Administration of the Estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez — Eleuterio Neri, et al. v. Ignacia Akutin and her Children G.R. No. L-47799, May 21, 1943 En Banc — Moran, J.

 

FACTS

Agripino Neri y Chavez left a will in which he left all his property by universal title to the children of his second marriage. The children of his first marriage were the petitioners. They claimed that they had been preterited because, without being expressly disinherited, they were left nothing, or at least some of them were left nothing, under the will. The Supreme Court had previously annulled the institution of heirs and declared total intestacy.

The respondents moved for reconsideration, arguing that there was no preterition because the children of the first marriage had already received their shares in the property left by the testator. They further argued that even assuming there was preterition, its effect should not be the annulment of the institution of heirs, but merely the reduction of the bequest made to the children of the second marriage.

The Court examined the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning the properties allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. The Court found that the property remained claimed by children of both marriages and that the findings did not establish that the children of the first marriage had received their shares from the testator. The Court therefore concluded that the testator had left all his property to the children of the second marriage by universal title while leaving nothing to some of the children of the first marriage.

The Court accordingly found that the circumstances constituted preterition. It applied Article 814 of the Civil Code, which provided that the preterition of one or all forced heirs in the direct line annulled the institution of heirs, while legacies and betterments remained valid insofar as they were not inofficious.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether the children of the first marriage had been preterited, considering the respondents' claim that they had already received their shares in the property of the deceased.

The second issue was whether, assuming preterition existed, its effect was the annulment of the institution of heirs and the opening of intestate succession, or merely the reduction of the testamentary disposition in favor of the children of the second marriage.

The third issue was whether Articles 814, 817, and 851 of the Civil Code were applicable to the situation presented in the case.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the motion for reconsideration. It held that the children of the first marriage had been preterited. The Court found that the testator left all his property by universal title to the children of his second marriage and, without expressly disinheriting the children of his first marriage, left nothing to them or at least to some of them. This constituted preterition under Article 814 of the Civil Code.

The Court explained that Article 814 expressly provided that the preterition of one or all forced heirs in the direct line annulled the institution of heirs, while legacies and betterments remained valid insofar as they were not inofficious. The Court further held that Article 851, which concerned unfounded disinheritance, could not be applied because the case involved preterition and not disinheritance.

The Court also rejected the argument that the testamentary disposition in favor of the children of the second marriage should merely be treated as legacies or betterments and simply reduced. It held that adopting that theory would render Articles 814 and 851 meaningless because every institution of heirs could then be converted into a legacy or betterment and merely reduced. The Court stated that this would not be a construction of the Civil Code but a destruction of integral provisions concerning preterition and disinheritance.

The Court further held that Article 814 was in force, noting that the provisions of the Civil Code affected by the Code of Civil Procedure had been restored by Act No. 2141. It therefore maintained its ruling that the institution of heirs was annulled and intestate succession was opened. The Court also considered the circumstances indicating that the testator had omitted the children of the first marriage because he believed that he had already given them more property than the children of the second marriage. The motion for reconsideration was consequently denied