FACTS
Sue Ann Bounsit-Torralba filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against her husband, Joseph Torralba, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that Joseph was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. She claimed that throughout their marriage, Joseph was a habitual drunkard, compulsive gambler, womanizer, drug user, and was even involved in drug trafficking. He frequently squandered his earnings on vices, failed to support the family, humiliated her, and abandoned her and their child. The RTC granted the petition after giving weight to the testimony of a psychologist who diagnosed Joseph with Anti-Social Personality Disorder, but the Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Before the Supreme Court, Sue Ann argued not only that Joseph was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code, but also that their marriage was void for lack of a valid marriage license. The marriage certificate itself showed that no marriage license had been issued. She explained that they did not qualify for the exemption under Article 34 of the Family Code, which dispenses with a marriage license only if the parties had lived together as husband and wife continuously for at least five years before the marriage. It was undisputed that they had not cohabited for the required period prior to their wedding. Although the issue of the absence of a marriage license was not squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court considered it in the interest of substantial justice.
ISSUE
Whether the marriage should be declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of Joseph's alleged psychological incapacity, considering the evidence presented regarding his gambling, alcoholism, womanizing, drug use, and irresponsible behavior, as interpreted under the doctrines in Republic v. Molina and the more recent Tan-Andal v. Andal, which clarified that psychological incapacity must be legally—not merely medically—incurable and must render a spouse genuinely incapable of performing essential marital obligations.
Whether the marriage was likewise void ab initio for failure to comply with the essential requirement of a marriage license under Articles 3, 4, and 35(3) of the Family Code, and whether the exemption under Article 34 could apply despite the parties' failure to cohabit as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
HELD
The Supreme Court partly granted the petition. It held that Sue Ann failed to prove psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Applying Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court ruled that although Joseph's vices and immoral conduct demonstrated serious character defects, they did not, by themselves, establish a genuine psychological incapacity that rendered him legally incapable of performing the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist's report merely relied on Sue Ann's narration and lacked independent evidence sufficiently linking Joseph's alleged personality disorder to a grave and incurable incapacity existing at the time of the marriage. Thus, the marriage could not be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the Court declared the marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. It explained that Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code make a marriage license an essential requisite of a valid marriage, while Article 35(3) expressly declares a marriage void if solemnized without one, except in marriages exempted by law. The exemption under Article 34 was inapplicable because the parties admittedly did not live together as husband and wife for at least five years before their marriage. Since the absence of a marriage license was evident from the marriage certificate and established by the evidence, the Court declared the marriage null and void, emphasizing that compliance with the statutory requisites for marriage is
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