CASE DIGEST : GR NO 212448 AAA vs BBB

 G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner

vs.

BBB, Respondent

FACTS: Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. s can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case

RTC that while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Hence This Petition

ISSUE: WON Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

HELD: As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed

CASE DIGEST : JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

 G.R. No. L-15905             August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

FACTS : This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

ISSUE : WON the publication in question is a privileged communication

HELD : Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question

he publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged

CASE DIGEST : PANGILINAN vs CAYETANO

CASE DIGEST : PANGILINAN vs CAYETANO

GR 238875 March 16, 2021

SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM" AQUINO :CV, LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioners, 

-versus-

ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR S. PANELO, Respondents.

 

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a  Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March 17, 2018. Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations in New York, deposited the Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations' Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the notification from the Philippine govemment. On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon, Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros and Antonio Trillanes IV filed a  Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, 20 assailing the executive's unilateral act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, and its members, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn Balais-Serrano, among others, also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 239483. On August 14, 2018, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed its own Petition,24 and an Omnibus Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the Oral Arguments. Oral arguments were conducted on August 28, 2018, September 4, 2018, and October 9, 2018

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the Philippines validly entered into, the Rome Statute "has the same status as an enactment of Congress,"29 as "a law in the Philippines."30 They claim that the President "cannot repeal a law."

In G.R. No. 239483, pe,titioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its members assert that their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute.33 Citing a decision of the South African High Court, they also claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a multilateral treaty require the Senate's concurrence.

ISSUE : whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a  Note Verbale delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual

While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present consolidated Petitions revolve. All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into international agreements. However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by the Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive, and is balanced by the legislative branch. The textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the basic separation of powers and to a  system of checks and balances. Presidential discretion is recognized, but it is not _absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists on how the Philippines withdraws from, an international agreement, the president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis treaty abrogation may run counter to the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic operation of treaties,. The mirror principle and the Youngstown framework are suitable :starting points in reviewing the president's acts in the exercise of a power shared with the legislature, However, their concepts-and methods cannot be adopted mechanically and indiscriminately.'. A compelling wisdom underlies them, but operationalizing them domestically requires careful consideration and adjustment in view of circumstances unique to the Philippine context

Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts, and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements

1) The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes

2) the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to congressional imprimatur.

3) the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence

In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a  determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a  statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a  withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal

CASE DIGEST : POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 221697, March 08, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.

G.R. NOS. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ, Respondents.

FACTS : Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester. coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.". On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections.

ISSUE : 1) WON GRACE POE IS A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES

2) WON GRACE POE SATISFY THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION

HELD : 

(THE 4 REASON WHY THE SC RULED IN FAVOR OF GPOE ON CITIZENSHIP)

1-A) At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

1-B) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

1-C)Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

1-D) Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation

        D.1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

          D.2) The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)

       D.3) n 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations

2) (RESIDENCY) The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases. the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy. In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

CASE DIGEST : MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE VS ABAN

G.R. No. 175666, July 29, 2013

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CRESENCIA P. ABAN,Respondent

FACTS : On July 3, 1993, Delia Sotero (Sotero) took out a life insurance policy from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation. Petitioner issued Insurance Policy No. 747411 (the policy), with a face value of P100,000.00, in Sotero's favor on August 30, 1993, after the requisite medical examination and payment of the insurance premium. On April 10, 1996, when the insurance policy had been in force for more than two years and seven months, Sotero died. Respondent filed a claim for the insurance proceeds on July 9, 1996. Petitioner conducted an investigation into the claim. petitioner denied respondent's claim on April 16, 1997 and refunded the premiums paid on the policy. On April 24, 1997, petitioner filed a civil case for rescission and/or annulment of the policy. The main thesis of the Complaint was that the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment and/or misrepresentation under the Insurance Code. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that petitioner's cause of action was barred by prescription pursuant to Section 48 of the Insurance Code.On December 9, 1997, the trial court issued an Order granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA sustained the trial court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE : WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE APPLICATION OF THE INCONTESTABILITY PROVISION IN THE INSURANCE CODE BY THE TRIAL COURT

HELD : Section 48 serves a noble purpose, as it regulates the actions of both the insurer and the insured. Under the provision, an insurer is given two years - from the effectivity of a life insurance contract and while the insured is alive - to discover or prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. After the two-year period lapses, or when the insured dies within the period, the insurer must make good on the policy, even though the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. Section 48 regulates both the actions of the insurers and prospective takers of life insurance. It gives insurers enough time to inquire whether the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation; on the other hand, it forewarns scheming individuals that their attempts at insurance fraud would be timely uncovered - thus deterring them from venturing into such nefarious enterprise. At the same time, legitimate policy holders are absolutely protected from unwarranted denial of their claims or delay in the collection of insurance proceeds occasioned by allegations of fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation by insurers, claims which may no longer be set up after the two-year period expires as ordained under the law.

CASE DIGEST : SUN LIFE CANADA VS. SIBYA

G.R. No. 211212, June 08, 2016

SUN LIFE OF CANADA (PHILIPPINES), INC., Petitioner, v. MA. DAISY'S. SIBYA, JESUS MANUEL S. SIBYA III, JAIME LUIS S. SIBYA, AND THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ATTY. JESUS SIBYA, JR., Respondents.

FACTS : On January 10, 2001, Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. (Atty. Jesus Jr.) applied for life insurance with Sun Life. In his Application for Insurance, he indicated that he had sought advice for kidney problems. On February 5, 2001, Sun Life approved Atty. Jesus Jr.'s application and issued Insurance Policy No. 031097335. On May 11, 2001, Atty. Jesus Jr. died as a result of a gunshot wound in San Joaquin, Iloilo. As such, Ma. Daisy filed a Claimant's Statement with Sun Life to seek the death benefits indicated in his insurance policy. In a letter dated August 27, 2001, however, Sun Life denied the claim on the ground that the details on Atty. Jesus Jr.'s medical history were not disclosed in his application. The respondents reiterated their claim against Sun Life thru a letter dated September 17, 2001. Sun Life, however, refused to heed the respondents' requests and instead filed a Complaint for Rescission before the RTC and prayed for judicial confirmation of Atty. Jesus Jr.'s rescission of insurance policy. In its Complaint, Sun Life alleged that Atty. Jesus Jr. did not disclose in his insurance application his previous medical treatment at the National Kidney Transplant Institute in May and August of 1994. For their defense, the respondents claimed that Atty. Jesus Jr. did not commit misrepresentation in his application for insurance. The RTC held that Atty. Jesus Jr. did not commit material concealment and misrepresentation when he applied for life insurance with Sun Life. Aggrieved, Sun Life elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

ISSUE : Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC decision finding that there was no concealment or misrepresentation when Atty. Jesus Jr. submitted his insurance application with Sun Life.

HELD : In Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation v. Aban,22 the Court held that if the insured dies within the two-year contestability period, the insurer is bound to make good its obligation under the policy, regardless of the presence or lack of concealment or misrepresentation. Section 48 serves a noble purpose, as it regulates the actions of both the insurer and the insured. Under the provision, an insurer is given two years - from the effectivity of a life insurance contract and while the insured is alive - to discover or prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent. After the two-year period lapses, or when the insured dies within the period, the insurer must make good on the policy, even though the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. This is not to say that insurance fraud must be rewarded, but that insurers who recklessly and indiscriminately solicit and obtain business must be penalized, for such recklessness and lack of discrimination ultimately work to the detriment of bona fide takers of insurance and the public in general. In the present case, Sun Life issued Atty. Jesus Jr.'s policy on February 5, 2001. Thus, it has two years from its issuance, to investigate and verify whether the policy was obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. Upon the death of Atty. Jesus Jr., however, on May 11, 2001, or a mere three months from the issuance of the policy, Sun Life loses its right to rescind the policy.

CASE DIGEST : GUILLERMO VS USON

G.R. No. 198967, March 07, 2016

JOSE EMMANUEL P. GUILLERMO, Petitioner, v. CRISANTO P. USON, Respondent.

FACTS: On March 11, 1996, respondent Crisanto P. Uson (Uson) began his employment with Royal Class Venture Phils., Inc. (Royal Class Venture) as an accounting clerk. Eventually, he was promoted to the position of accounting supervisor, with a salary of Php13,000.00 a month, until he was allegedly dismissed from employment on December 20, 2000. On March 2, 2001, Uson filed with the Sub-Regional Arbitration. Royal Class Venture did not make an appearance in the case despite its receipt of summons. On October 22, 2001, Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera rendered a Decision in favor of the complainant Uson and ordering therein respondent Royal Class Venture to reinstate him to his former position and pay his backwages, 13th month pay as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Royal Class Venture, as the losing party, did not file an appeal of the decision. On May 17, 2002, an Alias Writ of Execution. But with the judgment still unsatisfied, a Second Alias Writ of Execution. Again, it was reported in the Sheriff's Return that the Second Alias Writ of Execution dated September 11, 2002 remained "unsatisfied." Thus, on November 14, 2002, Uson filed a Motion for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and Officers of Respondent Liable for Satisfaction of the Decision. On December 26, 2002, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued an Order. The order held that officers of a corporation are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to the employees. 

Guillermo who appears to be the owner of the said corporation which was alleged to be resolved, filed, by way of special appearance, a Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the Order of December 26, 2002. The same, however, was not granted as, this time. On January 5, 2004, Guillermo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order, but the same was promptly denied by the Labor Arbiter in an Order dated January 7, 2004. Guillermo elevated the matter to the NLRC by filing a Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer for a (Writ of) Preliminary Injunction dated June 10, 2004. the NLRC dismissed Guillermo's appeal and denied his prayers for injunction. On August 20, 2010, Guillermo filed a Petition for Certiorari. On June 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision which denied Guillermo's petition and upheld all the findings of the NLRC. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE : WON the piercing the veil of corporate fiction proper in the case

HELD: The veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors and officers or even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on execution, so long as it is established that such persons have deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so. 

A finding of personal and solidary liability against a corporate officer like Guillermo must be rooted on a satisfactory showing of fraud, bad faith or malice, or the presence of any of the justifications for disregarding the corporate fiction. 

It is our finding that such evidence exists in the record. In the case at bar involves an apparent family corporation. As in those two cases, the records of the present case bear allegations and evidence that Guillermo, the officer being held liable, is the person responsible in the actual running of the company and for the malicious and illegal dismissal of the complainant; he, likewise, was shown to have a role in dissolving the original obligor company in an obvious "scheme to avoid liability" which jurisprudence has always looked upon with a suspicious eye in order to protect the rights of labor. Then, it is also clearly reflected in the records that it was Guillermo himself, as President and General Manager of the company, who received the summons to the case, and who also subsequently and without justifiable cause refused to receive all notices and orders of the Labor Arbiter that followed. Finally, the records likewise bear that Guillermo dissolved Royal Class Venture and helped incorporate a new firm, located in the same address as the former, wherein he is again a stockl1older. The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid the obligations to Uson and frustrate the execution of the judgment award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will not countenance.