FACTS
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, together with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig, went to the house of Salvador Mandaya and asked him to accompany them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. They later met Aniceto Dumalagan, who told them that he wanted Palangpangan killed because of a land dispute. Mandaya was instructed to accompany the group and was threatened with death if he refused.
Later that evening, Intod and his companions, all armed, went to Palangpangan's house. Mandaya pointed out what he believed to be Palangpangan's bedroom. Intod and his companions fired several shots into the room with the intention of killing Palangpangan. Unknown to them, however, Palangpangan was not in the room at that time. She was somewhere else, and consequently no one was hit or killed.
Intod was subsequently charged with attempted murder. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Intod then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he should not be convicted of attempted murder because the killing of Palangpangan was inherently impossible: she was not present in the room where the accused fired their guns. He contended that the proper offense was an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court therefore examined the distinction between an attempted felony under Article 6 and an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2. It also considered the purpose and requirements of the impossible-crime provision, particularly where the intended victim is absent and the offender's intended result cannot physically be accomplished.
ISSUE
The first issue was whether Intod was guilty of attempted murder or an impossible crime. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether firing several shots at the place where the accused believed the intended victim was located constituted an attempted murder under Article 6, or an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The second issue was whether the factual impossibility of accomplishing the intended killing falls within the concept of an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court had to determine whether the absence of Palangpangan from the room constituted the kind of impossibility contemplated by the law.
HELD
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and MODIFIED the decision of the Court of Appeals. Instead of attempted murder, Intod was held guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized under Article 4, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 59 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person who performs an act that would be an offense against persons or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or because the means employed were inadequate or ineffectual. The Court explained that the provision covers acts performed with evil intent even though, because of the circumstances, the intended crime could not actually be accomplished.
The Court distinguished legal impossibility from factual or physical impossibility. Legal impossibility exists when the intended act, even if completed, would not constitute a crime. Factual or physical impossibility, on the other hand, exists when circumstances unknown to the offender or beyond his control prevent the accomplishment of the intended crime. The Court held that the present case involved the latter because Palangpangan was not in the room when Intod and his companions fired their guns.
The Court further explained that the evil intent of Intod was clearly demonstrated by his acts. He and his companions went to Palangpangan's house armed with guns and deliberately fired at the room where they believed she was located. The intended killing could not be accomplished solely because the victim was not there. Thus, the act fell within Article 4, paragraph 2 rather than Article 6 on attempted felonies.
The Court also applied Article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides the penalty for an impossible crime. Since the intended felony could not be accomplished because of the factual impossibility created by Palangpangan's absence, Intod was not liable for attempted murder but for the impossible crime contemplated by Article 4, paragraph 2. The Supreme Court accordingly modified the judgment of the Court of Appeals and imposed the penalty prescribed by Article 59.
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