CASE DIGEST : Chua v. TOPROS

 G.R. No. 152808 September 30, 2005

ANTONIO T. CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.

TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (TOPROS), INC

FACTS: On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a complaint against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to respondent TOPROS in the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos. On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue On August 9, 2000, Judge Pahimna issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties reside. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said order, which Judge Pahimna denied in its order of October 6, 2000. Hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed said petition. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit in its resolution of April 1, 2002.

ISSUE: WON there is an improper Venue

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. An action for annulment of mortgage is a real action if there has already been a foreclosure sale. In the Case at bar, it is not an action involving foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue

CASE DIGEST : Optima Realty Corporation V. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc.,

 G.R. No. 183035               January 9, 2013

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS: Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking spot in the Optima Building for a period of three years. On 9 March 2004, the parties amended their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to two years and five months, commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on 28 February 2006. Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in November 2005. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s productivity. It then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July and August 2005.9 On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals for the months of August to December of 2005 and January to February 2006, Optima informed it that the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed. On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint. In that Complaint, Hertz prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin petitioner from committing acts that would tend to disrupt respondent’s peaceful use and possession of the leased premises. On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the Summons. On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with Counterclaim. MTC ruled infavor of Optima. Hertz appealed the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Optima. On 18 June 2007, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of its assailed Decision. On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons, the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. Motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the CA. Hence this petition

ISSUE: (1)WON MeTC acquired jurisdiction (2)WON there is litis pendentia

HELD: (1) Yes, The Court ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over the person by summons or voluntary appearance of the defendant. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. One who seeks affirmative relief from court appears voluntarily and is deemed submitted to the jurisdiction of the court however party who make special appearance to challenge the court jurisdiction cannot be considered as to submitted to its authority. As shown from the records of the case, Hertz ask for a affirmative relief.

(2) Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions;(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and(3) Identity Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, the court find that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific Performance and those under the present Unlawful Detainer Complaint are different.

CASE DIGEST : Chester De Joya v. Judge Placido C. Marquez et al.

 G.R. No. 162416             January 31, 2006

CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

ISSUE: WON petition may seek relief from court

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the court since he refuses to surrender to the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court cited Justice Regalado stating that the court may acquires jurisdiction over the case even If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person as long as it acquired jurisdiction over the res as when it involves the personal status or property of the plaintiff. Such Summons by publication is only to satisfy due process requirements. Petitioner’s continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge

CASE DIGEST : Calimlim v. Ramirez

 G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982

MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint. Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. A second Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September 29, 197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition

ISSUE: WON the action is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations

HELD: The SC rules that in order to avail the defense of res judicata the decision must be held by a court who has jurisdiction to hear and try the case. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. It is settled that the RTC, acting as a land registration court, has limited jurisdiction. It cannot take on issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action. Issues raised by the petitioner refer to the ownership of the of the property. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate. Also, the petitioner cannot be faulted with laches since it is only 2 years and a half has passed since the dismissal of the petition. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances

CASE DIGEST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Pagbilao Corporation

 G.R. No. 159593             October 12, 2006

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.

MIRANT1 PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.)

FACTS: The CTA partially granted the claim of herein respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) for the refund of the input Value Added Tax (VAT) on its purchase of capital goods and services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996, and ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P28,744,626.95. The CTA subsequently denied the BIR Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution,8 dated 31 August 2001. Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated 30 July 2003. It was only after the CTA promulgated its Decision on 11 July 2000, which was favorable to MPC and adverse to the BIR Commissioner, that the latter filed his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 4 October 2000, averring, for the very first time, that MPC was a public utility, subject to franchise tax and not VAT; and since it was not paying VAT, it could not claim the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services. Hence this petition

ISSUE: WON a party can change his theory of the case on appeal.

HELD: The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. Courts cannot relax or suspend rules unless there is compelling reason to do so. Also, it is based on the sound discretion of the court whether such ground is good or sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the rules. The supreme court ruled there is no sufficient cause presented by the BIR in order to warrant the relaxation of the rules.

CASE DIGEST : SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc. and Watsons Personal Care Stores, v. City of Manila

 G.R. No. 197151               October 22, 2012

SM LAND, INC. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC., Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his official capacity as the Chief of License Division of the City of Manila, Respondents

FACTS: On the strength of the provisions of Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which amended Ordinance No. 7794, also known as the Revenue Code of Manila, herein respondent City of Manila assessed herein petitioners, together with their other sister companies, increased rates of business taxes for the year 2003 and the first to third quarters of 2004. Petitioners and their sister companies paid the additional taxes under protest. Subsequently, petitioners and their sister companies claimed with herein respondent City Treasurer of Manila a credit or refund of the increased business taxes which they paid for the period abovementioned. However, the City Treasurer denied their claim. Aggrieved, petitioners and their sister companies filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City a Complaint for Refund and/or Issuance of Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. On July 10, 2007, the RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of herein petitioners. The CTA Second Division sustained the ruling of the RTC that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and void. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CTA Second Division, however, denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc, contending that the CTA Second Division erred in holding that the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended. On December 17, 2010, the CTA En Banc rendered its assailed Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the CTA Second Division. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CTA En Banc in its Resolution. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended

HELD: The period to appeal the decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a Petition for Review is specifically governed by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, and Section 3 (a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision that to appeal a decision of the RTC to the CTA the petitioner should file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the adverse decision of the RTC. Following the rules on appeal of the RTC to CTA the original period of 30 days is not extendable except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended period shall not exceed 15 days. Petitioners further contend that the Order of the CTA Second Division granting petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review is invalid, since the case used by the Supreme court is not yet in effect. The Supreme Court does not agree. At the time that the CTA Second Division granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review, Republic Act 928215 (RA 9282), which amended certain provisions of RA 1125,16 were already in effect,

CASE DIGEST : Tan, Jr. v. CA

 G.R. No. 136368            January 16, 2002

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, respondents.

 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 19981 and its Resolution dated November 9, 19982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738. The Magdangals appealed to the Supreme Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657. In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, The Supreme Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of Supreme Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision 'has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory. On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION. In opposition to this motion Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION. Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by the respondent judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996. On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory." The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession. They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996.9 The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the Rules of Court Should be given retroactive effect

HELD: The Supreme Court held that section 1 Rule 39 should not be given retroactive effect. As a General Rule The rules of court should be given effect. however, It has well-delineated exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous.