FACTS : Accused-appellant Rufino Pablo Palabrica III, then Municipal Mayor of Dingle, Iloilo, faced two separate charges for violating Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan, arising from alleged acts committed on or around January 7, 2014. In Criminal Case No. SB-16-CRM-1080, he was accused of entering into a lease contract for a market stall in Dingle Public Market, effectively signing as both lessor (the Municipality of Dingle) and lessee (himself, as owner of his medical clinic and Farmacia Francisca), thus taking advantage of his official position. In SB-16-CRM-1081, he was charged with granting a business permit to Farmacia Francisca, in which he had direct financial interest, while exercising his authority as mayor. These complaints stemmed from a prior complaint filed with the Ombudsman, which, after investigation, found probable cause to indict him, leading to the filing of Informations before the Sandiganbayan in November 2016, and the issuance of a Hold Departure Order and warrant of arrest (later recalled upon posting of bail). Palabrica filed motions to quash the Informations, arguing lack of legal basis and violation of due process, but these were denied by the Sandiganbayan. During trial, the prosecution presented documentary and testimonial evidence from municipal officials and the complainant, establishing that Palabrica executed the lease contract and approved the business permit for his clinic and pharmacy, which had been occupying the stalls since 1996. Witnesses corroborated deficiencies in the business permit application, including lack of zoning clearance and certificate of occupancy, though Palabrica argued he acted in good faith under municipal ordinances and resolutions granting him authority to lease the stalls. The defense also presented evidence highlighting the continuity of prior lease agreements and his ministerial role in issuing permits, as well as his provision of free medical services. On July 19, 2019, the Sandiganbayan Special Sixth Division convicted Palabrica in both cases, sentencing him to six years and one month to eight years in prison per the Indeterminate Sentence Law and imposing perpetual disqualification from public office. Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez dissented regarding SB-16-CRM-1081, contending that issuing a business permit is an exercise of delegated police power, not a “transaction” involving monetary consideration under Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Palabrica was denied on November 15, 2019, with the dissent on SB-16-CRM-1081 maintained by Justice Fernandez and joined by Justice Michael Frederick Musngi.
ISSUE : WON the sandiganbayan erred
HELD : The Court’s ruling in this case carefully applies the law under Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), emphasizing the essential elements for criminal liability: (1) that the accused is a public officer, (2) that he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract, or transaction, and (3) that he intervenes or participates in that interest in his official capacity. In SB-16-CRM-1080, although the accused-appellant was a public officer and had a pecuniary interest in the market stall lease (as lessee of his clinic and pharmacy), the Court found no evidence of actual intervention in the approval of the lease: his signing was authorized by Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2012-32 and followed standard renewal procedures, without showing undue influence, special treatment, or alteration of terms, making his act insufficient to constitute “intervention” under the law. In SB-16-CRM-1081, while the accused-appellant did issue a business permit to his own pharmacy, the Court ruled that the issuance of a business permit does not constitute a “business, contract, or transaction” because it does not involve monetary consideration or profit; it is merely an authorization to engage in business. The Court relied on principles of statutory construction, including the plain meaning of “business,” “contract,” and “transaction,” and the doctrine of strict construction of penal laws, which requires doubts to be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, because the prosecution failed to prove all elements under Section 3(h) in both cases, the accused-appellant was acquitted, and his bail bond and hold departure order were canceled. The ruling underscores that mere signing or ministerial acts by a public officer, without evidence of corrupt intervention or pecuniary manipulation, cannot support a conviction under the Anti-Graft law.
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