CASE DIGEST : VITANGCOL VS NEW VISTAS PROPERTIES

[G.R. NO. 176014 : September 17, 2009]

ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners, v. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS : Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1702 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (25311) 2528 of the Calamba, Laguna Registry in the name of Maria A. Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros

On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property described in the SPA as located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with Lot No. 1735 consisting of 242,540 square meters more or less. Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed on August 9, 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square meters situated in Calamba, Laguna.

Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers. he controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered into on August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit. Consequent to the Vitangcol-Maria Alipit sale, TCT No. (25311) 2528 was canceled and TCT No. T-482731 issued in its stead in favor of Vitangcol on August 15, 2001.

Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. By Order of November 25, 2003, the trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint[10] sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein that after the purchase and compliance with its legal obligations relative thereto, New Vista was immediately placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold to Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice

On August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the December 21, 2004 RTC Order

ISSUE : WON THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE TWELFTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER CHALLENGE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW

HELD : The Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It contains three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect that right; and (3) a breach of the defendants duty.[19] It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a right to file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.[20].

Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[22] However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded;[23] allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true;[24] and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.[25]

CASE DIGEST : SINGSON VS ISABELLA SAWMILL

G.R. No. L-27343 February 28, 1979

MANUEL G. SINGSONG, JOSE BELZUNCE, AGUSTIN E. TONSAY, JOSE L. ESPINOS, BACOLOD SOUTHERN LUMBER YARD, and OPPEN, ESTEBAN, INC., plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
ISABELA SAWMILL, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO LEON GARIBAY, TIMOTEO TUBUNGBANUA, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendants, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS : This is an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cage No. 5343, entitled "Manuel G. Singson, et all vs. Isabela Sawmill, et al.,". In a resolution promulgated on February 3, 1967, the Court of Appeals certified the records of this case to the Supreme Court "considering that the resolution of this appeal involves purely questions or question of law over which this Court has no jurisdiction. On June 5. 1959, Manuel G. Singsong, Jose Belzunce, Agustin E. Tonsay, Jose L. Espinos, Bacolod Southern Lumber Yard, and Oppen, Esteban, Inc. filed in the Court of first Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, against "Isabela Sawmill", Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, Leon Garibay, Timoteo Tubungbanua and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a complaint. Said defendants interposed a cross-claim against the defendsants Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua praying "that in the event that judgment be rendered ordering defendant cross claimant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount claimed in the latter's complaint, that the cross claimant whatever amount is paid by the latter to the plaintiff in accordance to the said judgment. ...5. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendants, Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, appealed to the Court of Appeals

ISSUE : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD : The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in so far as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of litigation, is defined in the amended Judiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any case the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. An action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to th category.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the cliam is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiciton is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject ogf the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

On the question of whether a court may nullify a final judgment of another court of co-equal, concurrent and coordinate jusridiction, this Court originally ruled that:

A court has no power to interfere with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and cannot be allowed to interfere with each others' judgments or decrees.

In December 1971, however, this court re-examined and reversed its earlier doctrine on the matter. Our conclusion must therefore be that a court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, suit to annul final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court... n the light of the latest ruling of the Supreme Court, there is no doubt that one branch of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental can take cognizance of an action to nullify a final judgment of the other two branches of the same court

The contention of the appellant that the appleees cannot bring an action to annul the chattel mortgage of the propertiesof the partnership executed by Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua in favor of Margarita G. Saldajeno has no merit.

As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party thereto. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may file an action to annul the contract. This Court has held that a person, who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract, may exercised an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he has no intervention.

CASE DIGEST : UNGRIA VS CA

[G.R. No. 165777 : July 25, 2011] 

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, AND RHODORA R. PELOMIDA AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, AND ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO, RESPONDENTS

FACTS : Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint[3] for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to DismissPetitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss[5] raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which the RTC denied in an Order[9] dated February 4, 2000. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10] asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint. In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.

In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petitionPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE : WON APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES

HELD : we find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.[23] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated

SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee

However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[30] we laid down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1.     It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.     The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.     Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[33] Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.[34] In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.

CASE DIGEST : MACABABBAD VS MASIRAG

[G.R. NO. 161237 : January 14, 2009]

PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr.,^* deceased, substituted by his heirs Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and Mary Grace Macababbad, and SPS. CHUA SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY,Petitioners v. FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY, Respondent 

FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD, AND SANTIAGO MASIRAG, Intervenors - Respondents.

FACTS : On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5] against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6] On May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint to allege new matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter. The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12] (hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00.[13] Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408,[14] presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.[15] Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his Petition for another owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.[17]

On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order[19] dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within the purview of the CAs appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint

ISSUE  :  WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision

HELD : A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[34] A question of law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.[35] No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law.[36] The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a calibration of the evidence. The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants notice of appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38] In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and on the basis of the environmental facts.[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had prescribed and that they had slept on their rights.[40] All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents appeal with the CA

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiffs cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the parties pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents complaint.

when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.[51] Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.

CASE DIGEST : CAPIOSO VS CAPIOSO

[G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002.]

LOLITA B. COPIOSO, Petitioner, v. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

FACTS : On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint2 for reconveyance of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar. Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00. The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration was denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of the twin orders of the trial court. The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the appellate court, hence this petition.

ISSUE :

HELD : The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation

Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real property involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC

Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST : FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.

FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court

ISSUE : WON  the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities

CASE DIGEST : INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS INTERPHIL LABORATORIES

FACTS : Prior to the expiration of the CBA or sometime in February 1993, Allesandro G. Salazar,1 Vice-President-Human Resources Department of respondent company, was approached by Nestor Ocampo, the union president, and Hernando Clemente, a union director.

In March 1993, Ocampo and Clemente again approached Salazar. They inquired once more about the CBA status and received the same reply from Salazar. In April 1993, Ocampo requested for a meeting to discuss the duration and effectivity of the CBA. Salazar acceded and a meeting was held on 15 April 1993 where the union officers asked whether Salazar would be amenable to make the new CBA effective for two (2) years, starting 01 August 1993. Salazar, however, declared that it would still be premature to discuss the matter and that the company could not make a decision at the moment. The very next day, or on 16 April 1993, all the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule of from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. At 2:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., respectively, the employees stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on. When Salazar inquired about the reason for their refusal to follow their normal work schedule, the employees told him to "ask the union officers." To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production of the company

On 14 May 1993, petitioner union submitted with respondent company its CBA proposal, and the latter filed its counter-proposal.

On 03 September 1993, respondent company filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare illegal petitioner union's "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal strike. On 22 October 1993, respondent company filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) an urgent request for preventive mediation aimed to help the parties in their CBA negotiations.

On 24 January 1994, petitioner union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike citing unfair labor practice allegedly committed by respondent company. On 12 February 1994, the union staged a strike

On 14 February 1994, Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order4 over the labor dispute. On 02 March 1994, Secretary Confesor issued an order directing respondent company to "immediately accept all striking workers, including the fifty-three (53) terminated union officers, shop stewards and union members back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike, and to pay all the unpaid accrued year end benefits of its employees in 1993

In the i, the case before Labor Arbiter Caday continued. On 16 March 1994, petitioner union filed an "Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Consolidate the Instant Case and to Suspend Proceedings" seeking the consolidation of the case with the labor dispute pending before the Secretary of Labor. Despite objection by respondent company, Labor Arbiter Caday held in abeyance the proceedings before him. However, on 06 June 1994, Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes, after finding that the issues raised would require a formal hearing and the presentation of evidentiary matters, directed Labor Arbiters Caday and M. Sol del Rosario to proceed with the hearing of the cases before them and to thereafter submit their report and recommendation to his office.

On 05 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

Petitioner union moved for the reconsideration of the order but its motion was denied. The union went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. n the now questioned decision promulgated on 29 December 1999, the appellate court dismissed the petition. The union's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied

ISSUE : WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD : On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike committed by petitioner union, it is undisputed that the petition to declare the strike illegal before Labor Arbiter Caday was filed long before the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued the assumption order on 14 February 1994. However, it cannot be denied that the issues of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" amounting to illegal strike before Labor Arbiter Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary

Anent the alleged misappreciation of the evidence proffered by the parties, it is axiomatic that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, when sufficiently supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded due respect by the Supreme Court

The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling.15 Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases.16 Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA

In any event, the parties stipulated:

Section 1.               Regular Working Hours — A normal workday shall consist of not more than eight (8) hours. The regular working hours for the Company shall be from 7:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. The schedule of shift work shall be maintained; however the company may change the prevailing work time at its discretion, should such change be necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company for the purpose of effecting control over working hours.17

It is evident from the foregoing provision that the working hours may be changed, at the discretion of the company, should such change be necessary for its operations, and that the employees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company.

More importantly, the "overtime boycott" or "work slowdown" by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work

Finally, the Court cannot agree with the proposition that respondent company, in extending substantial separation package to some officers of petitioner union during the pendency of this case, in effect, condoned the illegal acts they committed.

Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers obtained their separation benefits, they were still considered employees of the company. Hence, the company was merely complying with its legal obligations.25 Respondent company could have withheld these benefits pending the final resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps the financial hardships experienced by its employees and the economic situation prevailing, respondent company chose to let its employees avail of their separation benefits. The Court views the gesture of respondent company as an act of generosity for which it should not be punished

CASE DIGEST : NUWHRAIN VS CA

FACTS : On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)

Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotels basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotels Grooming Standards.

In view of the Hotels action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants

Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and charging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotels compound

On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.

Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting.

On the same day, the Secretary, through her January 31, 2002 Order, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration

Pursuant to the Secretarys Order, the Hotel, on February 1, 2002, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum,[9] directing some of the employees to return to work, while advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll reinstatement.

Unhappy with the Secretarys January 31, 2002 Order, the Union moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied per the Secretarys subsequent March 15, 2002 Order. Affronted by the Secretarys January 31, 2002 and March 15, 2002 Orders, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA

Meanwhile, after due proceedings, the NLRC issued its October 9, 2002 Decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02, in which it ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision

The Union then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision which was denied in the February 7, 2003 NLRC Resolution. Unfazed, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76568, and assailed both the October 9, 2002 Decision and the February 7, 2003 Resolution of the NLRC.

ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE ON JANUARY 18, 2002 DESPITE RESPONDENTS ADMISSION THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTELS GROOMING STANDARDS

HELD : Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit:

Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz.:

(1)   [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or

(2)   [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or

(3)   [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or

(4)   [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or

(5)   [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

(6)   [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.[18]

With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons

First, the Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings

Second, the Unions concerted action which disrupted the Hotels operations clearly violated the CBAs No Strike, No Lockout provision, which reads:

ARTICLE XXII NO STRIKE/WORK STOPPAGE AND LOCKOUT

SECTION 1. No Strikes

The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slow-down of work, boycott, refusal to handle accounts, picketing, sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes or any other form of interference and/or interruptions with any of the normal operations of the HOTEL during the life of this Agreement.

The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted no strike/work stoppage and lockout prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding

Third, the Union officers and members concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotels Grooming Standards but also violated the Unions duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code.

Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or holding a strike

Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures[21] presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.

Furthermore, this Court, not being a trier of facts, finds no reason to alter or disturb the NLRC findings on this matter, these findings being based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA.[22] Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[23] Likewise, we are not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arrived at arbitrarily and/or bereft of any rational basis

Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike. We, however, are of the opinion that there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel was able to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the commission of illegal acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61 Union member

CASE DIGEST : IMBONG VS OCHOA

FACTS Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law

ISSUE :  WON RH Law violates the right to health

HELD : SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination

CASE DIGEST : ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45081             July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, 

vs.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.

FACTS : At in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes. That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified. That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation. That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest. That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest. The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936. The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision,

ISSUE : Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

HELD : When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission..

CASE DIGEST : HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS REYES

FACTS : The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil Case No. R-19864.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge

ISSUE : WON The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program Violates the Constitution

HELD : There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns

The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.