CASE DIGEST : PULIDO vs PEOPLE

[ G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 ]

LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Records show that on September 5, 1983, then 16-year old petitioner married his teacher, then 22-year old private complainant Nora S. Arcon (Arcon) in a civil ceremony at the Municipal Hall of Rosario, Cavite. The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31, 1995 which was solemnized by Reverend Conrado P. Ramos. Their Marriage Certificate indicated Pulido's civil status as single. Hurt by the betrayal, Arcon charged10 Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy on December 4, 2007. In his defense, Pulido insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null and void. In its June 22, 2009 Decision,13 the trial court convicted petitioner of Bigamy and acquitted Baleda. Pulido appealed his conviction to the appellate court on the ground that the first element of the crime, i.e., the subsistence of a valid marriage, was absent. The CA ultimately affirmed, the June 22, 2009 Decision of the RTC but with modification as to the penalty imposed. 

ISSUE: Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage as provided under Article 40 of the Family Code may be invoked as a defense in Bigamy cases.

HELD: SC find that there is enough basis to abandon our earlier pronouncement and now hold that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy. When the prior marriage was contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code while the subsequent marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the said law, we recognize the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code but only insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroactive to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was considered never married under the eyes of the law. Consequently, with the declaration of nullity of the first marriage, the first element of bigamy, that is, that the accused must have been legally married, was lacking. Thus, the accused was acquitted based on the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage as there was no first marriage to speak of. After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured. Article 40 of the Family Code

requires a judicial declaration of absolute nullity for purposes of remarriage but not as a defense in

bigamy. Article 40 did not amend or repeal Article 349 of the RPC. In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances for purposes other than remarriage, such as in action for liquidation, partition, distribution, and separation of property, custody and support of common children and delivery of presumptive legitimes. Applying the foregoing, Pulido may validly raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage in the bigamy charge against him. In fact, he assails the validity of his marriage with Arcon on the absence of a valid marriage license as per the Certification dated December 8, 2008119 issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar (Registrar) of Rosario, Cavite. To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

CASE DIGEST : AQUINO VS AQUINO

 [ G.R. No. 208912. December 07, 2021 ]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C. AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 209018]

RODOLFO C. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO RESPONDENT.

FACTS : For this Court's resolution are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning a nonmarital child's right to inherit from her grandfather's estate. Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999, leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea), who had died earlier on September 27, 1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C. (Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo). On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate. Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her pregnancy with her.On November 12, 2003, Rodolfo opposed Angela's Motion, claiming that Arturo never legally recognized Angela as his natural child in his lifetime. On November 17, 2003, Abdulah filed his Comment on Rodolfo's Petition and moved for the issuance of letters of administration of Miguel's estate in his favor. Recognizing that Rodolfo had expressed his intention to yield the administration in favor of Abdulah, the trial court issued the letters of administration on September 3, 2004, and appointed Abdulah as administrator of Miguel's estate. On April 22, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order that granted Angela's July 2, 2003 and March 7, 2005 Motions. It ruled that the Aquino clan was already estopped from denying Angela's filiation. Rodolfo filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders. On August 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying Rodolfo's Petition on the grounds of wrong remedy and violation of the principles of forum shopping and res judicata. Rodolfo moved for reconsideration, but his motion was also denied in an August 1, 2013 Resolution. On September 30, 2013, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Review before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 209018. Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders before the Court of Appeals claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela could not inherit from Miguel ab intestato. On January 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of Abdulah. Angela moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 24, 2013 Resolution.. On October 2, 2013, Angela filed a Petition for Review before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208912. On October 21, 2013, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018. This Court denied both Petitions in its November 11, 2013 Resolution. On April 25, 2014, Angela moved to have the case referred to this Court En Banc. On April 29, 2014, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution granting Angela's Motion.

ISSUE : WON Angela can inherit from her grandfather's estate

HELD: YES, The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and the marital children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code. Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of the prohibition, reflected now in Article 992. The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate succession. But because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate succession. The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron curtain" separating marital and nonmarital relatives. Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents' relatives, there is no such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child as well. Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on their parents' marital status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real. This disparity of treatment was not left unnoticed. 

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay, among others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children. Nomnarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as nomnarital children of nonmarital children. This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives.

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the "grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation. Moreover, as pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on succession.

Applying Article 982 in situations where the grandchild's right to inherit from their grandparent is in issue is more in accord with our State policy of protecting children's best interests and our responsibility of complying with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.

CASE DIGEST : ADOLFO VS ADOLFO

 G.R. No. 201427

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner,

vs.

FE T. ADOLFO, Respondent.

FACTS : Civil Case No. MAN-4821 - On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud. In her Answer with counterclaim, respondent contended that while she remained married to petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she inherited from her mother. Respondent claimed in her Answer that the subject property was a portion of a bigger lot (mother lot) owned by her mother Petronila Tudtud which was covered by TCT T-15941. On October 11, 1967, her mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother lot – the subject property – to respondent. Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property which she alone redeemed from the Garcias; that the inclusion of petitioner’s name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co- owner of the property, but was merely necessary to describe respondent’s civil status. 

Civil Case No. MAN-2683 - In 1996, respondent’s sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The Complaint therein alleged that in 1988, respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the subject property, but that respondent refused to partition/subdivide the same even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and expenses of the sale. On May 15, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus nullified the 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent on the part of petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code.

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It reversed the May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. MAN-2683. and that the CA’s eventual finding in CA- G.R. CV No. 78971 that the subject lot was respondent’s paraphernal property cannot bind him because he was not a party to Civil Case No. MAN-2683.

On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision

ISSUE : WON Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence

HELD : Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading." Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted "if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." An answer would "fail to tender an issue" if it "does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action,51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent’s paraphernal property. Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, which became final and executory on June 23, 2007. The respondent included this development in her appellee's brief, but the CA did not take it into account. As an unfortunate consequence, the case was not appreciated and resolved completely.

Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner's case is left with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property to be divided between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be dismissed.

CASE DIGEST : REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR

 G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

Facts : Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Olaybar. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision. the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 

ISSUE : WON the RTC is correct.

Held : It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

CASE DIGEST : RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and ESTRADA

 G.R. No. 206666               January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,

ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

Facts : On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy. On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558. Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification." In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. 

Issue : WON Estrada Pardon is Conditional thus barring him to run from any elective posisiton.

Held: No, Estrada's Pardon is not Conditional. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

CASE DIGEST : JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM vs JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.

 G.R. No. 169588               October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. In the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense. In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order. The respondent judge released a Resolution dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed

HELD: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 

CASE DIGEST : GALANG jr vs JUDGE GERONIMO

G.R. No. 192793               February 22, 2011

FESTO R. GALANG, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81; and NICASIO M. RAMOS, Respondents.

FACTS : On May 12, 2010, at 12:37 p.m., petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 8923, granting said request. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence. On June 8, 2010, petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time. On July 12, 2010, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee's Standing in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on July 22, 2010, the trial court issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion. On the other hand, respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.

ISSUE:  WON the petition for certiorari should not be filed with the Supreme Court but with the COMELEC.

HELD : If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.