CASE DIGEST : People of the Philippine Islands v. Ignacio Nabong G.R. No. 36426, November 3, 1932
Facts
Ignacio Nabong, a practicing lawyer in Nueva Ecija, was charged with sedition under Section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, after making speeches and encouraging members of the communist movement to display the red flag during a memorial gathering for communist leader Antonio Ora. Prior to the meeting, Constabulary officers requested Nabong to persuade the organizers not to display the flag, explaining that it was considered unlawful. Nabong refused, insisting that no law prohibited its display and even stated that he would encourage the communists to raise it.
During the gathering, the red flag was displayed despite earlier assurances by the communist leader Juan Feleo that it would not be. When Constabulary officers arrested Feleo for his allegedly seditious speech, disorder ensued. Nabong then addressed the crowd, uttering statements urging the people to oppose and overthrow the authorities. The trial court found that his words tended to incite resistance against the Government and convicted him of sedition, imposing a fine. Nabong appealed, arguing that his statements were protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech under the Jones Law.
Issue
Whether Nabong's speeches and encouragement to the crowd constituted sedition under Section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, and whether his statements were protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech under the Jones Law.
Held
The Supreme Court affirmed Nabong's conviction. It held that his speeches were clearly seditious because they tended to incite the people to resist lawful authorities, encourage the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means, and disturb public peace. Under Section 8 of Act No. 292, sedition punishes not only actual public disturbances but also speeches and acts that encourage or incite rebellion, violence, or resistance against the Government. The Court emphasized that it is not necessary that the seditious words actually result in an uprising; it is sufficient that they naturally tend to endanger public order and incite unlawful action. In support of this principle, the Court cited Gitlow v. New York, recognizing that utterances advocating violent resistance may be punished because of the danger they pose to the security of the State.
The Court further ruled that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech under the Jones Law does not protect speech that constitutes an abuse of that right. Freedom of expression is not absolute and does not include language intended to incite violence, disorder, or the unlawful overthrow of the Government. Considering Nabong's status as a lawyer, the Court held that he had a greater duty to uphold the law rather than encourage sedition. It thus modified the penalty by imposing six (6) months' imprisonment in addition to the ₱200 fine, noting that the Revised Penal Code, which later penalized sedition under Articles 139 and 142, did not provide a lighter penalty that could benefit the accused.

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