CASE DIGEST : LAGUMBAY VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-25444             January 31, 1966

WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner, 

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO, respondents.

FACTS : This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.

The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1 we issued on December 24, 1965, a short resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty precincts. It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first set, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.

ISSUE WON FRAUD WAS COMMITED IN THE ELECTION

HELD : The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned. These returns were obviously false or fabricated — prima facie. Let us take for example, precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered voters. According to such return all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each,3 and the eight Nacionalista candidates got exactly zero. We hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability of such a result — against statistical probabilities — specially because at least one vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not like his party's senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it is not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election therein — if any — was no more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen contempt of the popular polls.

Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally settled — by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.

At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.4 All we hold now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco — in the corresponding election protest.

The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has spread among candidates for public office that the "important thing" is the proclamation; and to win it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering or the "manufacture" of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let the victimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money to work for an empty triumph.

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all previous elections. Never was the point pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way, modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs. Commission decision, we feel the mores of the day require application — even extension — of the principle in the Mitchell decision, which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blow at such pernicious "grab - the - proclamation - prolong - the - protest" slogan of some candidates or parties.

It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite "possible", bearing in mind the religious or political control of some leaders in the localities affected. We say, possible, not probable. It is possible to win the sweepstakes ten times; but not probable. Anyway, judges are not disposed to believe that such "control" has proved so powerful as to convert the electors into mere sheep or robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience refuse to believe that 100% of the voters in such precincts abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to choose the senators of this Republic.

Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether courts could, consistently with morality and public policy,5 render judgment acknowledging such "control" or validating such "controlled votes" as candidate Climaco chose to call them.

CASE DIGEST : OLFATO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52749 March 31, 1981

SOTERO OLFATO, MAURO V. BARADAS, CIRIACO L. PADILLA, MANUEL S. GONZALES, CECILIO F. HERNANDEZ LUCIO P. MENDOZA, JR., BENEDICTO C. MAGSINO, and BIENVENIDO P. TRINIDAD, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO E. LIRIO, respondents.

FACTS : In the local elections held last January 30, 1980, petitioner Sotero Olfato was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Mayor of Tanauan, Batangas. The other petitioners were the official NP candidates for Members, Sangguniang Bayan, in the same municipality. Respondent Francisco E. Lirio, on the other hand, was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for mayor of said town.

In the canvass of votes cast in Tanauan, Batangas by the Tanauan Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner Olfato and respondent Lirio obtained the following votes:

Sotero Olfato.....................................   15,293

Francisco E. Lirio..............................       13,714

On the basis of the results of its canvass of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanauan, Batangas, proclaimed on February 5, 1980 petitioner Olfato and the rest of the petitioners as the duly elected Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan,

On February 6, 1980, petitioners took their oaths of office as Mayor and as Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, before Notary Public Roberto P. Laurel.

Earlier, on February 2, 1980 or three (3) days before petitioners were proclaimed, respondent Lirio, together with the candidates on his ticket for Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, filed with respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation of "Winning candidates" for the elective positions of Tanauan, which was docketed as Pre-proclamation Case No. 118,

Thus, in said petition, Lirio alleged that around 3,000 fake voters using forms allegedly misinterpreting paragraph 2 of Section 13 of Resolution No. 1410 of the COMELEC

Consequently, respondent urged for the suspension of the canvass of election returns prior to the identification and the segregation of the alleged fake ballots from the genuine ballots. Hence, Lirio prayed inter alia that an order be issued for the suspension of the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of "winning candidates" for the positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors of Tanauan, Batangas;

On February 13, 1980, respondent Commission issued Minute Resolution No. 9092 in P. P. Case No. 118, suspending the effects of the proclamation of herein petitioners as duly elected Mayor and Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas

On February 15, 1980, respondent Lirio filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas an election protest ex abundante ad cautela against petitioner Olfato

Hence, in view of the promulgation by respondent Commission of Minute Resolution No. 9119, herein petitioners filed with respondent Commission on February 18, 1980, an urgent motion for reconsideration of Minute Resolution No. 9092

On February 23, 1980, after the lapse of the five (5) day period within which therein respondents (petitioners herein) were required to answer as per Resolution No. 9092, and after their failure to do so, respondent Commission, in a telegram-notice dated February 23, 1980, to respondent Lirio's counsel, granted the prayer in the opposition to the motion for reconsideration when it set the case "FOR HEARING ON 5 MARCH 1980 AT 10:00 A.M. AT THE SESSION HALL COMELEC MANILA."

On February 27, 1980, Guillermo L. Roxas and Melquiades Salisi, NP candidates for Vice Mayor and Member, Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, were proclaimed as duly elected officials in their respective positions. On February 28, 1980, they took their oaths of office.

On February 28, 1980, this Court in a resolution required respondents to comment and not to file a motion to dismiss within ten (10) days from notice

On February 29, 1980, petitioner Olfato filed with respondent Commission an opposition to respondent Lirio's urgent motion for reconsideration

On March 3, 1980, petitioners assumed their respective offices pursuant to Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52. On March 12, 1980, respondent Commission adopted, approved and promulgated Minute Resolution No. 9558

RESOLVED AS IT HEREBY RESOLVES to dismiss the petition and to reinstate the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in favor of the respondent and his entire ticket, without prejudice to other legal remedies under the Election Code of 1978, including the prosecution of the Criminal offenses, if warranted.

On March 21, 1980, petitioners filed with this Court the instant amended petition seeking to review and set aside Minute Resolution No. 9558, adopted by respondent Commission on March 12,

ISSUE : WON the Comelec erred in adopting MInute resolution 9558

HELD :  It is therefore clear from the above-quoted provisions that Section 172 speaks of material defects in the election returns, Section 173 speaks of tampered, altered or falsified returns and Section 174 speaks of discrepancies of election returns.

this Court empowered the Commission on Elections to nullify certain contested returns on the ground of "statistical improbabilities", when WE sustained the authority of the Commission to examine voting records, the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate, when the returns are obviously false or fabricated. In said case, WE, adopted "a practical approach to the Commissions mission to insure a free and honest elections" by denying prima facie recognition to the election returns on the ground that they were manifestly manufactured or falsified.

Thus, this Court concluded that where all the evidence and circumstances point to a systematic plan of allowing persons who were not registered voters to cast their ballots in all the precincts of a certain municipality and to count such spurious ballots and take them into account in the returns, there is no alternative but to consider said returns as deliberately prepared with a view to alter the true results of the voting, through either malice or coercion. The returns thereby become false or falsified.

Thus, it becomes clear from the above rulings that respondent Commission on Elections has the power and authority to inquire into the allegation of fake voters, with fake Ids Identification slips in a pre-proclamation controversy in order to determine the authenticity or integrity of the election returns or whether such election returns faithfully record that only registered or genuine electors were allowed to vote

Section 175 (first sentence) of the 1978 Election Code explicitly provides that "the Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory" (emphasis supplied)

The law says "all," and therefore covers all pre-proclamation tion controversies involving national, provincial, city and municipal elective officials. The law does not distinguish nor contain qualifications. To give a strict interpretation of Section 175 (second sentence) of the 1978 Election Code would be to limit the grounds in pre-proclamation controversies to matters purely affecting election returns. WE believe that to revert to the old doctrine prohibiting the Comelec from looking behind the election returns as to the existence of election irregularities is not consistent with the very purpose of the law.

Hence, once there is a prima facie showing of the commission of other election irregularities which will ultimately be reflected in the election returns, the Comelec should in a pre- proclamation controversy, with due observance of due process of course, be also authorized to suspend canvass, Suspend or annul a proclamation of a candidate-elect, for it smacks of absurdity to proscribe the commission of one kind of irregularity and yet countenance another kind of irregularity, when both irregularities make a mockery of suffrage.

It must be observed further, that there is no plausible reason to prohibit an aggrived candidate from filing an objection regarding the election returns directly, before the Comelec itself if the election irregularities that vitiate the integrity of the election returns are not apparent upon their faces. The reason is obvious — "the board of canvassers exists for a specific function — that is, to canvass the result of the elec- tion as shown in the election returns and to proclaim the winning candidates. Once this specific function had been perform- ed the existence of the board of canvassers is ended or terminated

CASE DIGEST : BETERINA VS COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 95347-49 January 6, 1992

SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CANDIDO BALBIN, GUILLERMO BALLESTEROS, NATHANIEL ESCOBAR, BENJAMIN GALAPIA, LEONARDO ROLDAN, FILEMON SISON, ERWIN REYES-ULEP, EVELYN VALDEZ, OCTAVIO VILLANUEVA, COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT OF ILOCOS SUR, AND LAKAS NG BANSA, petitioners, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EVARISTO "TITONG" SINGSON, CARIDAD ALCANTARA, MARIANO TAJON, WINSTON AGUIRRE, HEREDIO BELLO, BENJAMIN BUGARIN, TERESITA CORDERO, JOSE DIVINA, RODOLFO GALIMA, DEOGRACIAS VICTOR SAVELLANO, VICTOR VILORIA and AND THE PROVINCIAL BOARD CANVASSERS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondents.

Facts : Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina was a candidate for Governor of Ilocos Sur in the special local elections held on 25 January 1988. The other petitioners, Octavio Villanueva and Evelyn Valdez, Felimon Sison, Leonardo Roldan, Gil Ballesteros, Benjamin Galapia, Erwin Reyes-Ulep, and Nathaniel Escobar, were candidates for Vice Governor and Provincial Board Members, respectively, in the same local elections. Petitioners ran under the banner of the Lakas ng Bansa. Private respondent Evaristo Singson, on the other hand, was also a candidate for Governor of Ilocos Sur. Private respondent Mariano Tajon was a candidate for Vice Governor. The rest of the private respondents were candidates for the other disputed positions.

In the course of the canvass proceedings, verbal objections were raised by petitioners to certain election returns based on the grounds mentioned in Sections 233 (lost or destroyed election returns), 234 (material defects in the election returns), 235 (tampered or falsified election returns) and 236 (discrepancies in election returns), in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt and custody of the election returns. The objections were aimed at excluding the election returns from the canvass.

The BOARD, in several Resolutions dated 29, 30 and 31 January 1988, denied the objections and protests of petitioners mainly on the ground that the alleged defects of the election returns were merely formal and did not affect their authenticy, validity and genuineness as to warrant their exclusion from the canvass. Petitioners filed with the BOARD notices of appeal from its rulings.

On 30 January 1988, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a "Petition Contesting the Legality of the Proceedings of the Board of Canvassers with Motion to Restrain Canvassing and Proclamation and/or Suspend the Effects of any Proclamation," docketed as SPC No. 88-453 and assigned to the First Division (Suspension of Proclamation Case). The Petition sought the suspension of the canvassing and proclamation of any winning candidate.

On 31 January 1988 the BOARD issued the "Certification of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices, January 18, 1988 Elections," proclaiming respondents Evaristo C. Singson as the duly elected Governor of Ilocos Sur, Mariano M. Tajon as Vice Governor and the others as Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province.

On 23 March 1985, the First Division of the COMELEC issued a Minute Resolution dismissing the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453) filed on 30 January 1988, on the ground that the winning candidates had already been proclaimed on "21 January 1988" (should be 31 January 1988). It advised the petitioners to file instead an election protest with the COMELEC if desired

Petitioners appealed the dismissal of the Petition alleging error in that the proclamation was made on 31 January 1988, not 21 January, as stated in the First Division Resolution. Petitioners also alleged that the First Division failed to consider the other petition filed by them in the same SPC No. 88-453, dated 9 February 1988, thereby effectively dismissing said petition without notice and hearing in violation of Sections 242 and 246 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On 5 June 1989, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a decision in SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506 (Rollo, p. 124) dismissing petitioners' "Appeal" and "Appeal Memorandum" on the ground that no substantial objection had been raised against the election returns in accordance with Sections 233-236 and Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On 10 June 1989, petitioners appealed the Decision of the Second Division (in SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506) to the COMELEC en banc. On 6 September 1990, that body issued a per curiam Resolution, in SPC Nos. 88-453, 58-490, and 88-506, dismissing petitioners' appeals from the rulings rendered by its First and Second Divisions on the ground that no genuine pre-proclamation controversies had been raised by petitioners.

That dismissal prompted petitioners to avail of these Certiorari proceedings.

ISSUE : WON the COMELEC be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of the Suspension of Proclamation Case (SPC No. 88-453) and of petittoners' "Appeals" (SPC Nos. 88-490 and 88-506) ordered by its First and Second Divisions respectively

HELD : The Court thinks not. The Suspension of Proclamation Case, filed on 30 January, 1988 (SPC No. 88-453), was dismissed by the First Division considering "that the winning candidates have been proclaimed on January 21, 1988"

The grounds raised by petitioners for the exclusion of the election returns from the canvassing, as stated in their "Appeal Memorandum" before the COMELEC (Rollo, p. 92), refer to the failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors; lack of inner and outer paper seals; canvassing by the BOARD of copies not intended for it; lack of time and date of receipt by the BOARD of election returns; lack of signatures of petitioners' watchers; and lack of authority of the person receiving the election returns.

While the aforesaid grounds may, indeed, involve a violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their exclusion from the canvassing. The grounds for objection to the election returns made by petitioners are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious. "A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof" (Estrada v. Navarro, L-28340, 29 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1514). It is only when the election returns are palpably irregular that they may be rejected (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-28517, 21 February 1968, 22 SCRA 662). On the basis of formal defects alone, such palpable irregularity can not be said to have been established herein.

The foregoing provision negates the contention that an election return is spurious owing to the failure of a watcher to affix his signature. Under this provision, a watcher signs the election returns only if he is available. If he is not, or is unwilling, or refuses to sign them, any other watcher present may be required to sign. In this case, the signature of any watcher present is not even a mandatory requirement as can be gleaned from the text of the provision. In other words, while the signing of an election return by a watcher is a measure intended to discourage the preparation of falsified returns, the absence of said signature does not give rise to a presumption that the election returns are manufactured or spurious and should consequently be excluded in the canvass. Otherwise, a party's watcher can easily cause the nullification of election returns reflecting results unfavorable to the candidate he is representing by simply refusing to sign the returns.

In fine, the BOARD correctly included the contested election returns in the canvass as they did not suffer from any serious infirmities affecting their integrity. It is the "ministerial function of a board of canvassers to count the results as they appear in the returns which on their face does not reveal any irregularities nor falsities" (Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, L-28396, 29 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1462).

Petitioners also assail the dismissal of their petitions by the COMELEC without hearing. Suffice it to cite the ruling in Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, (L-31446, 23 January 1970, 31 SCRA 72) that "canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie case backed up by a specific offer of the evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation leading to a vacuum in an important office could easily be brought about." In their case before us, the petitions and appeals filed by petitioners in their pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC did not even point prima facie to a tampering of election returns, nor to returns with patent erasures and superimpositions, but merely raised objections based on defects that are, at best, formal in nature. The COMELEC, therefore, did not gravely abuse its discretion in concluding that in the absence of genuine pre-proclamation issues a full-blown hearing was rendered unnecessary.

CASED DIGEST : PIMENTEL VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 178413             March 13, 2008

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner, 

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI, respondents.

Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.

Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao)

Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs.

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. In the proceedings before the NBC, Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass

Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri

In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.

After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by all the parties before this Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition

ISSUE

HELD : A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:

SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections, pre-proclamation controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of election returns and certificates of canvass

Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.

According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the PCOC to the NBC.

Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due execution had been determined by the NBC in accordance with the criteria provided by the law.

This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he has not established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property right which he cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and settle them for him.

Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce an additional exception to the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators, this Court has already established in the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. The provisions in question did not materially change the nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still remain summary and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the new term of office

CASE DIGEST : VITANGCOL VS NEW VISTAS PROPERTIES

[G.R. NO. 176014 : September 17, 2009]

ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners, v. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS : Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1702 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (25311) 2528 of the Calamba, Laguna Registry in the name of Maria A. Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros

On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property described in the SPA as located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with Lot No. 1735 consisting of 242,540 square meters more or less. Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed on August 9, 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square meters situated in Calamba, Laguna.

Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers. he controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered into on August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit. Consequent to the Vitangcol-Maria Alipit sale, TCT No. (25311) 2528 was canceled and TCT No. T-482731 issued in its stead in favor of Vitangcol on August 15, 2001.

Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. By Order of November 25, 2003, the trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint[10] sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein that after the purchase and compliance with its legal obligations relative thereto, New Vista was immediately placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold to Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice

On August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the December 21, 2004 RTC Order

ISSUE : WON THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE TWELFTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER CHALLENGE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW

HELD : The Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It contains three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect that right; and (3) a breach of the defendants duty.[19] It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a right to file an action in court for recovery of damages or other relief.[20].

Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.[22] However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded;[23] allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true;[24] and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.[25]

CASE DIGEST : SINGSON VS ISABELLA SAWMILL

G.R. No. L-27343 February 28, 1979

MANUEL G. SINGSONG, JOSE BELZUNCE, AGUSTIN E. TONSAY, JOSE L. ESPINOS, BACOLOD SOUTHERN LUMBER YARD, and OPPEN, ESTEBAN, INC., plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
ISABELA SAWMILL, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO LEON GARIBAY, TIMOTEO TUBUNGBANUA, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendants, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS : This is an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cage No. 5343, entitled "Manuel G. Singson, et all vs. Isabela Sawmill, et al.,". In a resolution promulgated on February 3, 1967, the Court of Appeals certified the records of this case to the Supreme Court "considering that the resolution of this appeal involves purely questions or question of law over which this Court has no jurisdiction. On June 5. 1959, Manuel G. Singsong, Jose Belzunce, Agustin E. Tonsay, Jose L. Espinos, Bacolod Southern Lumber Yard, and Oppen, Esteban, Inc. filed in the Court of first Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, against "Isabela Sawmill", Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, Leon Garibay, Timoteo Tubungbanua and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a complaint. Said defendants interposed a cross-claim against the defendsants Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua praying "that in the event that judgment be rendered ordering defendant cross claimant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount claimed in the latter's complaint, that the cross claimant whatever amount is paid by the latter to the plaintiff in accordance to the said judgment. ...5. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendants, Margarita G. Saldajeno and her husband Cecilio Saldajeno, appealed to the Court of Appeals

ISSUE : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD : The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in so far as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of litigation, is defined in the amended Judiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any case the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. An action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to th category.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the cliam is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiciton is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject ogf the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

On the question of whether a court may nullify a final judgment of another court of co-equal, concurrent and coordinate jusridiction, this Court originally ruled that:

A court has no power to interfere with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and cannot be allowed to interfere with each others' judgments or decrees.

In December 1971, however, this court re-examined and reversed its earlier doctrine on the matter. Our conclusion must therefore be that a court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, suit to annul final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court... n the light of the latest ruling of the Supreme Court, there is no doubt that one branch of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental can take cognizance of an action to nullify a final judgment of the other two branches of the same court

The contention of the appellant that the appleees cannot bring an action to annul the chattel mortgage of the propertiesof the partnership executed by Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua in favor of Margarita G. Saldajeno has no merit.

As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party thereto. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may file an action to annul the contract. This Court has held that a person, who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract, may exercised an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he has no intervention.

CASE DIGEST : UNGRIA VS CA

[G.R. No. 165777 : July 25, 2011] 

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, AND RHODORA R. PELOMIDA AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB, RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, AND ROSALIE CASTOR BENEDICTO, RESPONDENTS

FACTS : Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint[3] for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to DismissPetitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss[5] raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which the RTC denied in an Order[9] dated February 4, 2000. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10] asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint. In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.

In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petitionPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE : WON APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES

HELD : we find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.[23] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated

SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee

However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[30] we laid down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1.     It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.     The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.     Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[33] Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.[34] In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.