CASE DIGEST : GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero

 G.R. Nos. 158090               October 4, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,

vs.

HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, Respondents.

FACTS: On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a complaint7 against defendant Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago). In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110 (3538). "In the course of the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal – the exact identity and location thereof. Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the respective titles of the parties. It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff. On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not be done in the case for damages and injunction before it. On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed

HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action

CASE DIGEST : Moskowsky v. CA

 ASTA MOSKOWSKY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO C. DORIA, EDGARDO L. ALCARAZ, AND EVANGELINE E. DORIA, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner herein Asta Moskowsky, a German national, is seeking to recover her investments in an alleged joint venture with private respondents Antonio C. Doria, Edgardo L. Alcaraz, and Evangeline E. Doria. On August 10, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages. On November 16, 1989, after a protracted trial on the merits, the trial rendered a decision  in favor of petitioner. From that decision, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising both factual and legal issues. The Court of Appeals, however, rendered a decision dated May 5, 1995  dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of plaintiff-appellee's (petitioner's) alleged non-payment of docket fees with the additional finding that petitioner can no longer pay the docket fees prescription of the action has already set in

ISSUE: WON the CA is Correct

HELD: utmost circumspection should be exercised by appellate courts in dismissing appeals on grounds which can be readily verified from the records of the case. Litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

 

CASE DIGEST : Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. CA

 G.R. No. 140058            August 1, 2002

MABAYO FARMS, INC., herein represented by its President MRS. RORAIMA SILVA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO SANTOS, respondents

FACTS: On August 22, 1969, the Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino and Severino Vistan, lawful possessors of Lot 1379. In October 1970, petitioner bought the respective portions of Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan, totaling 69,932 square meters and entered into a compromise settlement with six other persons occupying the property, whose applications had been rejected by the Bureau. On December 20, 1991, the trial court decided the land registration case in petitioner’s favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In June 1997, a group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner. On October 9, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction. The trial court issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) and on January 16, 1998, the sheriff served copies on the defendants. On April 14, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and cultivating the disputed property. On February 24, 1999, private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 with the Court of Appeals. On August 27, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 in private respondent’s favor.

ISSUE: WON  private respondent may intervene in the court proceeding

HELD: Private respondent had no duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6695. Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only optional and permissive. For intervention to effect, the movant must have interest in the matter in litigation and the intervention must not unduly delay the said proceeding. The interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. As a stranger to the case, private respondent had neither legal interest in a permanent injunction nor an interest on the damages to be imposed, if any, in Civil Case No. 6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the case

CASE DIGEST : Yau vs Manila Banking Corp

 G.R. No. 126731               July 11, 2002

ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner,

vs.

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION,respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 128623

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.

FACTS: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment at Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On February 11, 1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene9 in both cases pending before Branches 62 and 64 of the RTC of Makati City. In an Order10 dated March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the motion to intervene. Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yau’s motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-271 in an Order dated July 1, 1993.11 Manilabank sought reconsideration12 but Branch 64 denied the same in an Order13 dated August 30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for certiorari14 before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32405. Yau filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion for order directing Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.16 Acting upon the motion, the said court issued an Order dated March 6, 1995. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on May 2, 1995 a petition for certiorari19 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC Cebu City dated March 6, 1995, and amended on March 30, 1995. On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision20 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37085 nullifying the Orders of RTC Cebu City. Subsequently, on January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC Makati City (Branch 64) dated July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.1âwphi1 A Motion for Reconsideration24 of the said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997.25

ISSUE :WON Yau may be permitted to intervene

HELD: A person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment. Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention "before rendition of judgment by the trial court."After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same.

CASE DIGEST : Saw v. CA

 G.R. No. 90580             April 8, 1991

RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE AND EVELYN SAW, petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding Judge of Branch 43, (Regional Trial Court of Manila), FREEMAN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, FREEMAN INCORPORATED, SAW CHIAO LIAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROSALIO G. SIGUA, respondents.

FACTS: A collection suit with preliminary attachment was filed by Equitable Banking Corporation against Freeman, Inc. and Saw Chiao Lian, its President and General Manager. The petitioners moved to intervene. Meanwhile, Equitable and Saw Chiao Lian entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to and was app roved by the lower court. The Court of Appeals1 sustained the denial of the petitioners' motion for intervention.  It also ruled against the petitioners' argument that because they had already filed a notice of appeal, the trial judge had lost jurisdiction over the case and could no longer issue the writ of execution.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner cannot intervene and did not divest the RTC its jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Intervention is "an act or proceeding by which a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, and which results merely in the addition of a new party or parties to an original action, for the purpose of hearing and determining at the same time all conflicting claims which may be made to the subject matter in litigation”. It is not an independent proceeding, but an ancillary and supplemental one which, in the nature of things, unless otherwise provided for by the statute or Rules of Court, must be in subordination to the main proceeding. The Court observes that even with the denial of the petitioners' motion to intervene, nothing is really lost to them. The denial did not necessarily prejudice them as their rights are being litigated in the case now before the Securities and Exchange Commission and may be fully asserted and protected in that separate proceeding

CASE DIGEST : Agulto v. Tecson

 G.R. No. 145276 November 29, 2005

ROLANDO AGULTO, MAXIMA AGULTO and CECILLE TENORIO, Petitioners,

vs.

WILLIAM Z. TECSON, Respondent.

FACTS: On August 25, 1997, the respondent William Z. Tecson filed an action for damages against petitioners Rolando Agulto, Maxima Agulto, Cecille Tenoria and a certain Maribel Mallari in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 79. The petitioners and Mallari filed their answer on October 29, 1997. They claimed that the respondent had no cause of action against them, alleging malicious prosecution. On November 19, 1998, the RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Respondent filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. On December 2, 1998, the RTC ordered the revival of the complaint. During the scheduled pre-trial on April 29, 1999, petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. The counsel for petitioners suggested that the pre-trial be reset to June 17, 1999. The RTC employee advised petitioner’s counsel that the suggested setting was not yet official as it would depend on the calendar of the court and the counsel of respondent. The pre-trial proceeded on June 17, 1999. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and to submit their pre-trial brief, the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his evidence ex parte. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 17, 1999 order of the RTC. They claimed that they were not notified of the pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Before the motion could be heard, however, the court rendered its July 12, 1999 decision in favor of respondent. After receiving a copy of the decision on July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their July 28, 1999 motions to cite respondent’s counsel in contempt of court and to set the decision aside. On September 24, 1999, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CA. On September 27, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition

ISSUE: WON the RTC is correct in rejecting and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration

HELD: the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. It does not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. Thus, sending a notice of pre-trial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. Here, no notice of pre-trial was served on counsel of petitioners in connection with the pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Hence, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued its June 17, 1999 order allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte.

CASE DIGEST : Barangay Piapi v. Talip

 G.R. No. 138248 September 7, 2005

BARANGAY PIAPI, herein represented by its chairman ANDRES L. LUGNASIN and LIBERATO LARGO, RITA LARGO, SABAS MONTECALBO, SR., CARLOS ZAMORA, DONATA SESICAN, DIZAR CASTILLO, ALEJANDOR GICALE, SALVACION SALE, PABLO MORASTIL, JOSE JAVELOSA, ISIDRA BERNAL, FELIX EGHOT, CORAZON EGHOT, ROSALINA REMONDE, ROA EGHOT, CEFERINA LAGROSA, MARIO ARANEZ, ALBERTO CAMARILLO, BOBBY DULAOTO, NOEL ZAMORA, MARTINO MORALLAS, DANILO FAILAGA, MARITA BRAGAT, NATIVIDAD LAGRAMON, RAQUEL GEROZAGA, SHIRLY CESAR, PIO ZAMORA, ANDRES LUGNASIN, ELPIDIO SESICAN, CRESENTA BORJA, CARLITO TANEZA, JR., MARCIAL RELLON, JEANILITO SUMALINOG, ALBERTO ZAMORA, and LUISITO LAGROSA, Petitioners,

vs.

IGNACIO TALIP representing the HEIRS OF JUAN JAYAG, Respondent.

FACTS: On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 3715. Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the land is only ₱6,030.00. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed value of the property is ₱41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet. On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 20, 1999. Hence, petitioners directly filed with this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial court’s Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction

HELD: Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant. It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners’ complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is ₱15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

CASE DIGEST : Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona

 G.R. No. 141375            April 30, 2003

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI, petitioner,

vs.

Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents.

FACTS: A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga on October 31, 1997. No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session issued Resolution No. 97-01. No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session issued Resolution No. 97-01. In denying the Municipality of Kananga’s Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of Kananga filed this Petition. In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction

HELD: Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear and determine a cause.7 It is a question of law. As consistently ruled by this Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law Because it is "a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

CASE DIGEST : Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca

 G.R. No. L-11390            March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng

FACTS: This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. it was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands. As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the action of the court upon said motion.

ISSUE: WON the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction

HELD: The word jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or over the property which is the subject to the litigation. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

CASE DIGEST : Bachrach v. Icaringal

G.R. No. L-45350             May 29, 1939

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., 

FACTS: On June 11, 1930, defendant herein, Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note. Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.

ISSUE: WON there is a splitting of cause of action

HELD: The SC held that contract that do several things is divisible but if the contract is entire and the breach is total there can only be one cause of action. It is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties. A complaint for the recovery of personal property with damages for detention states a single cause of action which cannot be divided into an action for possession and one for damages. SC rules that in absence of statutory provision, mortgagor may choose either to file personal action or real action to foreclose the mortgage but by no means it affect his cause of action be impaired for each two remedies is complete in its self

CASE DIGEST : Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation

 G.R. No. 167246               July 20, 2011

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner,

vs.

CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS: In January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease. On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City. The MTC-Branch 68 decided the ejectment case in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch 155, Pasig City affirmed in toto the MTC-Branch 68 decision. The case, however, was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, Pasig City because the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Branch 155, upon motion, inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC-Branch 267 granted the petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City. On December 4, 2002, the MTC-Branch 71 rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia. Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA. On August 20, 2004, the CA nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON there is litis Pendentia.

HELD: litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. There is litis Pendentia if there is 1. Identities of the parties 2. Identities of the of the cause of action 3. identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. SC ruled that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action. There are 2 tests in determining to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action. 1. Same Evidence Test, 2. whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other, 3. whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint. The third one is especially applicable to the present case and to which SC answer in the negative because the first case is about violation of the Lease agreement while the second case was for the expiration of the Lease agreement.

CASE DIGEST : PNB v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 121251 June 26, 1998

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO BARILEA, respondents.

FACTS: On 12 November 1991 private respondent Romeo Barilea filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental against PNB. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, petitioner filed on 17 January 1991 a motion to dismiss. On 18 February 1992 private respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the amounts prayed for as moral damages and attorney's fees. On 10 March 1992 the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for being moot and academic because the sale sought to be enjoined had already been conducted on 7 November 1991. The motion for reconsideration by private respondent was denied. Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 28 June 1995, the Court of Appeals set aside the order dismissing the case. Hence this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to hold that (a) the dismissal of the case by the trial court was justified after it had become moot and academic with the foreclosure sale; (b) denial of the ancillary remedy of temporary restraining order was proper; and, (c) the foreclosure of the mortgage was valid in view of the contract between the parties and conformably with the mandatory requirements of PD No. 385.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in Denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

HELD: A complaint sufficiently states a cause of action when the following questions are answered in the affirmative: (a) Does the complaint show the plaintiff has suffered an injury? (b) Is it an injury which the law recognizes as a wrong and for which it provides a remedy? (c) Is the defendant liable for the alleged wrong done? and, (d) If the defendant is liable, is there a legal remedy for such injury? Applying these criteria to the complaint of private respondent, the same alleged facts are sufficient to state a cause of action for damages The complaint alleged that private respondent suffered actual expenses, moral anxiety and public humiliation, as a result of the alleged premature and malicious filing of the petition for foreclosure of mortgage over private respondent's property. Since the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not have been dismissed regardless of the defense that may be raised by petitioner as defendant before the trial court

CASE DIGEST : Misamis Occidental II Coop., Inc. v. David,

 G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioners,

vs.

VIRGILIO S. DAVID, Respondent

FACTS: Private respondent Virgilio S. David filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II. The said case, which was essentially a collection suit, pending before Judge Felixberto Olalia. MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint. In his opposition to MOELCI II’s Motion, David contended in the main that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation letter," being merely an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into. MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must consider the complaint’s annexes. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, Judge Olalia issued an order dated 16 November 1995 denying MOELCI II’s motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. MOELCI II’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in another order issued by Judge Olalia. MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance of the two aforesaid orders. On 14 March 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed MOELCI II’s petition. With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court seeking a review of the appellate court’s pronouncements

ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion

HELD: To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. The Court cannot take cognizance of any external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegation in the complaint is sufficient, it cannot be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be averred by the defendants. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complain. SC believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion

CASE DIGEST : Chua v. TOPROS

 G.R. No. 152808 September 30, 2005

ANTONIO T. CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.

TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (TOPROS), INC

FACTS: On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a complaint against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to respondent TOPROS in the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos. On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue On August 9, 2000, Judge Pahimna issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties reside. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said order, which Judge Pahimna denied in its order of October 6, 2000. Hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed said petition. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit in its resolution of April 1, 2002.

ISSUE: WON there is an improper Venue

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. An action for annulment of mortgage is a real action if there has already been a foreclosure sale. In the Case at bar, it is not an action involving foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue

CASE DIGEST : Optima Realty Corporation V. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc.,

 G.R. No. 183035               January 9, 2013

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS: Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking spot in the Optima Building for a period of three years. On 9 March 2004, the parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months, commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006. Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in November 2005. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s productivity. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July and August 2005.9 On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals for the months of August to December of 2005 and January to February 2006, Optima informed it that the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed. On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint. In that Complaint, Hertz prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin petitioner from committing acts that would tend to disrupt respondent’s peaceful use and possession of the leased premises. On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the Summons. On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with Counterclaim. MTC ruled infavor of Optima. Hertz appealed the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Optima. On 18 June 2007, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of its assailed Decision. On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons, the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. Motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the CA. Hence this petition

ISSUE: (1)WON MeTC acquired jurisdiction (2)WON there is litis pendentia

HELD: (1) Yes, The Court ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over the person by summons or voluntary appearance of the defendant. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. One who seeks affirmative relief from court appears voluntarily and is deemed submitted to the jurisdiction of the court however party who make special appearance to challenge the court jurisdiction cannot be considered as to submitted to its authority. As shown from the records of the case, Hertz ask for a affirmative relief.

(2) Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions;(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and(3) Identity Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, the court find that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific Performance and those under the present Unlawful Detainer Complaint are different.

CASE DIGEST : Chester De Joya v. Judge Placido C. Marquez et al.

 G.R. No. 162416             January 31, 2006

CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

ISSUE: WON petition may seek relief from court

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the court since he refuses to surrender to the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court cited Justice Regalado stating that the court may acquires jurisdiction over the case even If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person as long as it acquired jurisdiction over the res as when it involves the personal status or property of the plaintiff. Such Summons by publication is only to satisfy due process requirements. Petitioner’s continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge

CASE DIGEST : Calimlim v. Ramirez

 G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982

MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint. Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. A second Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September 29, 197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition

ISSUE: WON the action is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations

HELD: The SC rules that in order to avail the defense of res judicata the decision must be held by a court who has jurisdiction to hear and try the case. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. It is settled that the RTC, acting as a land registration court, has limited jurisdiction. It cannot take on issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action. Issues raised by the petitioner refer to the ownership of the of the property. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate. Also, the petitioner cannot be faulted with laches since it is only 2 years and a half has passed since the dismissal of the petition. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances

CASE DIGEST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Pagbilao Corporation

 G.R. No. 159593             October 12, 2006

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.

MIRANT1 PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.)

FACTS: The CTA partially granted the claim of herein respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) for the refund of the input Value Added Tax (VAT) on its purchase of capital goods and services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996, and ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P28,744,626.95. The CTA subsequently denied the BIR Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution,8 dated 31 August 2001. Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated 30 July 2003. It was only after the CTA promulgated its Decision on 11 July 2000, which was favorable to MPC and adverse to the BIR Commissioner, that the latter filed his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 4 October 2000, averring, for the very first time, that MPC was a public utility, subject to franchise tax and not VAT; and since it was not paying VAT, it could not claim the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services. Hence this petition

ISSUE: WON a party can change his theory of the case on appeal.

HELD: The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. Courts cannot relax or suspend rules unless there is compelling reason to do so. Also, it is based on the sound discretion of the court whether such ground is good or sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the rules. The supreme court ruled there is no sufficient cause presented by the BIR in order to warrant the relaxation of the rules.

CASE DIGEST : SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc. and Watsons Personal Care Stores, v. City of Manila

 G.R. No. 197151               October 22, 2012

SM LAND, INC. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC., Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his official capacity as the Chief of License Division of the City of Manila, Respondents

FACTS: On the strength of the provisions of Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which amended Ordinance No. 7794, also known as the Revenue Code of Manila, herein respondent City of Manila assessed herein petitioners, together with their other sister companies, increased rates of business taxes for the year 2003 and the first to third quarters of 2004. Petitioners and their sister companies paid the additional taxes under protest. Subsequently, petitioners and their sister companies claimed with herein respondent City Treasurer of Manila a credit or refund of the increased business taxes which they paid for the period abovementioned. However, the City Treasurer denied their claim. Aggrieved, petitioners and their sister companies filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City a Complaint for Refund and/or Issuance of Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. On July 10, 2007, the RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of herein petitioners. The CTA Second Division sustained the ruling of the RTC that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and void. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CTA Second Division, however, denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc, contending that the CTA Second Division erred in holding that the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended. On December 17, 2010, the CTA En Banc rendered its assailed Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the CTA Second Division. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CTA En Banc in its Resolution. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended

HELD: The period to appeal the decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a Petition for Review is specifically governed by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, and Section 3 (a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision that to appeal a decision of the RTC to the CTA the petitioner should file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the adverse decision of the RTC. Following the rules on appeal of the RTC to CTA the original period of 30 days is not extendable except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended period shall not exceed 15 days. Petitioners further contend that the Order of the CTA Second Division granting petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review is invalid, since the case used by the Supreme court is not yet in effect. The Supreme Court does not agree. At the time that the CTA Second Division granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review, Republic Act 928215 (RA 9282), which amended certain provisions of RA 1125,16 were already in effect,

CASE DIGEST : Tan, Jr. v. CA

 G.R. No. 136368            January 16, 2002

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, respondents.

 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 19981 and its Resolution dated November 9, 19982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738. The Magdangals appealed to the Supreme Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657. In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, The Supreme Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of Supreme Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision 'has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory. On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION. In opposition to this motion Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION. Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by the respondent judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996. On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory." The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession. They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996.9 The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the Rules of Court Should be given retroactive effect

HELD: The Supreme Court held that section 1 Rule 39 should not be given retroactive effect. As a General Rule The rules of court should be given effect. however, It has well-delineated exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous.