CASE DIGEST : Alejandro Manosca, Asuncion Manosca and Leonica Manosca v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996 Supreme Court, First Division Ponente: Justice Jose C. Vitug

FACTS

Petitioners Alejandro Manosca, Asuncion Manosca, and Leonica Manosca inherited a 492-square-meter parcel of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. The National Historical Institute (NHI) determined that the property was the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the NHI issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, declaring the property a National Historical Landmark. The resolution was approved by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports on January 6, 1986.

The Secretary of Justice was subsequently asked whether the government could acquire the property through expropriation. In Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice concluded that the property could be acquired because places possessing unusual historical interest may constitute a public use for purposes of eminent domain. Accordingly, on May 29, 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General and for the NHI, filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The Republic alleged that the property was needed as a national historical landmark and that its acquisition served a public purpose.

The RTC subsequently issued an order fixing the provisional market value at ₱54,120.00 and the assessed value at ₱16,236.00, and authorized the Republic to take possession after depositing the required amount. Petitioners moved to dismiss the expropriation case, arguing principally that the taking was not for public use or public purpose. They also argued that using public funds to acquire the property would amount to a direct or indirect use, benefit, or support of the Iglesia ni Cristo, allegedly violating Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, challenging the RTC's orders. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that ordinary appeal was an adequate remedy and that petitioners failed to establish grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, principally questioning whether the government's intended expropriation satisfied the constitutional requirement of public use.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Republic's expropriation of the petitioners' 492-square-meter property, which had been declared a National Historical Landmark because it was the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, constituted a public use or public purpose sufficient to justify the exercise of eminent domain.

Whether or not the concept of public use in eminent domain is limited to traditional purposes involving actual physical use of the property by the public, such as roads, bridges, schools, parks, and public buildings.

Whether or not the expropriation violated Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the appropriation or application of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of a religious sect or institution.

Whether or not petitioners were denied due process by the RTC in fixing the provisional value of the property and authorizing the Republic to take possession after the required deposit.

HELD

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and upheld the challenged rulings. The Court held that eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. The Constitution does not grant the power but regulates its exercise. The direct constitutional limitation relevant to the case is that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Court therefore focused on whether the intended acquisition of the property satisfied the requirement of public use.

The Court rejected the petitioners' narrow interpretation of public use. It explained that public use is not confined to actual physical use by the general public and is not limited to traditional projects such as roads, bridges, public buildings, parks, and similar facilities. The concept has evolved with changing social conditions and governmental functions. The Court held that “public use” should be understood in its general concept of meeting a public need or public exigency, and that public benefit, advantage, usefulness, or welfare may satisfy the requirement. The guidelines previously discussed in Guido v. Rural Progress Administration were not intended to restrict eminent domain to only those traditional forms of public use.

Applying this broader concept, the Court found that preserving the property as a National Historical Landmark constituted a legitimate public purpose. The government's objective was to recognize and preserve the historical and cultural contribution of Felix Y. Manalo, rather than to promote his religious organization. The Court emphasized that the principal objective of the taking, rather than incidental consequences, determines whether the purpose is public. Although members of the Iglesia ni Cristo might receive greater benefit from the preservation of the birthplace, such benefit was merely incidental and secondary. The fact that only a limited number of persons might directly benefit does not necessarily destroy the public character of the use.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that the expropriation violated Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional prohibition concerns the appropriation or application of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of a religious sect or institution. Here, the government's principal purpose was the preservation of a historically significant site, not the support of the Iglesia ni Cristo as a religious institution. The religious connection to Felix Y. Manalo did not transform the government's historical and cultural purpose into a sectarian one.

The Court likewise rejected the petitioners' claim that they were denied due process in the fixing of the property's provisional value. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard, and the records showed that petitioners had filed pleadings addressing the provisional value and other issues surrounding the expropriation. Thus, the mere fact that the RTC fixed a provisional value and authorized possession after the required deposit did not constitute a denial of due process.

Finally, the Court held that Noble v. City of Manila did not apply because the Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the petitioners and the Iglesia ni Cristo. Only the parties to that agreement could be bound by it; the Republic could not be prevented from exercising its power of eminent domain on the basis of a private agreement to which it was not a party. Accordingly, the Court found the CA's decision to be consistent with law and jurisprudence and DENIED the petition, with no costs.