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CASE DIGEST : CASE DIGEST Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and MABINI v. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, et al. G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985 Supreme Court, En Banc Ponente: Justice Emilio A. Escolin

 

FACTS

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) filed a petition for mandamus against government officials, principally Juan C. Tuvera, then Executive Assistant to the President. They invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and sought to compel the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette various presidential issuances that had not been published. These included numerous Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, General Orders, Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders issued during the Marcos administration.

The petitioners argued that laws and other issuances having the force and effect of law must be properly published before they can bind the public. They contended that publication was necessary because citizens could not reasonably be expected to obey or be penalized under laws or regulations of which they had not been given adequate notice. The petitioners therefore sought the performance of what they considered a ministerial public duty—the publication of the presidential issuances in the Official Gazette.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued that publication in the Official Gazette was not always indispensable to the validity or effectivity of a law. They relied particularly on Article 2 of the Civil Code, which then provided that laws generally take effect after fifteen days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. According to respondents, when an issuance itself provided for its own date of effectivity, publication was allegedly unnecessary because the date of publication would no longer be relevant to determining when the law became effective.

The Supreme Court also considered whether petitioners had sufficient legal standing to bring the action. The Court recognized that the petition sought enforcement of a public right, specifically the people's constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Because the duty sought to be compelled was a public duty, the petitioners were not required to demonstrate a personal or special interest different from that of the general public.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality or standing to institute a petition for mandamus to compel the publication of presidential issuances, despite having no personal or special interest in the subject matter.

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is mandatory for presidential issuances of general application before they may have force and effect, even when the issuance itself provides for its own date of effectivity.

Whether or not Article 2 of the Civil Code and Commonwealth Act No. 638 require the publication of presidential issuances of general application, and whether the absence of publication may be excused merely because the issuance specifies when it shall take effect.

HELD

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application. The Court held that petitioners had sufficient standing because they were asserting a public right. The petition sought to compel the performance of a public duty, and the right involved—the people's right to be informed of matters of public concern—was recognized under Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was then in force. The Court explained that requiring petitioners to show a personal and specific interest would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to enforce this public right.

The Court rejected the argument that publication is unnecessary whenever a law or presidential issuance contains its own effectivity clause. It explained that Article 2 of the Civil Code deals with the relationship between publication and the effectivity of laws, but it does not eliminate publication as a separate legal requirement. Publication serves a fundamental purpose: it gives the public adequate notice of the laws and regulations that will govern their conduct. Without publication, citizens would have no reasonable means of knowing the contents of laws that impose obligations or restrictions upon them. The Court emphasized that it would be unjust to impose penalties or burdens upon citizens for violating laws of which they had no notice, even constructive notice.

The Court relied as well on Commonwealth Act No. 638, particularly Section 1, which requires the publication in the Official Gazette of, among others, important legislative acts, executive and administrative orders and proclamations of general applicability, and other documents or classes of documents having general applicability and legal effect. Thus, the Court concluded that presidential issuances which are of general application must be published. The requirement is not limited to statutes enacted by Congress; it extends to presidential issuances that are intended to affect the public generally and possess the force and effect of law.

The Court consequently declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. However, the Court recognized the operative fact that some unpublished presidential decrees may already have been implemented or enforced before the judicial declaration. The Court explained that such prior implementation is a fact that may have produced consequences which cannot simply be erased retroactively. Therefore, the declaration that unpublished issuances have no binding force did not automatically invalidate every past act performed pursuant to them.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application. Until properly published, such issuances could not have binding force and effect against the public. The decision established that publication is an essential component of due process and fair notice, because people cannot be bound by laws and regulations that have never been properly made known to them

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