Friday, June 2, 2023

CASE DIGEST : JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM vs JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.

 G.R. No. 169588               October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.


FACTS: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. In the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense. In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order. The respondent judge released a Resolution dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed

HELD: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 

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