CASE DIGEST : UNGRIA VS CA

[G.R. No. 165777 : July 25, 2011] 

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, AND RHODORA R. PELOMIDA AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, AND ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO, RESPONDENTS

FACTS : Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint[3] for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to DismissPetitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss[5] raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which the RTC denied in an Order[9] dated February 4, 2000. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10] asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint. In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.

In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petitionPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE : WON APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES

HELD : we find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.[23] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated

SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee

However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[30] we laid down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1.     It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.     The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.     Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[33] Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.[34] In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.