CASE DIGEST : AQUINO VS AQUINO

 [ G.R. No. 208912. December 07, 2021 ]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C. AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 209018]

RODOLFO C. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO RESPONDENT.

FACTS : For this Court's resolution are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning a nonmarital child's right to inherit from her grandfather's estate. Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999, leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea), who had died earlier on September 27, 1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C. (Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo). On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate. Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her pregnancy with her.On November 12, 2003, Rodolfo opposed Angela's Motion, claiming that Arturo never legally recognized Angela as his natural child in his lifetime. On November 17, 2003, Abdulah filed his Comment on Rodolfo's Petition and moved for the issuance of letters of administration of Miguel's estate in his favor. Recognizing that Rodolfo had expressed his intention to yield the administration in favor of Abdulah, the trial court issued the letters of administration on September 3, 2004, and appointed Abdulah as administrator of Miguel's estate. On April 22, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order that granted Angela's July 2, 2003 and March 7, 2005 Motions. It ruled that the Aquino clan was already estopped from denying Angela's filiation. Rodolfo filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders. On August 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying Rodolfo's Petition on the grounds of wrong remedy and violation of the principles of forum shopping and res judicata. Rodolfo moved for reconsideration, but his motion was also denied in an August 1, 2013 Resolution. On September 30, 2013, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Review before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 209018. Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders before the Court of Appeals claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela could not inherit from Miguel ab intestato. On January 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of Abdulah. Angela moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 24, 2013 Resolution.. On October 2, 2013, Angela filed a Petition for Review before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208912. On October 21, 2013, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018. This Court denied both Petitions in its November 11, 2013 Resolution. On April 25, 2014, Angela moved to have the case referred to this Court En Banc. On April 29, 2014, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution granting Angela's Motion.

ISSUE : WON Angela can inherit from her grandfather's estate

HELD: YES, The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and the marital children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code. Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of the prohibition, reflected now in Article 992. The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate succession. But because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate succession. The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron curtain" separating marital and nonmarital relatives. Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents' relatives, there is no such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child as well. Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on their parents' marital status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real. This disparity of treatment was not left unnoticed. 

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay, among others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children. Nomnarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as nomnarital children of nonmarital children. This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives.

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the "grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation. Moreover, as pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on succession.

Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent is in issue is more in accord with our State policy of protecting children's best interests and our responsibility of complying with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.

CASE DIGEST : ADOLFO VS ADOLFO

 G.R. No. 201427

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner,

vs.

FE T. ADOLFO, Respondent.

FACTS : Civil Case No. MAN-4821 - On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud. In her Answer with counterclaim, respondent contended that while she remained married to petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she inherited from her mother. Respondent claimed in her Answer that the subject property was a portion of a bigger lot (mother lot) owned by her mother Petronila Tudtud which was covered by TCT T-15941. On October 11, 1967, her mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother lot – the subject property – to respondent. Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she alone redeemed from the Garcias; that the inclusion of petitioner’s name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co- owner of the property, but was merely necessary to describe respondent’s civil status. 

Civil Case No. MAN-2683 - In 1996, respondent’s sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The Complaint therein alleged that in 1988, respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the subject property, but that respondent refused to partition/subdivide the same even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and expenses of the sale. On May 15, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus nullified the 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent on the part of petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code.

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It reversed the May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. MAN-2683. and that the CA’s eventual finding in CA- G.R. CV No. 78971 that the subject lot was respondent’s paraphernal property cannot bind him because he was not a party to Civil Case No. MAN-2683.

On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision

ISSUE : WON Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence

HELD : Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading." Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted "if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." An answer would "fail to tender an issue" if it "does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action,51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent’s paraphernal property. Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, which became final and executory on June 23, 2007. The respondent included this development in her appellee's brief, but the CA did not take it into account. As an unfortunate consequence, the case was not appreciated and resolved completely.

Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner's case is left with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property to be divided between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be dismissed.

CASE DIGEST : REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR

 G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

Facts : Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Olaybar. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision. the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 

ISSUE : WON the RTC is correct.

Held : It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.