In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Edward E. Christensen, deceased: Adolfo C. Aznar v. Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan G.R. No. L-24365, June 30, 1966 En Banc — Makalintal, J.

 

FACTS

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California domiciled in the Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao. In the will, Christensen expressly recognized Maria Lucy Christensen Daney as his daughter. He also left Maria Helen Christensen a legacy of ₱3,600.00, although he expressly stated in the will that she was not related to him and had never been adopted by him. Maria Helen was subsequently judicially declared to be his natural child.

In an earlier proceeding involving the partition of the estate, the trial court approved a project of partition based on the provisions of the will and the law of California. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the order and held that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law. The case was remanded to the trial court for partition in accordance with Philippine law.

The trial court thereafter approved a new project of partition that divided the properties equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan and Maria Helen Christensen Garcia. It held that Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will and that the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was therefore annulled under Article 854 of the Civil Code, resulting in intestate succession, subject to the legacies in the will. Lucy Duncan appealed.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Helen Garcia's receipt of the ₱3,600.00 legacy constituted preterition, which would annul the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir, or whether Helen Garcia was merely entitled to demand the completion of her legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code, leaving the institution of Lucy Duncan intact.

ISSUE

The first issue was whether Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was preterited within the meaning of Article 854 of the Civil Code, despite having been given a legacy of ₱3,600.00 in the will.

The second issue was whether Article 906 of the Civil Code applied, such that Helen Garcia would merely be entitled to demand the completion of her legitime rather than the annulment of the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir.

The third issue was whether Helen Garcia was entitled to one-half of the estate by intestate succession or only to her legitime equivalent to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.

HELD

The Supreme Court SET ASIDE the trial court's order approving the project of partition and remanded the case for a new partition. It held that Helen Garcia was not preterited because the testator had left her a legacy of ₱3,600.00. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code requires the complete omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from the will. Since Helen Garcia had received something under the will, there was no complete omission.

The Court explained that Article 906 applies when a compulsory heir is given by any title less than the legitime belonging to him. In such a case, the heir may demand that the legitime be fully satisfied. The Court distinguished this situation from preterition under Article 854, where the compulsory heir receives nothing under the will and the institution of heirs is annulled.

The Court held that although Helen Garcia was not named as an heir and her status as the testator's natural child was even denied in the will, the ₱3,600.00 legacy given to her prevented her from being considered completely omitted. The Court noted that the law had adopted the rule that a compulsory heir who receives something by any title, even if insufficient to cover the legitime, is not preterited but may only demand the completion of the legitime.

The Court therefore ruled that Helen Garcia was entitled only to her legitime, equivalent to one-fourth of the hereditary estate, rather than an equal share with Lucy Duncan as in intestate succession. The Court further held that Helen Garcia became the owner of her legitime upon the death of Christensen under Articles 774 and 777 of the Civil Code, and was consequently entitled to the corresponding portion of the fruits and increments of the estate, including stock dividends. The case was remanded for partition in accordance with the ruling.