PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ATTY. ANNA LIZA R. JUAN-BARRAMEDA, MISCHAELLA SAVARI, AND MARLON SAVARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RUFINO RAMOY AND DENNIS PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS : Petitioners, who served as poll watchers during the 2010 Barangay Elections, filed complaints against Paul Borja and later against several barangay candidates for illegal electioneering. The Quezon City prosecutor found probable cause and filed three Informations charging the respondents with premature campaigning and soliciting votes on election day. The respondents sought reconsideration and later filed motions to quash the Informations, arguing they charged multiple offenses and lacked sufficient factual basis. The RTC denied the motions, ruling that the charges involved a single continuous offense. However, upon petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, ruling that the Informations indeed charged more than one offense—specifically, multiple acts constituting distinct violations under the Omnibus Election Code. Consequently, the CA quashed all three Informations, finding grave abuse of discretion by the RTC, and later denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE : whether or not the CA erred in ordering the quashal of the subject Informations on the ground that they charge more than one offense
HELD: An order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, meaning it is not appealable and generally cannot be questioned through a special civil action for certiorari since other remedies remain available, such as proceeding to trial and raising the issue on appeal after final judgment. However, certiorari may be allowed in exceptional circumstances. Unlike an appeal, which addresses errors of judgment, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari focuses only on errors of jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court’s review under Rule 45 is confined to determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly found grave abuse of discretion in the RTC’s interlocutory order. Considering the case’s unique aspects and its prolonged pendency since 2012, the Court deemed it proper to resolve the matter on the merits rather than dismiss it on technical grounds, emphasizing the importance of a speedy resolution.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 should be quashed because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, as premature campaigning is no longer punishable under current law. The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ view that the Informations charged two offenses based on Section 79(1) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. It explained that under Penera v. COMELEC, a person is considered a “candidate” only at the start of the campaign period, and election offenses apply only from that point onward. Therefore, acts done before the campaign period—such as campaigning or soliciting votes—are lawful. Since Section 80 punishes campaigning outside the campaign period but requires a “candidate” for liability to arise, the offense of premature campaigning has effectively been rendered legally impossible to commit. As a result, the Court ordered the quashal of the Informations without needing to determine whether they charged more than one offense.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-11-169067, ruling that it properly charged only one offense. In determining whether an information charges more than one offense, the Court emphasized that what matters is whether the alleged facts constitute the elements of a single crime, not merely the wording used. The case involved alleged violations of Sections 261(cc)(6) and 192 of the Omnibus Election Code — soliciting votes inside a polling place and unlawful presence therein. The Court found that these are mala prohibita offenses, where intent is immaterial, and that when the act of soliciting votes occurs inside the polling place, the unlawful presence becomes part of the same offense. Applying the doctrine of absorption, the Court held that the unlawful presence is an inherent element of unlawful campaigning, as both acts arise from a single criminal impulse and are committed simultaneously. Thus, only one crime was committed — unlawful campaign inside a polling place — and the Information was not duplicitous under Rule 117, Section 3(f) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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