Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982 First Division — Melencio-Herrera, J.

 

FACTS

Clemencia Aseneta, single, died on May 21, 1977 at the age of 81. She left a holographic will in which she stated that all her real and personal properties would be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang, with whose family she had lived for about 30 years. The will also contained statements concerning Bernardo Aseneta, who claimed to be Clemencia's adopted son.

On June 9, 1977, Soledad Maninang filed a petition for the probate of Clemencia's will before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Meanwhile, Bernardo Aseneta instituted intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, claiming that he was Clemencia's sole heir. The testate and intestate proceedings were subsequently consolidated.

Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate proceeding, arguing that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, had been preterited. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition for probate. It later denied reconsideration and appointed Bernardo as administrator of Clemencia's intestate estate.

Soledad and Rafael Maninang challenged the dismissal before the Court of Appeals through certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the trial court's dismissal was a final order that should have been challenged by appeal. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate proceeding without first allowing the holographic will to undergo probate.

The second issue was whether the probate court could dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that Bernardo Aseneta had been preterited, considering that the issue of whether he had actually been preterited or validly disinherited had not been thoroughly determined.

The third issue was whether certiorari was a proper remedy to challenge the dismissal of the testate proceeding.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. It held that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate proceeding. As a general rule, the probate of a will is mandatory under Article 838 of the Civil Code. No will may pass real or personal property unless it has been proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The Court explained that the ordinary function of probate is to determine the extrinsic validity of the will—its due execution, testamentary capacity, and compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will is normally considered only after the will has been authenticated.

The Court recognized the exception established in Nuguid v. Nuguid and Balanay v. Martinez, where practical considerations may justify determining intrinsic validity even before probate. However, those cases were exceptions rather than the general rule. In the present case, the issue of whether Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited required a determination that had not been thoroughly made by the trial court.

The Court emphasized that preterition and disinheritance are different concepts. Preterition consists of the omission of compulsory heirs from the will without instituting them as heirs or expressly disinheriting them. Disinheritance, on the other hand, is a testamentary disposition depriving a compulsory heir of his legitime for a cause authorized by law. Their legal effects are also different.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, preterition annuls the institution of heirs, while under Article 918, ineffective disinheritance annuls the institution only insofar as it prejudices the disinherited heir. The Court found that the trial court prematurely concluded that Bernardo had been preterited. The contents of the will did not make that conclusion indubitable.

The Supreme Court further held that certiorari was a proper remedy because the probate court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It therefore set aside the Court of Appeals' decision and nullified the trial court's orders dismissing the testate case. The testate proceeding was ordered reinstated and consolidated with the intestate proceeding for further proceedings.