CASE DIGEST : Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. COCOFED, et al., Ballares, et al., Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., and Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 147062-64, December 14, 2001 En Banc — Panganiban, J.

FACTS

Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Leyte questioning the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, and the validity of Municipal Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte. The ordinances imposed a municipal production tax on soft drinks manufactured within the municipality. Pepsi-Cola argued that Congress had unlawfully delegated its taxing power to local governments and that the municipal tax was invalid.

Ordinance No. 23 imposed a tax of 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked, while Ordinance No. 27 imposed one centavo for every gallon of soft drinks produced or manufactured within Tanauan. The parties stipulated that the two ordinances substantially covered the same subject matter and that their tax rates were practically equivalent. The municipality sought to collect the taxes from Pepsi-Cola as a manufacturer operating within its jurisdiction.

The trial court dismissed Pepsi-Cola's complaint and upheld the constitutionality of Section 2 of R.A. No. 2264 and the validity of the municipal ordinances. It ordered Pepsi-Cola to pay the taxes due. Pepsi-Cola appealed, and because the case involved pure questions of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Pepsi-Cola maintained that the delegation of taxing authority to municipalities was unconstitutional, that the tax amounted to prohibited double taxation because the company was already subject to national taxes, and that the levy was unjust, oppressive, and confiscatory. The Supreme Court therefore examined both the validity of the delegation of taxing power to local governments and the legality of the specific municipal production tax.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of taxation to municipalities. The Court had to determine whether Congress could authorize local governments to impose taxes for local purposes even though taxation is generally a legislative function.

The Court also had to resolve whether the municipal production tax imposed by Tanauan constituted prohibited double taxation or was otherwise unjust, oppressive, or confiscatory. This required determining whether the municipal levy violated constitutional or statutory limitations on local taxation.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and upheld the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264. The Court explained that although the power of taxation is inherently legislative, Congress may delegate taxing authority to municipal corporations for matters of local concern. Such delegation is recognized as an exception because local governments require fiscal authority to perform their governmental functions and exercise local self-government.

The Court held that the delegation under the Local Autonomy Act was not invalid merely because it granted municipalities broad taxing authority. Municipalities remain subject to constitutional and statutory limitations in exercising that authority. The Court found no basis for concluding that the delegation itself was confiscatory or oppressive.

The Court rejected Pepsi-Cola's claim of double taxation. It explained that taxation by different governmental authorities does not automatically constitute prohibited double taxation. For objectionable double taxation to exist, the same subject must generally be taxed twice for the same purpose by the same taxing authority within the same jurisdiction and taxing period. The municipal production tax and the national taxes imposed on Pepsi-Cola did not satisfy those conditions.

Finally, the Court found no sufficient showing that the tax imposed by Tanauan was unjust, unfair, confiscatory, or oppressive. It recognized that municipalities need adequate revenues to discharge their governmental duties and that the law authorized them to impose taxes within prescribed limits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the municipal taxing authority and upheld the ordinance imposing the production tax on soft drinks manufactured within Tanauan.

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Ceilito Orita G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990 First Division — Medialdea, J.

 

FACTS

Ceilito Orita alias “Lito,” a Philippine Constabulary soldier, was charged with rape for an incident involving Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year-old freshman student. In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina arrived at her boarding house after attending a party. Shortly after her classmates left, Orita suddenly held her and poked a Batangas knife at her neck. He ordered her upstairs and dragged her into her room while continuing to threaten her with the knife.

Inside the room, Orita ordered Cristina to undress and lie down. He then mounted her and ordered her to hold and guide his penis into her vagina. Cristina testified that his penis entered her vagina, although only partially. Orita subsequently changed positions and again attempted sexual intercourse. Cristina eventually saw an opportunity to escape and ran through several rooms before jumping from a window. She then went to the municipal building, where police officers found her naked and crying. The police brought her to the hospital for examination.

The medical certificate showed, among others, a hematoma on her anterior neck, abrasions below her left breast and on both knees, multiple pinpoint marks, and an erythematous and tender area surrounding the vaginal orifice. The trial court found Orita guilty of frustrated rape, reasoning that there was no conclusive evidence of penetration, and sentenced him to imprisonment of ten years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve years of prision mayor, as maximum. Orita appealed.

The Court of Appeals initially modified the judgment and found Orita guilty of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. It subsequently set aside its decision and forwarded the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed both Orita's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the proper stage of execution of the crime of rape.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the prosecution evidence sufficiently established Orita's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Orita questioned alleged inconsistencies in Cristina's testimony and argued that her testimony was not credible. The Court therefore examined the testimony of Cristina, the corroborating testimony of Pat. Donceras, and the medical findings.

The second issue was whether the crime committed was attempted rape, frustrated rape, or consummated rape. In particular, the Court had to determine whether rape can have a frustrated stage under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the trial court found no conclusive evidence of penetration.

The third issue was whether penetration must be complete for rape to be consummated. The Court examined Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined rape at the time, and the established rule concerning the degree of penetration necessary to constitute carnal knowledge.

HELD

The Supreme Court MODIFIED the decision of the Regional Trial Court and found Ceilito Orita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of consummated rape. The Court rejected the trial court's finding of frustrated rape. It held that the evidence, particularly Cristina's credible testimony, sufficiently established that penetration occurred.

The Court held that the alleged inconsistencies in Cristina's testimony were merely minor and trivial inconsistencies that did not destroy her credibility. The Court emphasized that minor discrepancies may actually indicate spontaneity rather than fabrication. Cristina's testimony concerning the assault was also corroborated by Pat. Donceras regarding what happened after she escaped and sought assistance, as well as by the physical findings recorded in the medical certificate.

The Court explained that under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape was committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances specified by law, including through force or intimidation. The Court reiterated that perfect or complete penetration is not necessary for rape to be consummated. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Even the entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to constitute rape.

The Court further held that rape has no frustrated stage. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution that should produce the felony but the felony is not produced because of causes independent of the offender's will. In rape, however, once carnal knowledge is achieved, all the essential elements of the crime have been accomplished. If there is no penetration, the crime is only attempted rape, because not all acts of execution have been performed. Once there is penetration, even if only partial, the rape is consummated.

The Court specifically rejected the earlier ruling in People v. Eriña, which had recognized frustrated rape, characterizing it as a “stray” decision because it had not been reiterated in subsequent cases. The Court also considered the provision in the then-existing Article 335 concerning attempted or frustrated rape with homicide as a dead provision, insofar as it contemplated a frustrated stage of rape.

Accordingly, because Cristina's testimony established that Orita's penis entered her vagina, even if only partially, the crime was consummated rape. The Court imposed reclusion perpetua, considering the applicable penalty under Article 335 and the constitutional prohibition then in force against the imposition of the death penalty. The Court also ordered Orita to indemnify Cristina S. Abayan ₱30,000.00. 

CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippines v. Mikael Malmstedt G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991 En Banc — Padilla, J.

 

FACTS

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines as a tourist in December 1988. On May 7, 1989, he left for Baguio City and subsequently proceeded to Sagada. While in Sagada, he stayed at a lodging house operated by Rosa Padilla. There, he met Tia and Peter Lo, who were also foreigners. Malmstedt eventually agreed to travel with them to Baguio.

On May 11, 1989, Tia and Peter Lo left Sagada with Malmstedt and another companion. Before they departed, Tia went ahead to Baguio and informed a NARCOM agent that Malmstedt and his companions were transporting prohibited drugs. NARCOM agents thereafter established a checkpoint along the road. When the vehicles carrying the group arrived, the agents intercepted them and placed the occupants under arrest.

The NARCOM agents searched the vehicles and the personal effects of the occupants. In the course of the search, they found two traveling bags belonging to Malmstedt, containing stuffed toys. Inside the toys were several tin cans containing hashish. A further search of Malmstedt's pouch bag also disclosed hashish. Laboratory examination confirmed that the substance was prohibited cannabis resin or hashish.

Malmstedt was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He denied ownership of the bags and claimed that the hashish had been planted by the NARCOM officers. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of ₱20,000. He appealed to the Supreme Court, principally questioning the legality of the warrantless arrest and search and the admissibility of the prohibited drugs seized from his belongings.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the warrantless arrest of Malmstedt was valid. The Court had to determine whether the NARCOM agents had sufficient grounds to arrest him without first obtaining a warrant, considering the information they had received concerning the transportation of prohibited drugs.

The second issue was whether the warrantless search of Malmstedt's personal effects and the seizure of the hashish were valid. The Court had to determine whether the search could be justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The third issue was whether the hashish seized from Malmstedt could be admitted in evidence against him. This depended upon whether the arrest and subsequent search were lawful and whether the seized drugs were therefore obtained in a manner consistent with the constitutional requirements governing searches and seizures.

HELD

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the judgment of conviction. It held that the warrantless arrest and search were valid, and consequently the hashish seized from Malmstedt was admissible in evidence. The Court therefore sustained his conviction for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

The Court explained that the 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 2, protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, a search conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest does not require a separate search warrant. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a peace officer or private person may arrest without a warrant when, among other circumstances, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the arresting person's presence.

The Court found that the NARCOM agents had sufficient basis for the warrantless arrest. They had received information that Malmstedt and his companions were transporting prohibited drugs. When the vehicles were intercepted, the agents observed circumstances that gave them probable cause to believe that the occupants were transporting illegal drugs. The Court therefore held that the arrest was lawful and that the search of Malmstedt's belongings was a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The Court also rejected Malmstedt's claim that the drugs had been planted. The Court noted that when he was investigated before the Provincial Fiscal, he did not immediately inform the fiscal or his lawyer that the NARCOM officers had planted the hashish. He raised the claim only about two months later. The Court therefore found his assertion insufficient to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the hashish was validly seized and admissible in evidence, and the conviction under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 was AFFIRMED, with costs against Malmstedt.

CASE DIGEST : Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance; David v. Guingona; Roco and IBP v. Secretary of Finance; Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Chato G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543 & 115544, October 30, 1995 Supreme Court En Banc

 

FACTS

These consolidated cases involved motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's earlier decision upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (E-VAT) Law. The petitioners questioned R.A. No. 7716 on several constitutional grounds, including the manner of its enactment, the alleged violation of the constitutional requirement that revenue bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, and alleged violations of due process, equal protection, freedom of the press, and the constitutional policies on taxation and cooperatives.

One of the principal challenges concerned Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The petitioners argued that the Senate went beyond its constitutional authority when it introduced its own version of the E-VAT measure. They also questioned the legislative procedure followed in passing the law, including the alleged amendments made during the final stages of congressional action.

The petitioners further attacked the substantive provisions of R.A. No. 7716. Philippine Airlines (PAL) questioned the withdrawal of its VAT exemption, arguing that the amendment of its franchise exemption was not sufficiently expressed in the title of the law. Philippine Press Institute (PPI) argued that imposing VAT on the press violated freedom of the press and equal protection. Other petitioners argued that the law impaired contractual obligations, violated the constitutional requirements of uniformity and equity in taxation, and improperly subjected cooperatives to VAT.

The Supreme Court had previously dismissed the petitions and upheld R.A. No. 7716. The petitioners filed motions for reconsideration, resulting in the October 30, 1995 Resolution. The Court reconsidered the arguments raised but ultimately maintained its conclusion that R.A. No. 7716 did not suffer from the constitutional infirmities alleged by the petitioners.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether R.A. No. 7716 was unconstitutional because it did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, as allegedly required by Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court had to determine the extent of the Senate's constitutional authority to propose or concur with amendments to revenue bills that originate in the House.

The second issue was whether the substantive provisions of R.A. No. 7716 violated the Constitution, particularly the requirements concerning the title of bills under Article VI, Section 26(1), freedom of the press, due process, equal protection, non-impairment of contracts, uniformity and equity in taxation, and the constitutional policy concerning cooperatives. The Court also considered whether the withdrawal of particular VAT exemptions and the expansion of the VAT base were constitutionally permissible.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the motions for reconsideration with finality and maintained its previous ruling upholding the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. On the issue of legislative origin, the Court held that although revenue bills must originate exclusively in the House, the Senate has broad authority under Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution to propose or concur with amendments. The Court held that the Senate may introduce an entirely new bill as a substitute measure, provided that the measure remains an amendment to the House bill in the constitutional sense.

The Court explained that the word "exclusively" in Article VI, Section 24 qualifies the requirement that the revenue bill must originate in the House; it does not restrict the Senate's authority to propose amendments. The Court noted that the Senate's power to amend may be extensive and may even result in the substitution of the entire text of the House bill. The Court therefore rejected the argument that the Senate was constitutionally required merely to make minor or limited amendments to the House version.

The Court also rejected the challenge based on Article VI, Section 26(1), which requires every bill to embrace only one subject expressed in its title. With respect to PAL, the Court held that the title of R.A. No. 7716 sufficiently expressed its subject because the law expressly sought to restructure the VAT system, widen its tax base, and amend the relevant provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. It was therefore unnecessary for the title to specifically identify every special law or franchise whose VAT exemption would be affected. The Court likewise held that the conference committee could introduce provisions germane to the subject of the bill, provided that its report was approved by both Houses.

The Court rejected the argument that imposing VAT upon the press violated freedom of the press. It distinguished VAT from a license or privilege tax. VAT is imposed upon the sale, barter, lease, or exchange of goods or properties and the sale or exchange of services for revenue purposes; it is not a tax imposed upon the exercise of the constitutional right to publish. The Court therefore held that subjecting the press to VAT did not, by itself, burden freedom of the press. The Court also found no unconstitutional discrimination in the exemptions retained by R.A. No. 7716 because the exempt transactions had reasonable classifications and included basic goods and services, agricultural products, educational and medical services, certain exports, and other transactions specifically identified by law.

The Court likewise rejected the claim that R.A. No. 7716 impaired the obligation of contracts. It reiterated that the government's power of taxation is an essential attribute of sovereignty and that the possibility of the lawful exercise of that power is read into contracts. The imposition of a new or increased tax does not constitute impairment of a contract merely because it increases the financial burden upon a party. The Court further rejected the challenges based on uniformity and equity of taxation and the constitutional policy favoring cooperatives, finding no constitutional infirmity in the classifications made by Congress.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that R.A. No. 7716 suffered from none of the constitutional infirmities alleged by the petitioners and that its enactment did not constitute grave abuse of discretion by Congress or the Executive. The Court DENIED the motions for reconsideration with finality and lifted the temporary restraining order previously issued against the enforcement of the law. The separate opinions and dissents remained as stated in the Resolution.

CASE DIGEST : Ramon C. Lee and Antonio D.M. Lacdao v. Court of Appeals, Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales, Jr., and Thomas Gonzales G.R. No. 93695, February 4, 1992 Third Division — Gutierrez, Jr., J.

 

FACTS

On November 15, 1985, International Corporate Bank, Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money against private respondents. On March 17, 1986, the private respondents filed a third-party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills, Inc. (ALFA) and petitioners Ramon C. Lee and Antonio D.M. Lacdao. The petitioners were then associated with ALFA as its president and executive vice-president. They eventually filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, which the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied.

The controversy arose when the trial court attempted to serve alias summons on ALFA. The petitioners informed the court that summons had been erroneously served upon them because the management of ALFA had already been transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). DBP, however, manifested that it was not authorized to receive summons for ALFA because it had not actually taken over the corporation, which remained a separate and distinct juridical entity. The trial court initially declared service through the petitioners proper, but later reversed itself and ruled that the service was invalid because the petitioners were no longer corporate officers of ALFA.

The petitioners relied on a Voting Trust Agreement dated March 11, 1981, executed by the ALFA stockholders, including the petitioners, in favor of DBP. Under the agreement, the stockholders assigned and delivered their shares to DBP as trustee, and DBP was given the right to vote the shares and exercise the rights pertaining to them. The agreement further authorized the trustee to transfer one share to a person for the purpose of qualifying that person as a director. The petitioners argued that because their shares had been transferred to DBP, they were no longer directors or officers of ALFA and consequently could not receive summons on behalf of the corporation.

The Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed the RTC and ruled that service of summons upon the petitioners was proper. It held that although the petitioners may have ceased to be president and vice-president, they were still directors of ALFA. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the execution of the voting trust agreement had terminated their status as directors and that service of summons upon them was therefore invalid.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether the execution of the voting trust agreement transferred the legal ownership of the ALFA shares to DBP and consequently caused the petitioners to cease being directors of ALFA. This required the Court to determine the legal nature and effect of a voting trust agreement under Section 59 of the Corporation Code.

Under Section 59, one or more stockholders of a stock corporation may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee the right to vote and other rights pertaining to the shares for a period not exceeding five years at any one time. If the voting trust is specifically required as a condition of a loan agreement, it may exceed five years but automatically expires upon full payment of the loan. The agreement must also be in writing, notarized, and filed with the corporation and the SEC; otherwise, it is ineffective and unenforceable.

The Court also had to determine the effect of the transfer upon the petitioners' qualification as directors under Section 23 of the Corporation Code. That provision requires every director to own at least one share of the corporation's capital stock, with such share standing in the director's name on the corporation's books. A director who ceases to be the owner of at least one share standing in his name thereby ceases to be a director.

Finally, the Court had to determine whether service of summons upon the petitioners constituted valid service upon ALFA. Under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, service upon a domestic corporation may be made on its president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. Since the petitioners claimed that they had already ceased to be directors and officers, the validity of the service depended upon whether they still occupied any of the positions authorized by the Rule to receive summons for ALFA.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition. It held that the voting trust agreement transferred the legal ownership of the shares covered by the agreement to DBP as trustee. Although the original stockholders retained equitable or beneficial ownership, the legal title to the shares was vested in DBP. The Court explained that a voting trust agreement creates a separation between the equitable or beneficial ownership of the shares and the legal title to them. The trustee becomes the stockholder of record with respect to the shares covered by the agreement.

The Court held that the petitioners consequently ceased to be directors of ALFA. Section 23 of the Corporation Code makes legal title to at least one share, as appearing on the corporation's books, material to a person's qualification as director. The Court emphasized that what is material under the present Corporation Code is legal title, not beneficial ownership. Because the petitioners had transferred all their shares to DBP, they no longer had even one share standing in their names on ALFA's books. The transfer therefore created vacancies in their respective positions as directors.

The Court also rejected the argument that the voting trust agreement had already expired after five years. Although Section 59 generally limits a voting trust to five years, the agreement in this case was connected with ALFA's obligations to DBP. Its terms expressly provided that the agreement would last for five years and would be renewable for as long as ALFA's obligations to DBP, or any portion thereof, remained outstanding. The Court found evidence that the voting trust had not yet terminated when summons was served on the petitioners in 1987. DBP had also taken over full control and management of ALFA. Thus, at the time of service, legal title to the shares still belonged to DBP.

The Court therefore held that service of summons upon the petitioners was invalid. Under Section 13, Rule 14, summons must be served upon a representative sufficiently integrated with the corporation to make it reasonable to expect that the representative would understand the responsibility of receiving legal process. Because the petitioners were no longer directors or officers of ALFA, they did not fall within the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The Court emphasized that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers and stockholders, and it can be bound only by acts performed within the authority of its officers or agents. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution and reinstated the RTC Orders dated April 25, 1989 and October 17, 1989

CASE DIGEST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pascor Realty and Development Corporation, Rogelio A. Dio, and Virginia S. Dio G.R. No. 128315, June 29, 1999 Third Division — Panganiban, J.

 

FACTS

By virtue of Letter of Authority No. 001198, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jose U. Ong authorized Revenue Officers Thomas T. Que, Sonia T. Estorco, and Emmanuel M. Savellano to examine the books of accounts and other accounting records of Pascor Realty and Development Corporation (PRDC) for taxable years 1986, 1987, and 1988. The examination resulted in a recommendation for the issuance of assessments amounting to P7,498,434.65 for 1986 and P3,015,236.35 for 1987.

On March 1, 1995, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a criminal complaint for tax evasion before the Department of Justice against PRDC, its President Rogelio A. Dio, and its Treasurer Virginia S. Dio, alleging tax evasion involving P10,513,671.00. Attached to the criminal complaint was the Joint Affidavit of the revenue examiners, which contained the details of the alleged tax liabilities. On March 23, 1995, respondents received a subpoena from the DOJ concerning the criminal complaint.

Respondents filed an Urgent Request for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, disputing the alleged tax assessment and liability. The Commissioner denied the request in a letter dated May 17, 1995, stating that no formal assessment had yet been issued. Respondents then filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), challenging the Commissioner's denial.

The Commissioner moved to dismiss the CTA case, arguing that the CTA had no jurisdiction because there was no formal assessment. The CTA denied the motion, ruling that the criminal complaint and the revenue examiners' Joint Affidavit constituted an assessment that could be protested. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA. The Commissioner then brought the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether the criminal complaint for tax evasion, together with the revenue officers' Joint Affidavit stating the alleged tax liabilities, constituted an assessment that could be questioned before the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court also had to determine whether the CTA could acquire jurisdiction over the case even though the Commissioner had not issued and served a formal assessment upon the respondents.

A related issue was whether a formal assessment is necessary before criminal charges for tax evasion may be instituted. The Court considered the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), particularly Section 205, which authorized the collection of delinquent taxes through civil or criminal action, and Section 223(a), which provided that in cases involving failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed or a proceeding in court may be begun without assessment.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals, and DISMISSED CTA Case No. 5271. The Court held that the revenue officers' Joint Affidavit attached to the criminal complaint was not an assessment that could be questioned before the CTA. An assessment does not merely contain a computation of tax liabilities; it also constitutes a demand for payment within a prescribed period and signals the time when penalties and interests begin to accrue. Due process therefore requires that the assessment be served on and received by the taxpayer.

The Court distinguished an assessment from a criminal complaint. Before an assessment is issued, the taxpayer is ordinarily given an opportunity to submit position papers and documents concerning the proposed liability. If the Commissioner remains unsatisfied, a formal assessment is issued and served upon the taxpayer, specifically and clearly informing the taxpayer that an assessment has been made. A criminal complaint, on the other hand, is filed with the DOJ to penalize the taxpayer for violation of the Tax Code, rather than to demand payment of the assessed tax.

The Court further held that an assessment is not necessary before criminal charges for tax evasion may be instituted. Under Section 223(a) of the NIRC, when there is a failure to file a return, a proceeding in court may be begun without an assessment. The Court reiterated that the criminal charge need only be supported by a prima facie showing of failure to file the required return; a prior assessment is not required for the institution of the criminal prosecution. Thus, the absence of a formal assessment did not prevent the Commissioner from filing the criminal complaint before the DOJ.

The Court therefore ruled that the CTA could not take cognizance of respondents' petition as a disputed assessment, because there was no formal assessment issued and served upon them. The May 17, 1995 letter denying their request for reconsideration/reinvestigation likewise could not be treated as a final decision on a disputed assessment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the CIR's petition, reversed the Court of Appeals, and dismissed CTA Case No. 5271, with no pronouncement as to costs. 

CASE DIGEST : Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte G.R. No. L-31156, February 27, 1976 En Banc — Martin, J.

 

FACTS

On February 14, 1963, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Leyte seeking to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional for allegedly being an undue delegation of taxing power. Pepsi-Cola likewise sought to declare Municipal Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void. The challenge arose after the municipal government sought to impose a production tax on soft drinks manufactured within the municipality.

Ordinance No. 23 imposed upon soft-drink producers and manufacturers a tax of 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked. Ordinance No. 27, meanwhile, imposed a tax of one centavo (₱0.01) for every gallon of soft drinks produced or manufactured within the municipality. Both ordinances denominated the levy as a "municipal production tax." The parties stipulated that the two ordinances covered substantially the same subject matter and that their production-tax rates were practically the same.

The Court of First Instance of Leyte dismissed Pepsi-Cola's complaint and upheld the constitutionality of Section 2 of R.A. No. 2264 and the validity of Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27. It ordered Pepsi-Cola to pay the taxes due under the ordinances. Pepsi-Cola appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because the appeal involved pure questions of law.

Pepsi-Cola raised three principal objections: first, that Section 2 of R.A. No. 2264 constituted an undue delegation of legislative taxing power and that the resulting tax was confiscatory and oppressive; second, that the ordinances constituted double taxation and imposed a percentage or specific tax contrary to law; and third, that the tax was unjust and unfair. The Supreme Court therefore examined both the validity of the delegation of taxing authority to municipalities and the validity of the particular municipal tax imposed by Tanauan.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 2264 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power to tax. The general rule is that the power of taxation is legislative in character and ordinarily cannot be delegated by Congress to another branch of government. The Court, however, considered whether the same prohibition applies when Congress delegates taxing authority to municipal corporations or local governments for matters of local concern.

The Court also had to determine whether the delegation under R.A. No. 2264 was so broad as to be confiscatory or oppressive. Section 2 granted municipalities and municipal districts broad authority to impose taxes, fees, or charges on matters not specifically reserved by law to the national government. The question was whether the breadth of this authority rendered the statutory delegation invalid.

The second issue was whether Municipal Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constituted double taxation. Pepsi-Cola argued that the municipal production tax resulted in an additional tax burden on the same subject already subject to national taxation. The Court therefore examined the nature of the municipal tax and whether the constitutional or statutory prohibition against double taxation was violated.

The third issue was whether the municipal production tax was unjust, unfair, confiscatory, or oppressive. The Court considered the nature and amount of the tax, the purpose of municipal taxation, and the limitations imposed by law and the Constitution on the exercise of delegated taxing power.

HELD

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte and upheld the validity of the challenged municipal taxing power. It held that Section 2 of R.A. No. 2264 was constitutional. Although taxation is inherently a legislative power, the Court explained that the prohibition against delegation does not apply in the same manner to municipal corporations, because the legislative power to create political subdivisions for purposes of local self-government necessarily includes the authority to confer upon them appropriate powers of taxation.

The Court explained that taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty and is primarily legislative in character. Nevertheless, Congress may delegate taxing authority to municipalities for matters of local concern. The Court found the delegation under the Local Autonomy Act sufficiently broad to provide municipalities with meaningful fiscal autonomy, but held that it was not unconstitutional merely because the delegation was broad. The municipality remained subject to constitutional and statutory limitations on the exercise of its taxing power.

The Court also rejected Pepsi-Cola's argument that the ordinances constituted double taxation. The Court explained that there was no prohibited double taxation merely because the same property or activity was subjected to taxation by different governmental authorities. For double taxation to be objectionable in the constitutional sense, the same subject must generally be taxed twice for the same purpose by the same taxing authority within the same jurisdiction and taxing period. The municipal production tax was imposed by the municipality pursuant to authority granted by law and did not constitute prohibited double taxation.

The Court likewise rejected the claim that the tax was confiscatory, oppressive, unjust, or unfair. It found no sufficient basis to conclude that the tax imposed by Tanauan exceeded the municipality's lawful taxing authority. The Court recognized that municipalities require sufficient sources of revenue to perform their governmental functions and that the Constitution and law permit local governments to exercise delegated taxing powers subject to established limitations. Ordinance No. 27 was therefore sustained as valid and constitutional

CASE DIGEST : Republic of the Philippines (Presidential Commission on Good Government) v. Sandiganbayan and Victor Africa G.R. Nos. 107789 & 147214, April 30, 2003 Supreme Court En Banc — Carpio Morales, J.

 

FACTS

The consolidated cases arose from a controversy involving Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) and the PCGG's sequestration of certain ETPI shares. On August 7, 1991, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an ETPI stockholders' meeting during which a PCGG-controlled Board of Directors was elected. A subsequent special stockholders' meeting was convened by the registered ETPI stockholders, during which another set of directors was elected. Thus, two sets of directors and officers claimed authority over ETPI. Victor Africa, an ETPI stockholder, alleged that the PCGG had been illegally exercising stockholder rights over ETPI, particularly in the election of directors.

Africa later asked the Sandiganbayan to order the calling and holding of ETPI's 1992 annual stockholders' meeting under its control and supervision. The Sandiganbayan granted the request and ordered that the meeting be held under its supervision. It directed that only duly registered stockholders, their authorized representatives, or proxies could vote. It also prescribed safeguards for ETPI while the ownership of the sequestered shares remained unresolved, including representation of the PCGG in the Board, access to corporate books and records, and restrictions on substantial corporate transactions.

The PCGG questioned the Sandiganbayan's resolution before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 107789. Meanwhile, Africa separately questioned the PCGG's authority to vote certain ETPI Class "A" shares, including shares that Africa claimed were not sequestered. In G.R. No. 147214, Africa sought to nullify votes cast by the PCGG in a later ETPI stockholders' meeting. The two cases were eventually consolidated because both involved the authority of the PCGG to exercise voting rights over sequestered ETPI shares and the proper manner of conducting ETPI's stockholders' meetings.

The Court examined the extent of the PCGG's powers over sequestered shares under its governing issuances and previous decisions, particularly Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG (BASECO) and Cojuangco v. Calpo. The Court emphasized that sequestration is a provisional remedy and does not, by itself, transfer ownership of the property to the government. The PCGG's authority must therefore be exercised only to the extent necessary to preserve the property and prevent its dissipation while ownership is being judicially determined.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether the PCGG could vote the sequestered ETPI shares in stockholders' meetings, particularly for the election of directors. The Court had to determine whether sequestration by itself gave the PCGG unrestricted authority to exercise the voting rights attached to the shares, or whether such authority was subject to limitations arising from the provisional nature and purpose of sequestration.

The Court applied Executive Order No. 1, particularly Section 3(b), which authorized the PCGG to provisionally take over business enterprises and properties in the public interest or to prevent their disposal or dissipation. The Court explained that this authority did not amount to an unrestricted power of ownership. In BASECO, the Court had already ruled that the PCGG could not exercise acts of dominion over sequestered, frozen, or provisionally taken-over property. Any interference with management had to be kept to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the purpose of sequestration.

The Court also considered the June 26, 1986 Memorandum of the President, which authorized the PCGG, pending determination of ownership, to vote sequestered shares in stockholders' meetings for purposes including the election of directors, declaration of dividends, and amendment of articles of incorporation. The Court held that this authority had to be construed consistently with the Executive Orders governing sequestration. Therefore, the PCGG could not exercise voting rights merely because the shares had been sequestered or because the shares represented a controlling or substantial portion of the corporation's voting power.

Another issue concerned shares allegedly transferred to the Republic under the Benedicto compromise agreement, shares represented by stock certificates found in Malacañang, and shares allegedly belonging to former President Ferdinand Marcos. The Court had to determine whether the PCGG could vote those shares before their ownership or transfer had been properly established and recorded in ETPI's Stock and Transfer Book. The Court also considered the applicable provision of Section 63 of the Corporation Code, governing the transfer and registration of shares of stock.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the PCGG may vote sequestered shares only under limited circumstances. It reiterated the rule in BASECO that the PCGG cannot exercise acts of ownership or dominion over sequestered property. The PCGG may exercise the voting rights attached to sequestered shares only when there are "demonstrably weighty and defensible grounds" for doing so or when voting is essential to prevent the disappearance or wastage of corporate property. The fact that shares are sequestered, or that they constitute a controlling or substantial portion of the corporation's voting power, is by itself insufficient.

The Court explained that the PCGG's intervention in the corporation must remain consistent with the purpose of sequestration. The objective is to prevent the disposal or dissipation of assets while the question of ownership is pending. Consequently, the PCGG should not ordinarily replace directors, alter the corporation's articles or by-laws, or make substantial changes in corporate policy merely because it possesses voting power over sequestered shares. Any intervention in management must be limited to what is necessary to preserve the property subject to sequestration.

With respect to the shares transferred to the Republic under the Benedicto compromise agreement, the Court held that the PCGG could vote those shares only after the compromise agreement had become final and executory and the transfer of the shares to the State had been entered in ETPI's Stock and Transfer Book. The Court applied Section 63 of the Corporation Code, which provides that shares of stock are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of an endorsed certificate, but that a transfer is not valid against the corporation until properly recorded in its books. The same principle applied to the stock certificates found in Malacañang and the shares allegedly belonging to Marcos: possession of stock certificates endorsed in blank did not, by itself, establish ownership or authorize the PCGG to vote them.

The Court further held that, to enable the PCGG to perform its conservatorship functions while ownership remained unresolved, it should have representation in the corporation and access to corporate records so that it could monitor possible dissipation or concealment of assets. Where the circumstances justified stronger safeguards, the Court approved measures such as an independent comptroller, a corporate secretary acceptable to the conservator, independent external auditors, PCGG representation on the Board and relevant committees, and prior approval for certain substantial disbursements, debts, and dispositions of assets. However, the Court held that these safeguards did not have to be incorporated into ETPI's articles and by-laws before the stockholders' meeting. The election of the Board had to occur first, after which the necessary amendments could be made in accordance with Section 16 of the Corporation Code, which requires the required Board and stockholder approval for amendments to the articles.

Accordingly, the Court recognized the limited authority of the PCGG to vote sequestered shares, subject to the requirements and limitations stated in the decision. It also held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in requiring the registration of the transferred shares in ETPI's Stock and Transfer Book before they could be voted. The Court's ruling preserved the distinction between sequestration and ownership and required the PCGG to exercise its powers only for the preservation of assets pending the final determination of ownership. 

CASE DIGEST : Lim Tong Lim v. Philippine Fishing Gear Industries, Inc. G.R. No. 136448, November 3, 1999 Third Division — Panganiban, J.

 

FACTS

Lim Tong Lim, Antonio Chua, and Peter Yao agreed to engage in a commercial fishing business. They agreed to acquire fishing boats and financed the venture through loans. Two boats, the F/B Lourdes and F/B Nelson, were purchased for ₱3.35 million, with ₱3.25 million borrowed from Jesus Lim, the brother of petitioner Lim Tong Lim. The boats were registered in Lim's name, but the Court noted that the registration was intended to serve as security for the loan. The parties also agreed that the expenses for refurbishing, repairing, and equipping the boats would be undertaken by Chua and Yao.

Because of the lack of funds, another ₱1 million loan was extended to the partnership. In connection with this loan, Chua and Yao entrusted the ownership papers of two other fishing boats to Lim. Thereafter, Chua and Yao purchased fishing nets and floats from Philippine Fishing Gear Industries, Inc. in the name of "Ocean Quest Fishing Corporation," their purported business name. The fishing nets cost ₱532,045, while the floats cost ₱68,000. The buyers failed to pay, prompting Philippine Fishing Gear to file a collection suit against Chua, Yao, and Lim and to seek a writ of preliminary attachment.

The alleged "Ocean Quest Fishing Corporation" was found to be nonexistent as a corporation according to a Certification from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The trial court therefore treated Chua, Yao, and Lim as general partners. The RTC found that a partnership existed based on the parties' conduct and a subsequent Compromise Agreement they entered into in another case. Under that agreement, the parties agreed to sell the four fishing vessels for ₱5.75 million, apply the proceeds to their obligations, and divide any excess or deficiency equally among Lim, Chua, and Yao.

The RTC ruled that Lim, Chua, and Yao were jointly liable for the unpaid fishing nets and floats. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that they had undertaken a partnership for commercial fishing. Lim then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court, arguing that no partnership existed, that he was merely a lessor of the boats, that he had not participated in purchasing the nets, and that he should not be liable under the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether a partnership existed among Lim, Chua, and Yao, such that Lim could be held liable for the fishing nets and floats purchased for their fishing venture. The Court examined their agreement, their contributions to the venture, their agreement to divide profits and losses, and their subsequent conduct.

The Court also had to determine whether Lim could avoid liability by claiming that he was merely a lessor of the fishing boats and that he did not personally purchase the nets and floats from Philippine Fishing Gear. Lim argued that the purchase negotiations were conducted only by Chua and Yao and that his name did not appear in the contracts with the respondent.

Another issue was whether Lim could escape liability because the supposed Ocean Quest Fishing Corporation was never legally incorporated. Lim invoked the doctrine of corporation by estoppel and argued that only Chua and Yao, who dealt directly with Philippine Fishing Gear in the name of the supposed corporation, should be liable for the purchase.

Finally, Lim questioned the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment over the fishing nets. The Court therefore considered whether the attachment was proper, particularly because the nets were acquired and used in the fishing venture and because ownership of the nets had been retained by Philippine Fishing Gear until full payment.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that a partnership existed among Lim, Chua, and Yao under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, which provides that by a contract of partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. The Court explained that their contribution to the common fund did not have to consist of cash or fixed assets; it could also consist of credit or industry.

The Court found that the parties had agreed to engage in a fishing business, acquired the boats through borrowed money, and agreed to divide equally any profits or losses arising from the sale and operation of the vessels. These circumstances established the existence of their partnership. The Court also held that the partnership extended to the purchase of the fishing nets and floats because these items were essential to the fishing business. Lim's claim that he was merely a lessor was rejected because his conduct—including consenting to the sale of the boats to pay the partnership's debt—was inconsistent with an ordinary lessor-lessee relationship.

The Court further applied Section 21 of the Corporation Code, concerning corporation by estoppel. The provision states that persons who assume to act as a corporation, knowing that they have no authority to do so, are liable as general partners for debts, liabilities, and damages incurred as a result. The Court explained that even if an ostensible corporation is legally nonexistent, persons who act on its behalf or knowingly benefit from transactions made by it may be held liable. Although Lim did not directly transact with Philippine Fishing Gear, he benefited from the use of the fishing nets because they were placed on the F/B Lourdes, which the Court found to be a partnership asset. He was therefore covered by the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.

The Court also held that the writ of preliminary attachment was proper. The F/B Lourdes was an asset of the partnership, while the nets and floats were specifically manufactured and acquired for the fishing venture. Moreover, ownership of the nets remained with Philippine Fishing Gear until full payment. The Court therefore DENIED the petition, affirmed the Court of Appeals, and ordered costs against Lim Tong Lim. The Court emphasized that the partners were liable for debts incurred by or on behalf of the partnership, and that a person who benefits from a contract entered into on behalf of an ostensible corporation may likewise be held liable.

CASE DIGEST : Alejandro D.C. Roque v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 211108, June 7, 2017 Third Division — Tijam, J.

 

FACTS

Barangay Mulawin Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association, Inc. (BMTODA) became a corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on November 17, 1993. In August 2003, Oscar Ongjoco, a member of BMTODA, learned that funds of the association were missing. He requested copies of the association's documents pursuant to his right to examine corporate records under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. Rosalyn Singson, BMTODA's Secretary, denied his request. Ongjoco also learned that the incumbent officers had already been holding office for three years, despite the association's by-laws providing for a one-year term. He then requested from Alejandro D.C. Roque, BMTODA's President, a copy of the list of members, the franchise numbers of their tricycles, and the franchise fees paid by each member. Roque likewise denied the request. 

Ongjoco subsequently filed an affidavit-complaint against Roque and Singson for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. The prosecution alleged that, despite written demands, Roque and Singson willfully refused to allow a member of BMTODA to examine and copy the association's records and minutes. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and an Information was filed against both officers. After the prosecution rested its case, Roque and Singson filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, together with a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the demurrer and dismissed the criminal case. It reasoned that the prosecution had failed to prove that BMTODA was a corporation, and therefore a violation of the Corporation Code could not be committed by its officers. On petition, however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC. The CA found that BMTODA was a duly registered corporation, relying on the documentary evidence showing that its registration had previously been revoked and was subsequently lifted. The case was remanded to the RTC for the presentation of the defense evidence.

Roque then went to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence proving BMTODA's corporate existence and that he therefore could not be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the Corporation Code. He also argued that BMTODA's registration had already been revoked when Ongjoco made his request and that Singson, rather than he, had denied Ongjoco's request. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether Roque could be prosecuted under Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code for refusing a member's written request to examine and obtain copies of BMTODA's corporate records. This required the Court to determine whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the existence of BMTODA as a corporation and whether the statutory requisites for a violation of Section 74 were present.

Under Section 74 of the Corporation Code, a director, trustee, stockholder, or member has the right to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's records and minutes, subject to the conditions provided by law. An officer or agent who refuses such examination or copying may be held liable for damages and may also be guilty of an offense punishable under Section 144. Section 144 provides the applicable penalties for violations of the Corporation Code.

The Court identified the requisites for liability under Section 74: (1) a director, trustee, stockholder, or member must make a prior demand in writing for copies of excerpts from the corporation's records or minutes; (2) an officer or agent must refuse to allow the examination and copying; (3) if the refusal is pursuant to a resolution or order of the board, liability is imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for the refusal; and (4) if the officer or agent claims that the requesting person was acting in bad faith, for an illegitimate purpose, or had improperly used information obtained from a prior examination, the contrary must be shown or proved.

The Court also had to resolve whether BMTODA's revocation of registration prevented the enforcement of the member's right to inspect its records. Roque argued that BMTODA had ceased to exist as a corporation when its registration was revoked. The Court therefore considered the effect of the revocation, particularly because the SEC subsequently lifted the revocation and restored BMTODA's active status.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED in toto the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Ongjoco, as a member of BMTODA, had the right under Section 74 of the Corporation Code to examine and obtain copies of the association's pertinent records. The Court found that the statutory requisites were present: Ongjoco made written demands, and Roque and Singson refused to furnish the requested records. Thus, the refusal constituted a violation contemplated by Section 74, with the applicable penalty provided under Section 144.

The Court rejected Roque's argument that BMTODA was not proven to be a corporation. BMTODA had been registered with the SEC on November 17, 1993. Although its registration was revoked on September 30, 2003, the SEC subsequently lifted the revocation on August 30, 2004. The Court noted that Singson's letter-request was actually received on September 23, 2004, when BMTODA had already regained its active status. The Court further held that revocation of a corporation's Certificate of Registration does not automatically extinguish the corporation's rights and liabilities. Citing Clemente v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself extinguish or diminish its rights and liabilities or those of its owners and creditors.

The Court also rejected Roque's attempt to avoid liability by pointing to Singson's refusal. Roque himself admitted that he had denied Ongjoco's request for the list of BMTODA members, their corresponding tricycle franchise numbers, and the franchise fees paid by each member. The request made to Singson involved a different document. Consequently, Singson's denial did not detract from Roque's own separate and individual refusal. The Court therefore held Roque accountable for his own violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED in toto the Court of Appeals' Decision dated August 31, 2012 and Resolution dated January 22, 2014. The case was therefore remanded to the RTC for the presentation of the defense evidence, consistent with the CA's ruling