CASE DIGEST : HERMIS CARLOS PEREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 245862, November 03, 2020

FACTS : On April 27, 2016, a complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against former Biñan, Laguna Mayor Hermis C. Perez for Malversation of Public Funds, violations of Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and Sections 37 and 48 of Republic Act No. 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act). The complaint arose from a November 12, 2001 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Municipality of Biñan and Etsaw Consultancy and Construction of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of the Philippines (ECCE) for a ₱71 million solid waste management project. It was alleged that the contract was awarded without competitive public bidding, lacked approval from the proper bids and awards committee, and was granted to ECCE despite its insufficient financial and technical capability, resulting in unwarranted benefits to the private contractor and prejudice to the government.

After preliminary investigation, the OMB found probable cause only for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, holding that Perez acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence by awarding the contract without public bidding and without conducting due diligence on ECCE's qualifications. The other criminal charges and the complaint against ECCE President Victor G. Rojo were dismissed for lack of merit. Following the filing of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on October 5, 2018, Perez moved to quash the Information, arguing that the offense had already prescribed under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, which then prescribed offenses after 15 years, and that his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases had been violated.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, ruling that under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period begins not from the commission of the offense but from its discovery, applying the doctrine of blameless ignorance, since the alleged irregularities were discovered only years after the execution of the MOA. It further held that the filing of the complaint before the OMB interrupted the running of the prescriptive period and that the OMB resolved the preliminary investigation within a reasonable time, thereby rejecting Perez's claim of denial of his right to the speedy disposition of cases. Perez thereafter elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, maintaining that prescription should be reckoned from the execution of the MOA in 2001 or its amendment in 2002, and insisting that only judicial proceedings—not the filing of a complaint before the OMB—could interrupt the running of the prescriptive period.

ISSUE : WON the offense charged against Perez has prescribed; and

                WON Perez's right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.

HELD : The Supreme Court granted Perez's petition, holding that although his motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan was filed beyond the five-day period under the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, a liberal application of procedural rules was warranted because the case involved his liberty and constitutional rights. The Court ruled that the offense charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) remained subject to the 15-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of the law, as the 20-year period introduced by R.A. No. 10910 could not be applied retroactively. Applying Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the Court held that prescription generally begins from the commission of the offense, and the "blameless ignorance" doctrine applies only when the offense could not reasonably have been discovered. Since the MOA and related government disbursements were required to be publicly posted under the Local Government Code (LGC), the alleged irregularities were readily discoverable, making the doctrine inapplicable. Thus, prescription commenced on November 12, 2001, the date the MOA was executed.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed because the filing of the complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) on April 27, 2016 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Citing Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, People v. Pangilinan, and related jurisprudence, the Court explained that although Act No. 3326 refers to the institution of "judicial proceedings," the commencement of a preliminary investigation before the OMB likewise tolls prescription, as it constitutes the initial step in prosecuting the offender. Since the complaint was filed approximately 14 years and five months after the alleged commission of the offense, it was still within the applicable 15-year prescriptive period.

However, the Court found that Perez's constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was violated. Guided by Cagang v. Sandiganbayan and Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, the Court noted that after Perez filed his counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016, the OMB remained inactive for one year, two months, and two days before resolving the preliminary investigation, far beyond the 10-day period contemplated under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution failed to justify the delay by showing that the case was unusually complex or supported by voluminous evidence, relying only on the OMB's heavy caseload, which the Court held was insufficient. The Court also rejected the Sandiganbayan's finding that Perez waived his right by not filing a motion for early resolution, emphasizing that it is the OMB's duty—not the accused's—to promptly resolve complaints.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Perez's motion to quash. While the criminal action had not prescribed, the unjustified and inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation violated Perez's constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases. The Court granted the petition, annulled the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated January 29, 2019 and March 8, 2019, permanently enjoined the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the case, and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-0526.