CASE DIGEST : Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013 Supreme Court, En Banc Ponente: Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

 

FACTS

Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of a 71,324-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, claiming that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession of the property for more than 30 years. To establish that the property was alienable and disposable, he presented a CENRO-DENR certification dated June 11, 2001, stating that the land was within the alienable and disposable area under Land Classification Map No. 3013, approved on March 15, 1982.

The RTC granted the application for registration. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed, arguing that Malabanan failed to prove that the property had been alienable and disposable for the period required by law and that his possession did not satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, ruling that possession before the land was classified as alienable and disposable could not be counted.

Malabanan elevated the case to the Supreme Court. While the case was pending, he died and was substituted by his heirs. The Supreme Court initially denied the petition in its April 29, 2009 Decision, finding that the heirs failed to sufficiently establish the required possession. Both parties sought reconsideration. The principal question then became whether land classified as alienable and disposable only in 1982 could be acquired through prescription under the Civil Code, or whether the applicant had to prove possession of alienable and disposable public land since June 12, 1945, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not the classification of the property as alienable and disposable in 1982 was sufficient to allow the property to be acquired through prescription under the Civil Code, despite the absence of proof that the land had been alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945.

Whether or not the petitioners were entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, based on their alleged possession of the property for more than 30 years.

Whether or not the property had already become private or patrimonial property of the State merely because it had been declared alienable and disposable, thereby making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription under Articles 1113, 1134, and 1141 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the denial of the application for registration. The Court held that the petitioners failed to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, as required under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. The evidence only established that the property was classified as alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. Therefore, the petitioners could not acquire the property through judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

The Court explained that Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides a specific statutory basis for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. It requires that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest must have possessed and occupied alienable and disposable lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership. The provision creates a conclusive presumption that the possessor has performed the conditions essential to a government grant. Since the petitioners failed to establish the required possession dating back to June 12, 1945, they could not rely on this provision.

The Court also rejected the argument that the mere classification of land as alienable and disposable automatically converted it into patrimonial property of the State. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State unless clearly shown to have been otherwise acquired. The classification of public land as alienable and disposable merely removes the restriction against its disposition under the Public Land Act; it does not, by itself, convert the land into patrimonial property. For prescription under Article 1134 of the Civil Code, there must first be a clear showing that the property has become patrimonial property of the State, because only patrimonial property may generally be acquired by prescription.

The Court distinguished judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 from registration based on acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2). Section 14(1), read with Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, concerns possession of alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain dating from June 12, 1945. Section 14(2), on the other hand, concerns lands that have already become private or patrimonial property and may therefore be acquired through prescription under the Civil Code. The petitioners failed under both provisions because they did not establish the required possession since June 12, 1945 and did not prove that the land had become patrimonial property of the State.

The Court further clarified that alienable and disposable classification is necessary but not sufficient for acquisition through prescription. Before prescription can run against the State, the land must have ceased to be part of the public domain and must have become patrimonial property. Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, property of public dominion becomes patrimonial property only when there is a declaration by the State that the property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth. The petitioners presented no such government declaration. Consequently, the property remained public land and could not have been acquired through ordinary or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied the motions for reconsideration and maintained the denial of the application for registration. The Court emphasized that possession of public land, no matter how long, does not automatically ripen into ownership unless the requirements imposed by the Constitution, Public Land Act, Property Registration Decree, and Civil Code are satisfied. In this case, the petitioners failed to establish the statutory requirements necessary to obtain judicial confirmation of imperfect title or to acquire the property through prescription