CASE DIGEST : PEOPLE v. RON RON SAN PEDRO Y SERVANO GR 219850 GAERLAN

[ GR No. 219850, Jul 14, 2021 ]

PEOPLE v. RON RON SAN PEDRO Y SERVANO                                                                                                    

FACTS : Ron Ron San Pedro was charged with raping AAA, a deaf and mute 19-year-old. The prosecution alleged that he took advantage of AAA’s condition, while the defense claimed that the intercourse was consensual. AAA testified—through writing and an interpreter—that she was drunk, fell asleep, and awoke to find Ron Ron on top of her; medical findings confirmed recent lacerations and injuries consistent with sexual assault. Ron Ron admitted to intercourse but argued consent, supported by his partner Matet, who claimed AAA later apologized. The RTC found AAA’s testimony credible, corroborated by physical evidence, and convicted Ron Ron of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, holding that AAA’s consistent and convincing testimony outweighed Ron Ron’s unsubstantiated claim of consent and lack of ill motive on AAA’s part.

ISSUE  : WON the CA is coorecr

HELD :The Court emphasized that under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, rape can be committed either by sexual intercourse or sexual assault, and conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of carnal knowledge through force, intimidation, or lack of consent. While Ron Ron admitted to intercourse with AAA, a deaf-mute, he claimed it was consensual. The Court, after reviewing the evidence, found several factors creating reasonable doubt. AAA initially told police it was a "misunderstanding" and signed a blotter entry with assistance, later re-filing the case only at her mother’s insistence. Testimonies and medico-legal findings showed an altercation involving a knife, consistent with both parties’ accounts, but unclear on who initiated force. AAA’s friend Matet, who was close to both, corroborated parts of both sides and testified that AAA later apologized for what she had done. Given these inconsistencies and doubts about the non-consensual nature of the encounter, the Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, underscoring the principle that conviction for rape requires clear, convincing, and credible evidence free from reasonable doubt.

CASE DIGEST : MIGUELA QUITALIG VS. ELADIO QUITALIG GR 207958 GAERLAN

 

[ G.R. No. 207958. August 04, 2021 ]

MIGUELA QUITALIG, PETITIONER, VS. ELADIO QUITALIG, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS : Miguela Quitalig filed a complaint before the MTCC claiming ownership and possession of a 19,798-square-meter parcel of land in Tarlac, which she said she bought from Paz Mendoza in 2001 and had possessed peacefully for over 30 years. She accused Eladio Quitalig of unlawfully entering, fencing, and cultivating the land in 2004, despite lacking any title, and sought his eviction, damages, and attorney’s fees. Eladio denied her claims, asserting that he was a lawful tenant of the landowner, Bonifacio dela Cruz, and presented receipts for lease payments as proof. The MTCC ruled for Miguela, recognizing her ownership and ordering Eladio to vacate and pay attorney’s fees. The RTC affirmed this decision, holding that Eladio failed to prove any right of possession. However, upon appeal, the CA reversed the rulings, finding Miguela’s evidence insufficient while giving more weight to Eladio’s tenancy claim, though it clarified that no agrarian tenancy relationship was established to warrant DARAB’s jurisdiction. Miguela’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE :  Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing Eladio Quitalig’s petition for review despite its procedural defects, particularly the absence of verification, certificate of non-forum shopping, and certified copies of pertinent pleadings and assailed decisions; (2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the rulings of the MTCC and RTC on a ground not raised by Eladio in his petition; and (3) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of evidence, particularly by giving improper inference and probative weight to the Tax Declaration and other documents presented by Eladio.

HELD : Miguela in her petition before this Court raised as an error CA's failure to dismiss Eladio's petition despite the lack of verification, certificate of non-forum shopping, certified annexes of the pertinent pleadings, and certified annexes or original duplicates of the assailed MTCC and RTC Decisions.[28]

Upon examination of the records of this case, it is undeniable that Eladio failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In his Comment for the Respondent with Motion and Manifestation,[29] he stated that he submitted his Compliance and Manifestation dated December 1, 2012 before the CA with the required verification and a certification against forum shopping, including all documents required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[30]

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires that a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA. It clearly states:

SEC. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals x x x. (Underlining supplied)

While Section 2 of the same rule requires that a petition for review from the RTC to the CA shall be, as alleged by Miguela, be accompanied by certified clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts and other material portions of the records and a certification against forum shopping, to wit:

SEC. 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of the same rule provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition, to wit:

SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Underscoring supplied)

While there is a plethora of cases that expresses the exception that "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice,"[31] it should not be forgotten that as a general rule –

Furthermore, no one has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari. These are statutory privileges which may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with by the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.[32] (Underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Verily, the party invoking the exception must allege, substantiate, and prove that his case falls under any of the exceptions.

In Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr.,[33] this Court cited the guidelines as well as the exceptions laid down in Altres v. Empleo,[34] with respect to non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping, to wit:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.[35] (Underlining supplied and citations omitted)

Clearly, "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons," when there is a need to relax the rules, are the only exceptions to the rule that non-compliance or the submission of a defective certification against forum shopping is not curable by its subsequent submission or the correction thereof.

The question really therefore is - was there a reason to relax the rules?

This Court finds no need to do so.

A careful perusal of the records of this case revealed that the Compliance with Manifestation[36] of Eladio merely stated that the reason for his submission of the documents is that "in order prove that the instant petition is meritorious, hence, should not be dismissed; this representation would like to manifest that attached herewith are the following required documents, to wit:"[37] Eladio undeniably did not allege, substantiate, and prove the need to relax the rules in his favor. He just made a general allegation that his petition is meritorious and claimed a substantial compliance to the rule.

More importantly, a review of the evidence presented by both parties reveal that the defense of Eladio to the allegation of Miguela that she is the rightful owner of the land in dispute, thus, is entitled to the possession thereof, is that he is a de jure tenant of the alleged owner of land, Bonifacio.[38] He capitalized on his belief that the case is under the primary jurisdiction of the DARAB and that since an agricultural tenancy exists between him and Bonifacio, the case should be filed before the DARAB.[39] He presented as proof of the agricultural tenancy receipts of lease rentals he paid to Bonifacio.[40]

It has been settled by the DARAB, MTCC, RTC, and CA that the case does not fall under the jurisdiction of DARAB as the agricultural tenancy is not between Miguela and Eladio. Still, Eladio maintained such defense[41] but this Court concurs with the courts a quo. The issue to be resolved does not involve an agricultural tenancy between Miguela and Eladio, which to begin with, never existed.

Moving on, this Court observed that in his Position Paper[42] submitted before the MTCC, Eladio stated that Miguela's claim of ownership is baseless and unfounded for the reason that the subject parcel of land is not part of the landholding acquired by Miguela.[43] He, however, also claimed that Miguela acquired her property by way of Absolute Sale dated March 19, 2001[44] and that the same is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 341528.[45] Also, the Acknowledgment of Absolute Sale executed by Paz, from whom Miguela acquired the land, stated that the land sold to Miguela was covered by TCT No. 280596.[46] To prove his claim that the landholding of Miguela does not include the land he is currently possessing, he submitted the tax declaration of Bonifacio.[47]

The CA, in ruling in favor of Eladio, held that the evidence he presented is weightier than that of Miguela. The CA held that Eladio was able to show through a tax declaration that the owners of the subject property are the heirs of Bonifacio.[48] This Court, however, is not of the same finding. It is noteworthy at this juncture that Eladio himself claimed that the landholding of Miguela is covered by TCT No. 341528, which fact was also included in the finding of the DARAB in a case between the same parties.[49]

Age-old is the rule that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears.[50] It is a conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.[51] Compared with a tax declaration, which is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership,[52] a Torrens title is a conclusive evidence of ownership.

Eladio never questioned the existence of a Torrens title under Miguela's name. In fact, what he averred as a defense was that the subject land is not a part of the landholding of Miguela, which he miserably failed to prove considering there is not an iota of evidence to establish such claim. Basic is the rule that in civil cases, the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.[53]

The case being for recovery of possession, the issue to be resolved is who has the better right to possess the property. It has been settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.[54] The person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[55]

The CA, in reversing the ruling of the MTCC and the RTC considered an issue which was never raised by Eladio. It explained that in order to arrive at a just decision and serve the interest, it exercised its discretion to waive the proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned.[56] It ruled that Miguela utterly failed to support her allegations.[57] It explained that although the matter was not included by Eladio in his assignment of errors in his petition before it, it was deemed proper to consider the same in order to arrive at a just decision and to serve the interest of justice.[58]

This Court begs to differ with the CA. The tax declaration of Bonifacio which Eladio presented as proof of his defense and considered by the CA as adequate to have proven that the real owners of the land are the heirs of Bonifacio, does not support his claim that the former is the owner of the land and that the same land is not included in the land acquired by Miguela from Paz. To reiterate, a tax declaration is not a proof of ownership but a mere proof of a claim of ownership.

To conclude, Miguela, being the owner of the subject land, has the right to the possession thereof.

CASE DIGEST : WENCESLAO EBANCUEL v. ROMULO ACIERTO GR 214540 GAERLAN

 

[ GR No. 214540, Jul 28, 2021 ]

WENCESLAO EBANCUEL v. ROMULO ACIERTO

FACTS : Buenaventura Ebancuel owned a two-hectare land in Masinloc, Zambales, covered by Title No. 97. After his death in 1948, his son Wenceslao, unaware of the property, later discovered it in 1974, paid the taxes, and found several occupants on it in 1981. His initial 1984 recovery case was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and he refiled in 1997. The respondents claimed they bought the land from Buenaventura or his predecessors in the 1940s and had possessed it for over 30 years. After Wenceslao’s death, his widow and children continued the case. Both the RTC and CA dismissed the suit, ruling that Wenceslao’s claim was barred by laches, as he delayed asserting his rights for decades without justifiable reason.

ISSUE : WON the Respondents  is entitled to possession of the subject property

HELD : The Supreme Court ruled that the registered owner’s right to recover possession of property is imprescriptible and not barred by laches, affirming that possession based merely on tolerance or unauthorized occupation cannot defeat a Torrens title. In this case, Wenceslao, who inherited the property from his father and later transferred it to Adoracion, acted within reason by asserting his rights after discovering the respondents’ illegal occupation. His delay was justified by circumstances such as childhood displacement and financial hardship, showing no abandonment of rights. The Court stressed that laches cannot override a statutory right under the Torrens system, which protects registered land from claims based on prescription or adverse possession. Meanwhile, the respondents failed to prove ownership, presenting no valid deeds of sale, unregistered transactions, and inconsistent tax declarations, which hold little evidentiary value. The Court concluded that the petitioners’ Torrens title and documentary evidence outweighed the respondents’ unsubstantiated claims, confirming that the latter were mere intruders without possessory rights over the property.

CASE DIGEST : OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. TEODORA T. HERMOSURA GR 207606 GAERLAN

 

[ G.R. No. 207606. February 16, 2022 ]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. TEODORA T. HERMOSURA, RESPONDENT

FACTS : Brenda Ortiz, a lending business owner, engaged Teodora Hermosura, a Computer Operator at the University of Makati, as her loan agent after successfully transacting loans together. Hermosura was tasked to distribute funds, collect payments, and remit them to Ortiz for a 5% commission. In 2007, Hermosura stopped remitting collections, allegedly admitting to using the money for personal needs before disappearing. Ortiz demanded repayment of over ₱40 million but received none, prompting her to file a dishonesty complaint before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found Hermosura guilty, imposing penalties of forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from public service despite her prior retirement. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that since Hermosura’s optional retirement preceded the filing of the case and there was no proof it was meant to avoid liability, she could no longer be held administratively accountable. The Ombudsman appealed, arguing her retirement was linked to the pending complaints, but Hermosura maintained it was bona fide. The Supreme Court was thus tasked to decide whether the Ombudsman retained jurisdiction despite her retirement and whether she was administratively liable for dishonesty.

ISSUE :  whether the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to hear the administrative complaint against Teodora Hermosura despite her prior retirement from government service, and (2) whether Hermosura should be held administratively liable for dishonesty based on her alleged failure to remit collections from the lending business

HELD : The Supreme Court ruled that resignation or retirement cannot be used to evade administrative liability, emphasizing prior rulings that resignation after discovery of an offense suggests guilt. It held that unlike in Andutan, where the resignation was forced and occurred long before any complaint, Hermosura’s optional retirement came soon after receiving demand letters warning of legal action, showing intent to preempt charges. Thus, the Ombudsman properly exercised jurisdiction. On liability, the Court found Hermosura guilty of simple dishonesty, not serious dishonesty, since her failure to remit loan collections involved a private transaction and caused no direct government damage. Her penalty was reduced to the forfeiture of six months’ salary from her retirement benefits.

CASE DIGEST : BENJIE LAGAO Y GARCIA v. PEOPLE GR 217721 GAERLAN

[ GR No. 217721, Sep 15, 2021 ]

BENJIE LAGAO Y GARCIA v. PEOPLE

FACTS : Benjie Lagao was charged with homicide for allegedly attacking and fatally injuring Anthony Nerida in Bauang, La Union, on February 20, 2008. Witnesses Ricardo de Guzman and Ryan Cruz testified that the victim told them Lagao struck him during an altercation, while the victim’s father confirmed the same account and testified about funeral expenses. Lagao denied the accusation, but the RTC convicted him, sentencing him to 8 years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day imprisonment, with damages to the victim’s family. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the victim’s statements were admissible as part of the res gestae, linking Lagao to the crime. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lagao argued that the testimonies were hearsay, lacked spontaneity, and that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. The prosecution, however, maintained that the lower courts’ factual findings were sound, emphasizing that any inconsistencies were minor and that the victim’s statements were credible evidence.

ISSUE : WON the RTC erred in relying upon these testimonies as basis for his conviction

HELD : The Supreme Court ruled that this case falls under an exception allowing it to review factual issues since the findings of both the RTC and CA were manifestly mistaken. It reiterated that the accused is presumed innocent and must be convicted only when guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found inconsistencies between the death certificate, which cited natural causes, and the autopsy report, which attributed the death to head injury, placing the evidence in equipoise—thus favoring acquittal. It also ruled that the victim’s statements identifying the petitioner were inadmissible hearsay, as they did not qualify as either a dying declaration (since the victim was not aware of impending death) or res gestae (as the statements lacked spontaneity and were made hours later during casual drinking). Since no eyewitnesses directly linked the petitioner to the crime and the prosecution’s case relied solely on hearsay, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, warranting the petitioner’s acquittal.

CASE DIGEST : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUFINO PABLO PALABRICA III GR 250590-91 GAERLAN

[ G.R. Nos. 250590-91. November 17, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RUFINO PABLO PALABRICA III, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS : Dr. Rufino Pablo Palabrica III, then Municipal Mayor of Dingle, Iloilo, was charged with two counts of violating Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) for (1) entering into a lease contract with the municipality—where he signed both as lessor (Mayor) and lessee (for his own clinic and pharmacy)—and (2) granting a business permit to his own establishment, Farmacia Francisca, in which he had a direct financial interest. The charges arose from a complaint filed by Zoilo “Boy” Suplemento Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman–Visayas, which later found probable cause and filed informations in 2016.

Despite his claim that he acted in good faith and with authority from the Sangguniang Bayan through resolutions allowing him to lease the stalls, and that issuing a business permit was merely a ministerial duty, the Sandiganbayan (Special Sixth Division) found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases. The court held that by entering into a contract and issuing a permit involving his own business, he violated the prohibition under Section 3(h) against public officials having a direct or indirect financial interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which they intervene in their official capacity. He was sentenced to six years and one month to eight years imprisonment for each count and perpetually disqualified from holding public office.

However, Associate Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez dissented regarding the conviction for granting a business permit (SB-16-CRM-1081), arguing that the issuance of a permit is an exercise of regulatory power, not a “transaction” under the law since it does not involve monetary consideration. Her dissent was later joined by Justice Michael Frederick Musngi in the denial of Palabrica’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE : WON the SB ERRED

HELD : The Supreme Court held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, allowing the appellate court to correct any errors or even modify the judgment. It emphasized that the presumption of innocence remains unless the prosecution proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt by establishing all elements of the crime charged. In this case, the issue was whether Mayor Rufino Pablo Palabrica III was guilty of two counts of violating Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The Court explained that the provision punishes public officers who either (1) intervene in a business, contract, or transaction in which they have a financial or pecuniary interest, or (2) have such interest when prohibited by law or the Constitution. The two informations charged Palabrica under the first mode. The Court ruled that the information in SB-16-CRM-1080 was valid because it sufficiently alleged all essential elements — that Palabrica, as Municipal Mayor, signed the lease contract both as lessor (for the municipality) and lessee (for himself), showing intervention in his official capacity and a financial interest inferred from his act of leasing a market stall for business. The Court rejected his claim that the information was defective or that his pecuniary interest could not be presumed, clarifying that these are matters of defense to be determined after trial.

The Supreme Court found that while Mayor Rufino Palabrica III was a public officer and had a pecuniary interest in his clinic and pharmacy operating in the leased market stalls, the prosecution failed to prove his actual intervention in the approval of the January 7, 2014 Contract of Lease. Evidence showed he had been leasing stalls since 1997, and the 2014 contract was merely a renewal with no irregularities or preferential treatment. Witnesses confirmed that he complied with all requirements and exerted no undue influence. His signing of the contract as both lessor (mayor) and lessee was done under Sanggunian Resolution No. 2012-32, which authorized him to represent the municipality in such contracts, pursuant to Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the Local Government Code. Since there was no proof that he approved his own lease or used his position to influence the process, his mere signing did not amount to “intervention” under Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, leading the Court to clear him on that count. However, for the second count (SB-16-CRM-1081) involving the issuance of a business permit to his own pharmacy, the Court found that his actual intervention was proven, as he personally approved and issued the permit — a discretionary act requiring compliance with laws and ordinances — thus satisfying the third element of the offense.

The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a business permit is not a “transaction” within the meaning of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the Court explained that the word “transaction” must be interpreted in relation to the words “business” and “contract” preceding it—both of which involve agreements with monetary consideration. A business permit, however, is neither a business nor a contract; it merely authorizes a person to engage in business, does not involve monetary exchange, and is issued only after compliance with legal requirements. The Court emphasized that Section 3(h) seeks to prevent the abuse of influence or authority in matters involving financial interest, which does not apply to the ministerial process of issuing permits in accordance with the law. Moreover, even if the issuance of a permit were irregular, such act would properly fall under Section 3(j) (knowingly approving irregular transactions), not Section 3(h). The Court further rejected reliance on R.A. 9485 (Anti-Red Tape Act) and R.A. 11032 (Ease of Doing Business Act) since these laws do not amend or apply suppletorily to R.A. 3019. Reinforcing the rule of strict construction of penal laws, the Court held that ambiguity in criminal statutes must always be resolved in favor of the accused, citing precedents such as Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, and Merencillo v. People, which consistently interpret “transaction” in Section 3 of R.A. 3019 as referring only to dealings involving monetary or pecuniary consideration.

CASE DIGEST : PATRIA C. GUTIERREZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 193728 GAERLAN

 

[ G.R. No. 193728. October 13, 2021 ]

PATRIA C. GUTIERREZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS : After former Tiwi, Albay Mayor Naomi Corral’s death in 1996, her husband, Dr. Bernardo Corral, sought her gratuity pay. Despite GSIS approval of ₱352,456.11 and its inclusion in the 1997 municipal budget, newly elected Mayor Patria Gutierrez withheld payment, citing alleged financial irregularities by Municipal Treasurer Corazon Pulvinar. Gutierrez repeatedly reported Pulvinar to the Department of Finance and the Ombudsman for supposed anomalies, though investigations later found only minor administrative lapses. Despite confirmation from COA and municipal officials that the gratuity remained unpaid, Gutierrez refused to release the funds, claiming reliance on an audit stating otherwise. Dr. Corral later filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan, accusing Gutierrez of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for unjustly refusing payment and causing undue injury. The Sandiganbayan found Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt, ruling that she acted with evident bad faith in delaying the gratuity’s release despite clear entitlement and existing appropriations, sentencing her to 6 to 9 years’ imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE : WON the SB erred in convicting Mayor Gutierrez

HELD : The Supreme Court ruled that Mayor Gutierrez’s petition lacked merit. It emphasized that under Rule 45, only questions of law may be reviewed, while factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are generally conclusive unless they fall under specific exceptions—which Gutierrez failed to show. Her claim that the lower court made “unfair inferences” did not qualify as grave abuse of discretion or factual misapprehension. Even assuming review was proper, the Court still upheld her conviction for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It found that as Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, Gutierrez acted with evident bad faith when she unjustly withheld the gratuity pay of Dr. Corral despite the existence of all required clearances, appropriations, and approvals. Her repeated refusal to release payment showed a dishonest and malicious intent, causing undue injury to Dr. Corral’s family amounting to ₱352,456.11, which remains unpaid even after 25 years. Thus, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision in full.