CASE DIGEST : RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and ESTRADA

 G.R. No. 206666               January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,

ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

Facts : On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy. On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558. Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification." In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. 

Issue : WON Estrada Pardon is Conditional thus barring him to run from any elective posisiton.

Held: No, Estrada's Pardon is not Conditional. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

CASE DIGEST : JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEM vs JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.

 G.R. No. 169588               October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. In the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense. In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order. The respondent judge released a Resolution dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WON the action has already prescribed

HELD: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 

CASE DIGEST : GALANG jr vs JUDGE GERONIMO

G.R. No. 192793               February 22, 2011

FESTO R. GALANG, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81; and NICASIO M. RAMOS, Respondents.

FACTS : On May 12, 2010, at 12:37 p.m., petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 8923, granting said request. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence. On June 8, 2010, petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time. On July 12, 2010, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee's Standing in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on July 22, 2010, the trial court issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion. On the other hand, respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.

ISSUE:  WON the petition for certiorari should not be filed with the Supreme Court but with the COMELEC.

HELD : If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.

CASE DIGEST : GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero

 G.R. Nos. 158090               October 4, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,

vs.

HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, Respondents.

FACTS: On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a complaint7 against defendant Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago). In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110 (3538). "In the course of the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal – the exact identity and location thereof. Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the respective titles of the parties. It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff. On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not be done in the case for damages and injunction before it. On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed

HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action

CASE DIGEST : Moskowsky v. CA

 ASTA MOSKOWSKY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO C. DORIA, EDGARDO L. ALCARAZ, AND EVANGELINE E. DORIA, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner herein Asta Moskowsky, a German national, is seeking to recover her investments in an alleged joint venture with private respondents Antonio C. Doria, Edgardo L. Alcaraz, and Evangeline E. Doria. On August 10, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages. On November 16, 1989, after a protracted trial on the merits, the trial rendered a decision  in favor of petitioner. From that decision, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising both factual and legal issues. The Court of Appeals, however, rendered a decision dated May 5, 1995  dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of plaintiff-appellee's (petitioner's) alleged non-payment of docket fees with the additional finding that petitioner can no longer pay the docket fees prescription of the action has already set in

ISSUE: WON the CA is Correct

HELD: utmost circumspection should be exercised by appellate courts in dismissing appeals on grounds which can be readily verified from the records of the case. Litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

 

CASE DIGEST : Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. CA

 G.R. No. 140058            August 1, 2002

MABAYO FARMS, INC., herein represented by its President MRS. RORAIMA SILVA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO SANTOS, respondents

FACTS: On August 22, 1969, the Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino and Severino Vistan, lawful possessors of Lot 1379. In October 1970, petitioner bought the respective portions of Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan, totaling 69,932 square meters and entered into a compromise settlement with six other persons occupying the property, whose applications had been rejected by the Bureau. On December 20, 1991, the trial court decided the land registration case in petitioner’s favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In June 1997, a group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner. On October 9, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction. The trial court issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) and on January 16, 1998, the sheriff served copies on the defendants. On April 14, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and cultivating the disputed property. On February 24, 1999, private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 with the Court of Appeals. On August 27, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 in private respondent’s favor.

ISSUE: WON  private respondent may intervene in the court proceeding

HELD: Private respondent had no duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6695. Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only optional and permissive. For intervention to effect, the movant must have interest in the matter in litigation and the intervention must not unduly delay the said proceeding. The interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. As a stranger to the case, private respondent had neither legal interest in a permanent injunction nor an interest on the damages to be imposed, if any, in Civil Case No. 6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the case

CASE DIGEST : Yau vs Manila Banking Corp

 G.R. No. 126731               July 11, 2002

ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner,

vs.

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION,respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 128623

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.

FACTS: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment at Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On February 11, 1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene9 in both cases pending before Branches 62 and 64 of the RTC of Makati City. In an Order10 dated March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the motion to intervene. Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yau’s motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-271 in an Order dated July 1, 1993.11 Manilabank sought reconsideration12 but Branch 64 denied the same in an Order13 dated August 30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for certiorari14 before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32405. Yau filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion for order directing Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.16 Acting upon the motion, the said court issued an Order dated March 6, 1995. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on May 2, 1995 a petition for certiorari19 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC Cebu City dated March 6, 1995, and amended on March 30, 1995. On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision20 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37085 nullifying the Orders of RTC Cebu City. Subsequently, on January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC Makati City (Branch 64) dated July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.1âwphi1 A Motion for Reconsideration24 of the said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997.25

ISSUE :WON Yau may be permitted to intervene

HELD: A person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment. Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention "before rendition of judgment by the trial court."After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same.