CASE DIGEST : NAVAROSA VS COMELEC

CHARITO NAVAROSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HONORABLE DEAN R. TELAN, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan and ROGER M. ESTO, respondents.

FACTS : Petitioner Charito Navarosa (petitioner Navarosa) and respondent Roger M. Esto (respondent Esto) were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three (3) votes over respondent Esto

Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, respondent Esto filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. 129 (election protest) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (trial court). Petitioner Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case.

On 4 March 2002, after revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Esto

Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial courts ruling to the COMELEC (EAC Case No. A-9-2002). Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosas appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent Estos motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Estos motion.

In its Resolution dated 28 November 2002 (Resolution), the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the trial courts Order granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. The Second Division also found that respondent Esto duly paid the COMELEC filing fee.

Petitioner Navarosa sought reconsideration of this ruling but the COMELEC En Banc denied her motion on 15 April 2003.

Hence, this petition.

On 10 June 2003, the Court required the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of this petition.

ISSUE : WON the Trial court had power to order the stay of execution pending appeal

HELD :

to grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.[23] Petitioner Navarosa concedes respondent Estos compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the trial courts finding that there are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its decision.

Unlike the Election Code of 1971,[27] which expressly provided for execution pending appeal of trial courts rulings in election protests, the present election laws are silent on such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 (Section 2) of the Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies in suppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court.

he Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) and the other election laws do not specifically provide for execution pending appeal of judgment in election cases, unlike the Election Code of 1971 whose Section 218 made express reference to the Rules of Court on execution pending appeal The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that Section 3 of Rule 39 (Section 3) applies also in a suppletory character because its Siamese twin[30] provision, Section 2, is already being so applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying Section 2s application. We cannot countenance such argument.

T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.

Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in election protest cases

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of its affirmation.[31] Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: [T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions

As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the trial courts ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages, attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and authorizing him to assume the office. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of the supersedeas bond in the first place.

In sum, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[33] This does not obtain in the present case.