CASE DIGEST : GALANG jr vs JUDGE GERONIMO

G.R. No. 192793               February 22, 2011

FESTO R. GALANG, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81; and NICASIO M. RAMOS, Respondents.

FACTS : On May 12, 2010, at 12:37 p.m., petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 8923, granting said request. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence. On June 8, 2010, petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time. On July 12, 2010, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to: (1) Restore Protestee's Standing in Court; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 24, 2010; and (3) Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Falsification Case Before the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on July 22, 2010, the trial court issued the second assailed Order denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion. On the other hand, respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.

ISSUE:  WON the petition for certiorari should not be filed with the Supreme Court but with the COMELEC.

HELD : If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.

CASE DIGEST : GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero

 G.R. Nos. 158090               October 4, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,

vs.

HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, Respondents.

FACTS: On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a complaint7 against defendant Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago). In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110 (3538). "In the course of the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal – the exact identity and location thereof. Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the respective titles of the parties. It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff. On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not be done in the case for damages and injunction before it. On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed

HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action

CASE DIGEST : Moskowsky v. CA

 ASTA MOSKOWSKY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO C. DORIA, EDGARDO L. ALCARAZ, AND EVANGELINE E. DORIA, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner herein Asta Moskowsky, a German national, is seeking to recover her investments in an alleged joint venture with private respondents Antonio C. Doria, Edgardo L. Alcaraz, and Evangeline E. Doria. On August 10, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages. On November 16, 1989, after a protracted trial on the merits, the trial rendered a decision  in favor of petitioner. From that decision, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising both factual and legal issues. The Court of Appeals, however, rendered a decision dated May 5, 1995  dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of plaintiff-appellee's (petitioner's) alleged non-payment of docket fees with the additional finding that petitioner can no longer pay the docket fees prescription of the action has already set in

ISSUE: WON the CA is Correct

HELD: utmost circumspection should be exercised by appellate courts in dismissing appeals on grounds which can be readily verified from the records of the case. Litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

 

CASE DIGEST : Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. CA

 G.R. No. 140058            August 1, 2002

MABAYO FARMS, INC., herein represented by its President MRS. RORAIMA SILVA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO SANTOS, respondents

FACTS: On August 22, 1969, the Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino and Severino Vistan, lawful possessors of Lot 1379. In October 1970, petitioner bought the respective portions of Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan, totaling 69,932 square meters and entered into a compromise settlement with six other persons occupying the property, whose applications had been rejected by the Bureau. On December 20, 1991, the trial court decided the land registration case in petitioner’s favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In June 1997, a group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner. On October 9, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction. The trial court issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) and on January 16, 1998, the sheriff served copies on the defendants. On April 14, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and cultivating the disputed property. On February 24, 1999, private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 with the Court of Appeals. On August 27, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 in private respondent’s favor.

ISSUE: WON  private respondent may intervene in the court proceeding

HELD: Private respondent had no duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6695. Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only optional and permissive. For intervention to effect, the movant must have interest in the matter in litigation and the intervention must not unduly delay the said proceeding. The interest, which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. As a stranger to the case, private respondent had neither legal interest in a permanent injunction nor an interest on the damages to be imposed, if any, in Civil Case No. 6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the case

CASE DIGEST : Yau vs Manila Banking Corp

 G.R. No. 126731               July 11, 2002

ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner,

vs.

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION,respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 128623

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, respondents.

FACTS: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment at Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On February 11, 1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene9 in both cases pending before Branches 62 and 64 of the RTC of Makati City. In an Order10 dated March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the motion to intervene. Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yau’s motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-271 in an Order dated July 1, 1993.11 Manilabank sought reconsideration12 but Branch 64 denied the same in an Order13 dated August 30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for certiorari14 before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32405. Yau filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion for order directing Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.16 Acting upon the motion, the said court issued an Order dated March 6, 1995. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on May 2, 1995 a petition for certiorari19 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC Cebu City dated March 6, 1995, and amended on March 30, 1995. On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision20 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37085 nullifying the Orders of RTC Cebu City. Subsequently, on January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC Makati City (Branch 64) dated July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.1âwphi1 A Motion for Reconsideration24 of the said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997.25

ISSUE :WON Yau may be permitted to intervene

HELD: A person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment. Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention "before rendition of judgment by the trial court."After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same.

CASE DIGEST : Saw v. CA

 G.R. No. 90580             April 8, 1991

RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE AND EVELYN SAW, petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, Presiding Judge of Branch 43, (Regional Trial Court of Manila), FREEMAN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, FREEMAN INCORPORATED, SAW CHIAO LIAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROSALIO G. SIGUA, respondents.

FACTS: A collection suit with preliminary attachment was filed by Equitable Banking Corporation against Freeman, Inc. and Saw Chiao Lian, its President and General Manager. The petitioners moved to intervene. Meanwhile, Equitable and Saw Chiao Lian entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to and was app roved by the lower court. The Court of Appeals1 sustained the denial of the petitioners' motion for intervention.  It also ruled against the petitioners' argument that because they had already filed a notice of appeal, the trial judge had lost jurisdiction over the case and could no longer issue the writ of execution.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner cannot intervene and did not divest the RTC its jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Intervention is "an act or proceeding by which a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, and which results merely in the addition of a new party or parties to an original action, for the purpose of hearing and determining at the same time all conflicting claims which may be made to the subject matter in litigation”. It is not an independent proceeding, but an ancillary and supplemental one which, in the nature of things, unless otherwise provided for by the statute or Rules of Court, must be in subordination to the main proceeding. The Court observes that even with the denial of the petitioners' motion to intervene, nothing is really lost to them. The denial did not necessarily prejudice them as their rights are being litigated in the case now before the Securities and Exchange Commission and may be fully asserted and protected in that separate proceeding

CASE DIGEST : Agulto v. Tecson

 G.R. No. 145276 November 29, 2005

ROLANDO AGULTO, MAXIMA AGULTO and CECILLE TENORIO, Petitioners,

vs.

WILLIAM Z. TECSON, Respondent.

FACTS: On August 25, 1997, the respondent William Z. Tecson filed an action for damages against petitioners Rolando Agulto, Maxima Agulto, Cecille Tenoria and a certain Maribel Mallari in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 79. The petitioners and Mallari filed their answer on October 29, 1997. They claimed that the respondent had no cause of action against them, alleging malicious prosecution. On November 19, 1998, the RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Respondent filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. On December 2, 1998, the RTC ordered the revival of the complaint. During the scheduled pre-trial on April 29, 1999, petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. The counsel for petitioners suggested that the pre-trial be reset to June 17, 1999. The RTC employee advised petitioner’s counsel that the suggested setting was not yet official as it would depend on the calendar of the court and the counsel of respondent. The pre-trial proceeded on June 17, 1999. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and to submit their pre-trial brief, the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his evidence ex parte. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 17, 1999 order of the RTC. They claimed that they were not notified of the pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Before the motion could be heard, however, the court rendered its July 12, 1999 decision in favor of respondent. After receiving a copy of the decision on July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their July 28, 1999 motions to cite respondent’s counsel in contempt of court and to set the decision aside. On September 24, 1999, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CA. On September 27, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition

ISSUE: WON the RTC is correct in rejecting and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration

HELD: the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. It does not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. Thus, sending a notice of pre-trial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. Here, no notice of pre-trial was served on counsel of petitioners in connection with the pre-trial held on June 17, 1999. Hence, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued its June 17, 1999 order allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte.