELD

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It held that Francisco had been preterited. Preterition consists of the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from the inheritance, without express disinheritance. It requires that the heir receive nothing under the will, including no legacy, devise, or advance on his legitime.

Francisco, being the decedent's illegitimate son, was a compulsory heir in the direct line. He was completely omitted from the will and was not instituted as an heir, legatee, or devisee. Morales had been given the opportunity to prove that Francisco had received donations inter vivos or advances on his legitime, but she failed to appear at the evidentiary hearings. The Court therefore found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Francisco had been preterited.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs. Since the will contained no specific legacies or devises that could remain valid after the annulment of the institution of heirs, the preterition resulted in the total abrogation of the will and total intestacy.

The Court held that although the general rule is that a probate court determines only the extrinsic validity of a will, this rule is not absolute. When exceptional circumstances make it apparent that probate would be an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void, the probate court may determine its intrinsic validity even before probate. In this case, Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs and rendered the will ineffective, making separate proceedings on its intrinsic validity unnecessary.

The Court also held that the earlier order setting the case for probate was merely interlocutory. It had not become final and executory and could still be modified or rescinded by the RTC before final judgment. Thus, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it subsequently ordered the estate to proceed intestate. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed Morales' petition, with costs against her.

Celedonia Solivio v. Court of Appeals and Concordia Javellana-Villanueva G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 First Division — Medialdea, J.

 

FACTS

Esteban Javellana, Jr., a bachelor who died without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews, or nieces, left an estate consisting largely of properties inherited from his mother, Salustia Solivio. His surviving relatives were his maternal aunt, Celedonia Solivio, and his paternal aunt, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. During his lifetime, Esteban had expressed his desire to establish a foundation in his mother's name to help poor but deserving students. After his death, Celedonia and Concordia agreed to carry out this plan.

Pursuant to their agreement, Celedonia initiated Special Proceeding No. 2540 for the settlement of Esteban's estate. She was appointed administratrix and later filed a petition to be declared the sole heir. On April 3, 1978, the probate court declared Celedonia the sole legal heir. Celedonia subsequently sold some estate properties to pay the deceased's obligations and established the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Concordia later filed a motion for reconsideration of the order declaring Celedonia the sole heir, claiming that she was also an heir of Esteban. The probate court denied the motion for having been filed late. Instead of appealing that order, Concordia subsequently filed Civil Case No. 13207 before another branch of the same Regional Trial Court for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages. The trial court ruled in Concordia's favor and ordered the estate divided equally between her and Celedonia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Celedonia then appealed to the Supreme Court. She questioned, among others, whether the second RTC branch had jurisdiction to entertain Concordia's separate action while the settlement proceedings involving the same estate were still pending before another branch of the RTC.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain Concordia's separate action for partition and recovery of her share in Esteban Javellana, Jr.'s estate while the settlement proceedings were still pending before Branch 23.

The second issue was whether Concordia's remedy was to seek relief within the pending probate proceedings rather than institute a separate action before another branch of the same court.

The third issue was whether the probate court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the estate until the administration had been completed, the residue distributed, and the proceedings terminated.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and held that Branch 26 lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia's separate action for partition and recovery while the probate proceedings remained pending before Branch 23. The Court found that there were still no orders approving the administratrix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heirs, and terminating the administration proceedings.

The Court explained that it is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled to it that brings intestate proceedings to a close and terminates the administrator's duties. The order declaring Celedonia the sole heir did not terminate the proceedings because the same order expressly directed her, as administratrix, to proceed with the settlement of the estate.

The Court held that Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia the sole heir and to have herself declared a co-heir was properly filed in the pending special proceeding. When that motion was denied, her remedy was to elevate the denial for appellate review, rather than file a separate action before another branch of the court. The probate court has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

The Court emphasized that a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending before a co-equal court, in order to avoid conflicting dispositions and multiplicity of suits. A separate action for the declaration of heirs or recovery of an estate share is improper while the probate proceedings remain pending. The proper procedure is to seek the desired relief through a motion in the same probate or administration proceeding, or, if already closed, through reopening of that proceeding when legally proper.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the separate action filed by Concordia was improperly filed, and the judgment rendered by Branch 26 and affirmed by the Court of Appeals could not stand

Tai Tong Chuache & Co. v. Insurance Commission and Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation G.R. No. L-55397, February 29, 1988 First Division — Gancayco, J.

 

FACTS

Spouses Pedro and Azucena Palomo acquired a parcel of land and a building in San Rafael Village, Davao City, and assumed an existing mortgage over the building in favor of the Social Security System. On April 19, 1975, Azucena Palomo obtained a ₱100,000.00 loan from Tai Tong Chuache & Co., a partnership, and executed a mortgage over the property to secure the loan.

To protect its mortgage interest, Tai Tong Chuache & Co., through its managing partner Arsenio Lopez Chua, obtained Fire Insurance Policy No. 599-DV from Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation for ₱100,000.00. The policy covered the building and its contents. Other fire insurance policies covering the same property were also obtained from other insurance companies.

On July 31, 1975, the building and its contents were totally destroyed by fire. The other insurers paid their respective portions of the insurance claims, but Travellers refused to pay under Policy No. 599-DV. Travellers claimed that Tai Tong no longer had an insurable interest because the Palomos had allegedly already paid their mortgage indebtedness before the fire.

Tai Tong filed a complaint in intervention before the Insurance Commission to recover the proceeds of its policy. The Insurance Commission dismissed the claim, reasoning that the evidence showed a civil case involving the Palomos had been filed by Arsenio Lopez Chua rather than Tai Tong Chuache & Co., and inferred from this that the mortgage obligation had already been paid. Tai Tong elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Tai Tong Chuache & Co. had an insurable interest in the property at the time of the fire.

The second issue was whether Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation sufficiently proved its affirmative defense that the mortgage debt had already been paid before the occurrence of the fire.

The third issue was whether Arsenio Lopez Chua's filing of a civil action against the Palomos in his own name established that the mortgage obligation to Tai Tong had already been paid.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the decision of the Insurance Commission. It ordered Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation to pay Tai Tong Chuache & Co. the face value of Fire Insurance Policy No. 599-DV amounting to ₱100,000.00.

The Court held that Tai Tong had an insurable interest in the property. As mortgagee, it had a financial interest in the preservation of the property because the property secured the ₱100,000.00 loan extended to the Palomos. The insurance policy obtained by Tai Tong was valid and was in force when the fire occurred.

The Court further held that Travellers failed to prove its affirmative defense that the mortgage debt had already been paid. The Insurance Commission merely inferred payment from the fact that a civil action against the Palomos had been filed by Arsenio Lopez Chua. The Court found this inference insufficient. The mortgage document presented by Tai Tong had not been cancelled or released, and when a creditor remains in possession of the document evidencing the credit, nonpayment is presumed. Azucena Palomo likewise testified that the debt remained unpaid.

The Court rejected the argument that the civil action filed by Arsenio Chua demonstrated that the debt was his personal credit rather than Tai Tong's. Arsenio Chua was the managing partner of Tai Tong Chuache & Co. and could perform acts of administration for the partnership, including suing debtors for unpaid obligations. At the very least, as a partner, he was an agent of the partnership and acted for and on behalf of the firm.

Accordingly, because Travellers failed to establish the alleged lack of insurable interest and had issued a valid policy covering Tai Tong's mortgage interest, the insurer was bound by the terms and conditions of the policy. The Supreme Court ordered Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation to pay Tai Tong Chuache & Co. ₱100,000.00, with costs against the private respondent. 

Constantino C. Acain v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. G.R. No. L-72706, October 27, 1987 En Banc — Paras, J.

 

FACTS

Nemesio Acain died leaving a will allegedly executed on February 17, 1960. On May 29, 1984, Constantino C. Acain filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a petition for the probate of Nemesio's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary. The will instituted Constantino and his brothers and sisters as heirs. It was written in Bisaya and accompanied by an English translation.

The will contained provisions concerning the testator's burial, payment of debts, appointment of an executor, and disposition of his property. It stated that Nemesio's shares in the properties he had acquired jointly with his wife, Rosa Diongson, would be given to the children of his predeceased brother, Segundo Acain.

Virginia A. Fernandez, the legally adopted daughter of Nemesio, and Rosa Diongson, his surviving spouse, opposed the probate proceedings. They argued that the will completely omitted them and that such omission constituted preterition. They sought dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the preterition of Virginia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, annulled the institution of heirs under Article 854 of the Civil Code.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The appellate court granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the probate proceeding. Constantino elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the probate court could determine only the extrinsic validity of the will and that the respondents' remedy was improper.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the probate court could consider the intrinsic validity of the will before its formal validity had been established through probate.

The second issue was whether the omission of Virginia Fernandez, the legally adopted daughter of Nemesio Acain, constituted preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code.

The third issue was whether the preterition of Virginia annulled the institution of heirs and resulted in intestate succession, thereby depriving Constantino of legal standing to seek probate of the will.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court ordering the dismissal of the probate proceeding. The Court held that although the general rule is that probate courts determine the extrinsic validity of a will, there are exceptional circumstances where the intrinsic validity may be determined before probate. The Court applied the practical considerations recognized in Nuguid v. Nuguid and Maninang v. Court of Appeals, where proceeding with probate would serve no useful purpose because the will was already shown to be intrinsically ineffective.

The Court held that Virginia Fernandez was the legally adopted daughter of Nemesio and therefore a compulsory heir in the direct line. Her complete omission from the will constituted preterition. The Court explained that preterition consists of the omission of compulsory heirs in the direct line, either because they are not mentioned or, although mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor expressly disinherited. Adoption makes the adopted child the legal heir of the adopter.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, the preterition of one or all compulsory heirs in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs. Since the will contained a universal institution of Constantino and his brothers and sisters, the annulment of that institution resulted in intestate succession. The Court noted that the will contained no legacies or devises that could remain effective after the institution of heirs was annulled.

The Court distinguished the position of Rosa Diongson, the surviving spouse. Although she was also a compulsory heir, Article 854 does not apply to her because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. The preterition of Virginia, however, was sufficient to annul the institution of heirs. Consequently, Constantino, having been deprived of his status as an heir by the operation of Article 854, had no legal standing to continue the petition for probate.

The Supreme Court therefore denied Constantino Acain's petition and affirmed the dismissal of the probate proceeding. 

Sofia J. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985 First Division — Gutierrez, Jr., J.

 

FACTS

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal, leaving a last will and testament. In the will, he acknowledged that he was legally married to Rufina Gomez, with whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. The will further stated that Jugo had been separated from Rufina since 1952 and had been living with Sofia J. Nepomuceno as husband and wife. Jugo and Sofia were subsequently married in Victoria, Tarlac, despite his existing marriage to Rufina.

Jugo designated Sofia as the sole and only executor of his estate. In the will, he provided for his legal wife and children as his forced heirs and gave the free portion of his estate to Sofia. Sofia thereafter filed a petition for the probate of the will and for the issuance of letters testamentary. Rufina and her children opposed the probate, among other grounds, on the basis of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between Jugo and Sofia.

The trial court denied probate of the will. It held that because the will itself admitted that Jugo and Sofia had been living together as husband and wife while Jugo was still legally married to Rufina, the devise in favor of Sofia was intrinsically invalid. Sofia appealed. The Court of Appeals later set aside the trial court's denial of probate and declared the will validly drawn, but held that the devise in favor of Sofia was null and void under Article 739 in relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code.

Sofia elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to determine the intrinsic validity of the devise during the probate proceeding. The Supreme Court noted that the parties no longer disputed the extrinsic validity of the will and that the principal issue was whether the probate court could determine the validity of the testamentary provision in Sofia's favor.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in the probate proceeding, to determine the intrinsic validity of the devise in favor of Sofia Nepomuceno.

The second issue was whether the devise in favor of Sofia Nepomuceno was void under Article 739 of the Civil Code because the testator had been living with her in concubinage.

The third issue was whether the validity of the will's testamentary provisions should have been determined only in a separate proceeding after the will had been admitted to probate.

HELD

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the appellate court acted within its jurisdiction when, after determining that the will was validly executed, it proceeded to determine the intrinsic validity of the devise in favor of Sofia.

The Court recognized the general rule that in probate proceedings, the court ordinarily determines only the extrinsic validity of the will, including the testamentary capacity of the testator and compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by law. However, the Court reiterated the exception recognized in Nuguid v. Nuguid and Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez: when practical considerations make it necessary to determine the intrinsic validity of a will during probate, the court may do so rather than subject the parties to unnecessary and prolonged litigation.

The Court held that the devise to Sofia was null and void under Article 739 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 1028. Article 739 prohibits donations between persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage. The Court applied this prohibition to testamentary dispositions because Article 1028 expressly extends the provisions concerning prohibited donations to testamentary dispositions. The testator himself had expressly admitted in his will that he had been living with Sofia as husband and wife while his marriage to Rufina remained subsisting.

The Court further held that the invalidity of the devise did not render the entire will void. The will was validly drawn, but the particular devise in favor of Sofia was void. The properties covered by the invalid devise therefore passed in intestacy to the proper heirs. The Court consequently dismissed Sofia's petition for certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982 First Division — Melencio-Herrera, J.

 

FACTS

Clemencia Aseneta, single, died on May 21, 1977 at the age of 81. She left a holographic will in which she stated that all her real and personal properties would be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang, with whose family she had lived for about 30 years. The will also contained statements concerning Bernardo Aseneta, who claimed to be Clemencia's adopted son.

On June 9, 1977, Soledad Maninang filed a petition for the probate of Clemencia's will before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Meanwhile, Bernardo Aseneta instituted intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, claiming that he was Clemencia's sole heir. The testate and intestate proceedings were subsequently consolidated.

Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate proceeding, arguing that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, had been preterited. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition for probate. It later denied reconsideration and appointed Bernardo as administrator of Clemencia's intestate estate.

Soledad and Rafael Maninang challenged the dismissal before the Court of Appeals through certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the trial court's dismissal was a final order that should have been challenged by appeal. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate proceeding without first allowing the holographic will to undergo probate.

The second issue was whether the probate court could dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that Bernardo Aseneta had been preterited, considering that the issue of whether he had actually been preterited or validly disinherited had not been thoroughly determined.

The third issue was whether certiorari was a proper remedy to challenge the dismissal of the testate proceeding.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. It held that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate proceeding. As a general rule, the probate of a will is mandatory under Article 838 of the Civil Code. No will may pass real or personal property unless it has been proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The Court explained that the ordinary function of probate is to determine the extrinsic validity of the will—its due execution, testamentary capacity, and compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will is normally considered only after the will has been authenticated.

The Court recognized the exception established in Nuguid v. Nuguid and Balanay v. Martinez, where practical considerations may justify determining intrinsic validity even before probate. However, those cases were exceptions rather than the general rule. In the present case, the issue of whether Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited required a determination that had not been thoroughly made by the trial court.

The Court emphasized that preterition and disinheritance are different concepts. Preterition consists of the omission of compulsory heirs from the will without instituting them as heirs or expressly disinheriting them. Disinheritance, on the other hand, is a testamentary disposition depriving a compulsory heir of his legitime for a cause authorized by law. Their legal effects are also different.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, preterition annuls the institution of heirs, while under Article 918, ineffective disinheritance annuls the institution only insofar as it prejudices the disinherited heir. The Court found that the trial court prematurely concluded that Bernardo had been preterited. The contents of the will did not make that conclusion indubitable.

The Supreme Court further held that certiorari was a proper remedy because the probate court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It therefore set aside the Court of Appeals' decision and nullified the trial court's orders dismissing the testate case. The testate proceeding was ordered reinstated and consolidated with the intestate proceeding for further proceedings. 

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian: Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio M. Martinez, et al. G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975 Second Division — Aquino, J

 

FACTS

Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973, leaving a notarial will dated September 5, 1970. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and their six legitimate children. In her will, Leodegaria declared that she owned the southern half of nine conjugal lots and two parcels of land inherited from her father. She expressed her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied from the fruits of the properties.

In paragraph V of the will, Leodegaria provided for the division and distribution of her paraphernal and conjugal lands among her six children after her husband's death. She effectively disposed of her husband's one-half share in the conjugal properties. Felix Balanay, Sr. initially opposed the probate but later withdrew his opposition and executed an instrument entitled “Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights,” by which he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of their six children and confirmed the partition of the conjugal properties provided in the will.

The probate court initially gave effect to Felix Balanay, Sr.'s conformity and proceeded with the probate. Subsequently, another lawyer filed a motion seeking to withdraw the petition for probate and convert the proceeding into intestate proceedings. The trial court adopted the view that the will was void and, on February 28, 1974, dismissed the petition for probate, converted the proceeding into an intestate proceeding, and ordered the publication of notice to creditors. Felix Balanay, Jr. later sought reconsideration, asserting that the withdrawal of the probate petition had been made without his authority.

The trial court denied reconsideration and maintained that it had independently determined that the will was void. The Supreme Court considered whether the probate court properly passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will before determining its formal validity, and whether the provisions of the will were in fact sufficient to render the entire will void.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity and in declaring the will void.

The second issue was whether the invalidity of certain provisions of the will rendered the entire will void.

The third issue was whether the testatrix could validly provide for the partition of the conjugal properties and require that the legitimes of the compulsory heirs be satisfied in cash.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that, because of the unusual provisions of the will and the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the probate petition, the probate court could pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before its formal validity had been established. The Court explained that where practical considerations demand it, particularly when the will appears on its face to be intrinsically void, the probate court may determine the intrinsic validity rather than allow the probate proceeding to become an idle ceremony.

However, the Supreme Court held that the probate court erred in declaring the entire will void. Under Article 792 of the Civil Code, the invalidity of one of several dispositions does not invalidate the other dispositions unless it appears that the testator would not have made the other dispositions had the invalid provision not been made. The Court found that the invalid provisions could be separated from the valid provisions without defeating the testatrix's general testamentary scheme.

The Court found that Leodegaria's statement that she owned the southern half of the conjugal properties was contrary to law because her share in the conjugal property was still inchoate and pro indiviso. This did not, however, invalidate the entire will. The Court likewise held that the provision requiring the estate to remain undivided during the husband's lifetime could not operate indefinitely. Under Article 1083 of the Civil Code, the estate could remain undivided only for the period allowed by law.

The Court further held that the provision requiring the legitimes to be paid in cash was contrary to Article 1080 of the Civil Code, because the testatrix had not assigned the whole estate to one or more children in the manner contemplated by that provision. Nevertheless, the will remained intrinsically valid subject to these limitations. The surviving husband could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal partnership under Articles 179(1) and 1041, although the renunciation, insofar as it constituted a donation, remained subject to Articles 750 and 752.

The Court therefore held that the will should proceed to probate. It emphasized that, except in an extreme case where a will is intrinsically void on its face, the probate court should first pass upon its formal validity. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, probate is generally mandatory. The Court also applied the principle that testacy is preferred to intestacy, and that an interpretation which gives effect to a testamentary disposition is preferred over one that would nullify it. The trial court was therefore directed to proceed with the probate of Leodegaria Julian's will.