FACTS
Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973, leaving a notarial will dated September 5, 1970. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and their six legitimate children. In her will, Leodegaria declared that she owned the southern half of nine conjugal lots and two parcels of land inherited from her father. She expressed her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied from the fruits of the properties.
In paragraph V of the will, Leodegaria provided for the division and distribution of her paraphernal and conjugal lands among her six children after her husband's death. She effectively disposed of her husband's one-half share in the conjugal properties. Felix Balanay, Sr. initially opposed the probate but later withdrew his opposition and executed an instrument entitled “Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights,” by which he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of their six children and confirmed the partition of the conjugal properties provided in the will.
The probate court initially gave effect to Felix Balanay, Sr.'s conformity and proceeded with the probate. Subsequently, another lawyer filed a motion seeking to withdraw the petition for probate and convert the proceeding into intestate proceedings. The trial court adopted the view that the will was void and, on February 28, 1974, dismissed the petition for probate, converted the proceeding into an intestate proceeding, and ordered the publication of notice to creditors. Felix Balanay, Jr. later sought reconsideration, asserting that the withdrawal of the probate petition had been made without his authority.
The trial court denied reconsideration and maintained that it had independently determined that the will was void. The Supreme Court considered whether the probate court properly passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will before determining its formal validity, and whether the provisions of the will were in fact sufficient to render the entire will void.
ISSUE
The first issue was whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity and in declaring the will void.
The second issue was whether the invalidity of certain provisions of the will rendered the entire will void.
The third issue was whether the testatrix could validly provide for the partition of the conjugal properties and require that the legitimes of the compulsory heirs be satisfied in cash.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that, because of the unusual provisions of the will and the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the probate petition, the probate court could pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before its formal validity had been established. The Court explained that where practical considerations demand it, particularly when the will appears on its face to be intrinsically void, the probate court may determine the intrinsic validity rather than allow the probate proceeding to become an idle ceremony.
However, the Supreme Court held that the probate court erred in declaring the entire will void. Under Article 792 of the Civil Code, the invalidity of one of several dispositions does not invalidate the other dispositions unless it appears that the testator would not have made the other dispositions had the invalid provision not been made. The Court found that the invalid provisions could be separated from the valid provisions without defeating the testatrix's general testamentary scheme.
The Court found that Leodegaria's statement that she owned the southern half of the conjugal properties was contrary to law because her share in the conjugal property was still inchoate and pro indiviso. This did not, however, invalidate the entire will. The Court likewise held that the provision requiring the estate to remain undivided during the husband's lifetime could not operate indefinitely. Under Article 1083 of the Civil Code, the estate could remain undivided only for the period allowed by law.
The Court further held that the provision requiring the legitimes to be paid in cash was contrary to Article 1080 of the Civil Code, because the testatrix had not assigned the whole estate to one or more children in the manner contemplated by that provision. Nevertheless, the will remained intrinsically valid subject to these limitations. The surviving husband could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal partnership under Articles 179(1) and 1041, although the renunciation, insofar as it constituted a donation, remained subject to Articles 750 and 752.
The Court therefore held that the will should proceed to probate. It emphasized that, except in an extreme case where a will is intrinsically void on its face, the probate court should first pass upon its formal validity. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, probate is generally mandatory. The Court also applied the principle that testacy is preferred to intestacy, and that an interpretation which gives effect to a testamentary disposition is preferred over one that would nullify it. The trial court was therefore directed to proceed with the probate of Leodegaria Julian's will.
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