CASE DIGEST : Calimlim v. Ramirez

 G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982

MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title. On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968 dismissing the petition. The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint. Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC- 180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. A second Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September 29, 197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition

ISSUE: WON the action is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations

HELD: The SC rules that in order to avail the defense of res judicata the decision must be held by a court who has jurisdiction to hear and try the case. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. It is settled that the RTC, acting as a land registration court, has limited jurisdiction. It cannot take on issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action. Issues raised by the petitioner refer to the ownership of the of the property. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate. Also, the petitioner cannot be faulted with laches since it is only 2 years and a half has passed since the dismissal of the petition. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances

CASE DIGEST : Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Migrant Pagbilao Corporation

 G.R. No. 159593             October 12, 2006

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.

MIRANT1 PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.)

FACTS: The CTA partially granted the claim of herein respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) for the refund of the input Value Added Tax (VAT) on its purchase of capital goods and services for the period 1 April 1996 to 31 December 1996, and ordered herein petitioner Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P28,744,626.95. The CTA subsequently denied the BIR Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution,8 dated 31 August 2001. Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated 30 July 2003. It was only after the CTA promulgated its Decision on 11 July 2000, which was favorable to MPC and adverse to the BIR Commissioner, that the latter filed his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 4 October 2000, averring, for the very first time, that MPC was a public utility, subject to franchise tax and not VAT; and since it was not paying VAT, it could not claim the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services. Hence this petition

ISSUE: WON a party can change his theory of the case on appeal.

HELD: The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. Courts cannot relax or suspend rules unless there is compelling reason to do so. Also, it is based on the sound discretion of the court whether such ground is good or sufficient to warrant the relaxation of the rules. The supreme court ruled there is no sufficient cause presented by the BIR in order to warrant the relaxation of the rules.

CASE DIGEST : SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc. and Watsons Personal Care Stores, v. City of Manila

 G.R. No. 197151               October 22, 2012

SM LAND, INC. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC., Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his official capacity as the Chief of License Division of the City of Manila, Respondents

FACTS: On the strength of the provisions of Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which amended Ordinance No. 7794, also known as the Revenue Code of Manila, herein respondent City of Manila assessed herein petitioners, together with their other sister companies, increased rates of business taxes for the year 2003 and the first to third quarters of 2004. Petitioners and their sister companies paid the additional taxes under protest. Subsequently, petitioners and their sister companies claimed with herein respondent City Treasurer of Manila a credit or refund of the increased business taxes which they paid for the period abovementioned. However, the City Treasurer denied their claim. Aggrieved, petitioners and their sister companies filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City a Complaint for Refund and/or Issuance of Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. On July 10, 2007, the RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of herein petitioners. The CTA Second Division sustained the ruling of the RTC that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and void. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CTA Second Division, however, denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc, contending that the CTA Second Division erred in holding that the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended. On December 17, 2010, the CTA En Banc rendered its assailed Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the CTA Second Division. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CTA En Banc in its Resolution. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the 30-day period provided by law within which to appeal decisions of the RTC to the CTA may be extended

HELD: The period to appeal the decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a Petition for Review is specifically governed by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, and Section 3 (a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision that to appeal a decision of the RTC to the CTA the petitioner should file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the adverse decision of the RTC. Following the rules on appeal of the RTC to CTA the original period of 30 days is not extendable except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended period shall not exceed 15 days. Petitioners further contend that the Order of the CTA Second Division granting petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review is invalid, since the case used by the Supreme court is not yet in effect. The Supreme Court does not agree. At the time that the CTA Second Division granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition for review, Republic Act 928215 (RA 9282), which amended certain provisions of RA 1125,16 were already in effect,

CASE DIGEST : Tan, Jr. v. CA

 G.R. No. 136368            January 16, 2002

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, respondents.

 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 19981 and its Resolution dated November 9, 19982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738. The Magdangals appealed to the Supreme Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657. In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, The Supreme Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of Supreme Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision 'has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory. On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION. In opposition to this motion Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION. Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by the respondent judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996. On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory." The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession. They alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13, 1996.9 The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the Rules of Court Should be given retroactive effect

HELD: The Supreme Court held that section 1 Rule 39 should not be given retroactive effect. As a General Rule The rules of court should be given effect. however, It has well-delineated exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous.

CASE DIGEST : VIVARES VS STC

 G.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

vs.

ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

FACTS : Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile. Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress.  , Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC. Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data

ISSUE : whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

HELD : STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is" Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage in cyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up.

CASE DIGEST : GR NO 212448 AAA vs BBB

 G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner

vs.

BBB, Respondent

FACTS: Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. s can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case

RTC that while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Hence This Petition

ISSUE: WON Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

HELD: As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed

CASE DIGEST : JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

 G.R. No. L-15905             August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

FACTS : This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

ISSUE : WON the publication in question is a privileged communication

HELD : Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question

he publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged